Flydubai Flight 981

Can anyone further comment that has better knowledge of duty and rest rules for FlyDubai?

https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydubai-pilots-fatigue-crash/
As far as I heard they stretch it really to the max, no difference between Flydubai and the "big sister EK". A couple of ex colleagues are currently in the sand pit, it seems they are running out of captains. I was thinking about the gig because of the possibility to move smooth to EK. Thx god things developed somehow different. There are 2 or 3 FDB Skippers on pprune. Reading their posts makes me think about the ME Airlines company culture.

For the love of god!!! The 2 hours holding is standard FDB operations. We are routinely sent to somewhere we knew we couldn't get into with little prospect of being able to get into it with boatloads of fuel and told give it a go. If you didn't then you came under the scrutiny of the chief pilot who had a penchant for bullying crew and making careers untenable.

9/10 times we would do just that fly 3/4/5hrs get their hold have a look try again if necessary and more times that not we would divert.

The route they were flying was not one that more senior pilots would ever pick as it is known for crap weather, is captain only landing and its dark o'clock. It was just one of those places that you hoped to not get on your roster and if you did and if you couldn't swap it then you hoped you had one of those nights where there was a break in the crap weather and you could get in. If not you rocked up with extra stuff as you knew you could easily end up in a hotel.

FDB heap commercial pressure on crews way past the normal anyone else but if you have your family stuck in the middle east you have a choice do what they ask be it carry lithium batteries, operate outside of FTLs, ignore assaults on crew etc or loose your job and possibly your career.

It wasn't that we didn't know that but most of us just took the money and hoped to not be the crew of FZ981 before we got either enough money/hours/experience in LHS, etc to move to somewhere else.

The chief pilots favourite saying is "if you don't like it leave!" it was his solution to every problem given and the culture of fear has eroded the culture of safety to such an extent that most pilots were unlikely torpor anything but the most serious incidents as they knew they were simply raising their heads above the parapet.

Re the numerous posts from experts on here who have not operated in the Middle east, who have not flown in Russian airspace and who do not know anything about HGS/HUD ops suggest you use the two ears more than the one mouth and though of course you are interested but your conjecture does nothing to help do anything other than muddy the waters.

FDB never ever do coupled approaches. All CAT3a, CAT2 and CAT1 are manually flown to the ground. All low vis is hand flown. All low vis is hand flown on the HGS. All approaches in Russia are flown on QNH we have LIDO tables with a conversion table on EVRY Plate.

If you find a pilot in FZ unfamiliar with flying in metres and getting wind in metres per second then they are very very new indeed. There would have been little to no confusion in the crews mind about altimeter settings, when to set or change and wind in mps as it is an almost every day occurrence in Russia and we have/had 18 routes to Russia which is pretty significant.

What happened, I have a guess the same as any other pilot and more so with other 737 pilots and even more so with 737NG pilots. The factors are facts and everything else at this stage is clearly conjecture. Did they make and error in the GA, was their catastrophic failure of something or other, was it an act of god? That will all come out pretty soon.

What isn't conjecture however is that colleagues are dead and the weather was crap on departure, estimated to be crap at ETA, estimated to be crap until way past the point of full tanks and they left with the FDB standard cunning plan of well maybe it will be okay. If you want a fact it is that not many airlines would consider that normal they would simply wait at base until it was at least predicted to be likely and then leave.

FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.

So yes whilst of course factors such as starting a new job etc would have been a factor the reality is FDB take 7 days minimum to sort your visa out when you leave and frequently take longer because we the crew do not matter, were not humans are simply slaves to be abused at their whim so why would looking after us or our families matter. So yes these factors exist but lets be honest we have all heard the tape. They called the GA and did it so the why were they there and why wait so long is simple, that is what NCC demanded they do. Why because the Chief Pilot lets them do whatever they please and refuses to exert any control over what is directly his area of responsibility because nothing is important except his pay check.

I hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.

It seems like their CP is a somehow a very special person.....
 
FO's schedule. Damn look at the night shifts and immediate transition to early morning shifts. And only 8 days off total.

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At least they're trying! :)

Still trying to figure out why a FBW aircraft has a trim switch though...
Ask Dassault why they put a trim disconnect in a fbw airplane... haha

Might be along the same lines..

Sent from my SM-G900V using Tapatalk
 
Ask Dassault why they put a trim disconnect in a fbw airplane... haha

Pretty sure the trim disconnect switch is attached to the motor actuating the trim, not the control cable (or computer system) connecting the yoke to the actuator.
 
https://www.theguardian.com/busines...n-dangerous-fatigue-leaked-documents-flydubai

574 DXB-BGW
Dubai to Baghdad, Iraq


When we arrived at the a/c, the engineer was in the flight deck, and he said that he needed a few minutes to complete his checks. I asked him if the a/c needed a daily check, and he told me that he was doing it at that time. I asked him if he was alone and how much time he needed cause the flight was already delayed. He said that he was alone and needed about 25 minutes!!! When i spoke to Maintrol office, i asked the shift supervisor of how much time is needed for a daily check to be completed, and he told me about 1:30 hours for 1 man.

If the engineers are 2 or 3, half of that time or even less. So i questioned him how 1 engineer will perform a daily check and a turn around alone, in 25 minutes on our a/c. He said he will call us back.

Then the engineer came back to the flight deck and told us that he will not perform the daily check after all and they will push it for later on that day.

So, if i wasn’t questioning the maintrol, the engineer would have signed an incomplete daily check for our aircraft???

XXXXX
Beirut, Lebanon, to Dubai


Safety Concern

There is a genuine safety concern regarding xxxxx. Over a period of approximately four years there has been four or five rostered duties with the concerned crew member. In summary, it has been witnessed that the crew member displays little or no situational awareness, limited operational understanding, has a tendency to become agitated or inflamed when prompted or asked to act on a parameter and makes excuses and places blame on others when mistakes are made. The crew members’ overall performance during the past rostered duties has been blemished with numerous operational and handling blunders which required immediate intervention to prevent a situation becoming worse.

It is not possible to document every possible event as no record was kept. However with each duty with the mentioned xxxxx, constant supervision is required to ensure flight safety.

On one duty returning from Moscow whilst approaching position SAV the senior was summoned to the flight deck to allow a short toilet break and to make a fresh coffee. Upon returning to the flight deck I witnessed the xxxxx did not have their headset on, nor were the speakers switched on. Contact was made immediately with Tehran ATC. During the time the xxxxx did not have the headset placed on, Tehran ATC had been attempting numerous times to contact the aircraft. The xxxxx apologised and remarked that Tehran ATC were not truthful that numerous attempts had been made to contact the aircraft. Recent events highlighted some worrying behaviour. Upon decent into Dubai (OMDW), clearance was given to descend to 9000 ft. Upon levelling out, the airspeed was 260 knots. The xxxxx was prompted to slow the speed down to 250 knots. The reply was along the lines of “250 knots is only a recommendation, the limitation is only 5000 ft”.

After an ill-timed and uncomfortable exchange, the xxxxx begrudgingly reduced the speed to 250 knots. On final approach into Dubai, tower instructed that after landing vacate at V6. Auto brakes 3 was then selected to allow for the best chance to make the rapid exit.

Upon landing the xxxxx applied excessive braking, to the extent which would cause passenger anxiety. “I have control” was commanded twice before a more aggressive tone had to be used for the xxxxx to completely relinquish control. The braking by the xxxxx was excessive and unnecessary. Deadheading crew remarked after landing that the deceleration was quite uncomfortable.


Interesting read. I wonder if this is also the case at the "big sister" EK.
 
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