Feds & ALPA questioning RJ pilots training & supervision

Man....the media is crucifying Pinnacle.

"Safety investigators were interested in finding out how much the fast-growing company knew about its pilots -- and why it had changed its training and procedures since the accident."

"The Federal Aviation Administration has also asked Pinnacle to require more experience of its pilots."

I wonder what effect this is having on Gulfstream?

From ALPA, "Carriers like Pinnacle must provide comprehensive operational training to compensate for this lack of hands-on experience and to better prepare its pilots for the transition to jet aircraft,"

How about this...Give low time pilots without jet time a lot more IOE and some jumpseat observation time. Say, 50 hours and 50 landings, of formal IOE, preceeded by 50 hours in the jumpseat and a requirement to experience 90% of the airports served by that pilots crew base. Define low time as less than 1500 total.

"...the company believed it was extremely improbable that two jet engines would fail."

I think I've seen loss of all engines about every other year in the sim. Thought it was an FAA requirement. Guess not...
 
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How about this...Give low time pilots without jet time a lot more IOE and some jumpseat observation time. Say, 50 hours and 50 landings, of formal IOE, preceeded by 50 hours in the jumpseat and a requirement to experience 90% of the airports served by that pilots crew base. Define low time as less than 1500 total.

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Sounds good to me. I would also add more LOFT training in the sim to make IOE more beneficial from the very first day. I also agree with kingairer that any minimums under 1000 TT are a bit rediculous.
 
Companies arent going to go for the extra training. They just wont pay for it. Theyll either make you pay for it, or hire someone that wont need it. And where are regional applicants going to pick up jet time?
 
This accident reeks of poor professionalism, poor judgment, and poor airmanship. But most important of all...it was due to a lack of experience.

Many pilots can compensate for poor experience levels by displaying exemplary levels of professionalism and judgment. Throw these ingredients out of the mix and you're an accident waiting to happen.

The professional cockpit does not have to be a rigid, tense environment. It can be casual...but it absolutely must be businesslike.

Can you imagine walking into a bank and the tellers saying "Dude, look at this...Dude, look at that...Dude,...". Yet here we have professional pilots talking like Jeff Spicolli from "Fast Times....". Pisses me off.
 
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Many pilots can compensate for poor experience levels by displaying exemplary levels of professionalism and judgment.

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Well said. In addition, I think if your goal is to be a professional pilot you should display that professionalism and attitude even when training in a 172 or taking some friends up sightseeing.
 
This simply underscores how badly ALPA screwed the pooch in allowing ANY jets to be flown by non-mainline pilots. In a perfect world, RJ CA would pay better than B777 FO and thus go more senior as just another type in the mainline fleet. The genie's out of the bottle now, but I can't help wonder if those Pinnacle guys would be alive today if the captain had 12,000 hours of jet time instead of the 3,000 he probably had.
 
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"The Federal Aviation Administration has also asked Pinnacle to require more experience of its pilots."

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That's pretty damning.

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I wonder what effect this is having on Gulfstream?



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And related to above, what does that say or how would it apply to any of the other pilot mills out there?

Interesting question. Sure, much of this accident seems to be focused on flight discipline problems, but IMO lack of knowlege, experience, and judgement played big factors here too. Is this saying this wouldn't have happened to a 25,000 hour Capt and FO? No. Anyone putting the jet in a similiar circumstance under the same conditions and standards of performance, would likely have met a similiar fate. What I am saying is that the crew with better systems knowlege, better judgement, and ultimately, better discipline, likely would never have had this happen since they would've found no need to test the waters.
 
This is most likely going to sound weird, and I'm sure I'll step on a few toes with this, but here goes.

The problem really isn't training, I think the problem is experience.

In the training environment, if the performance charts dictate a climb to 410 and if the pilot respects the high/low speed margins, it's "supposed" to be able to achieve the altitude.

As any pilot knows, your anticipated performance and your actual performance don't always match up.

I'm not sure how to specifically train a pilot that if you've got an abnormally high alpha near your peformance limit, chances are that you've probably already exceeded it and need to respond before the aircraft responds for you.

Training is based upon 'reacting to an annunciation' and pulling out a checklist than it is doing detective work and figuring out what the real story is.

A few years ago, in recurrent, we had a second-stage engine failure. Basically secure the engine, determine that the departure airport requires a divert to our takeoff alternate and go thru the engine shutdown procedures. Very simple, trucking along to our takeoff alternate, the captain decides to open the crossfeed valve to keep the fuel load balanced and we lose the other engine.

Fuel contamination. Is there a fuel contamination annunciator? Nope. A procedure? Maybe. But as you're drifting down, you'd certainly better divide the cockpit, close the fuel crossfeed and fight like heck to get the engine restarted - if it even will restart.

Ok, back to the CRJ...

In flight, you can look at the cruise page (at least on the series that we have in the MD-88) and see what the "MAX FL" is, which is normally the maximum attainable flight level taking into account your performance based upon whatever the operator has programmed in as a margin index.

Push the button, "Yeah, we can make it" and go.

However, if the performance of the aircraft (slow speeds, high alpha, etc) might suggest that one of the crew should pull out the Operations Data Manual (it's a Delta word for 'performance manual') and take a peek at how many G's of protection you want and what the low speed and high buffets are. At times, you may only have a +/- 15 knot margin between a high speed buffet onset and low speed buffet onset.

The inflight characteristics of a straight-wing Beech 1900 where you rarely get up to FL250 and a swept-wing CRJ up in the high 30's/early 40's are two completely different animals. The Fl250 limit on the 1900's isn't performance, it's the ability of the aircraft to perform an emergency descent within a specified period of time to a prescribed altitude. But I presume the 410 limit on the CRJ's is more engine/wing than it is descent-based like the 1900.

Ok, I'm rambling. Time to forage for food.
 
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The inflight characteristics of a straight-wing Beech 1900 where you rarely get up to FL250 and a swept-wing CRJ up in the high 30's/early 40's are two completely different animals. The Fl250 limit on the 1900's isn't performance, it's the ability of the aircraft to perform an emergency descent within a specified period of time to a prescribed altitude.

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Doug,

What is the significance of this perscribed altitude in the 1900? And what is it? Is it to get to oxygen altitude or something else entirely?
 
"Fuel contamination. Is there a fuel contamination annunciator? Nope. A procedure?"

Both the jets I've flown have had fuel filter lights. The fuel contamination scenario in the sim starts with one or both lights on. Then, there is a checklist procedure. I think you kinda got screwed on your sim ride if they gave you an engine failure then we you tried to balance fuel, they kill then other one and say "Guess what, that was fuel contamination, shouldn't have touched those crossfeeds". That could kinda be negative training in a way. What happens when you have a engine failure in real life and start thinking "well, we better not balance fuel cause it could be fuel contamination"
 
Every pilot should give serious pause prior to balancing fuel after an engine failure.

I believe Doug's position was that many pilots will begin to balance fuel immediately after an engine failure for no other reason than to prevent the fuel from becoming unbalanced. The Air Transat flight that dead sticked a landing in from out over the Atlantic somewhere should teach us a lesson. There was a leak in the crossfeed system and they proceeded to dump all of their fuel overboard.

Fuel contamination, faulty fuel system or a fuel leak should be given due concern prior to crossfeeding. Automatically opening the crossfeed valve(s) for the heck of it should not be a technique IMO.

Many times you will be on the ground prior to a serious imbalance....or if you must crossfeed...do it with a serious imbalance pending...and give it great consideration.
 
Food for thought

The Capt had 6900 hours total time, 150 hours as pilot in command CRJ. The F/O had 761 hours total time with 222 as SIC in the CRJ. Both were low time in their respective seats. Then, add to that....

The Capt had been a street Capt at Gulfstream while the F/O did the PFT program at Gulfstream and got hired at Pinnacle at a little over 500 hours.

I can only say I was appalled at the lack of personal discipline and professionalism shown by this crew after reading the CVR transcript. You gotta read it for yourself. Then you see they both were at....Gulfstream? Draw your own conclusions about the professionalism of someone who would PFJ or work for a PFJ airline?
 
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Companies arent going to go for the extra training. They just wont pay for it. Theyll either make you pay for it, or hire someone that wont need it. And where are regional applicants going to pick up jet time?

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IN THE PERFECT WORLD - They are going to pick up the experience the same way anyone else will. Teach, then move to a small 135 flying 210s, Navijo, Barons, 400 series cessnas. Then move on to a turbo prop... King Air, Conquest, 1900, PC12, TBM, Caravan. Yes I realize that there are people out there that are so set on flying a regional, that they will do whatever they can to get there. And IMO, Slow progression on the type of AC, and the experience level will continually grow at a pace that the pilot can grasp the operational requirements of the aircraft they are flying. Not to mention they will have enough experience and more importantly in this case with the Pinnacle crash they will have the "PIC decision making ability," to keep themselves nicely inside the envelope.

This crash was a chain of events, not just on the flight, but before that, all the way back.

Pinnacle grew too quickly, and hired a lot of people who were willing to do anything to get in the plane, except get practical experience. They pay less then a McDonalds drive up window person. They hired people who have never instructed, and lets be honest here, most pilots are made or broken in the time they are instructors.

The company would not have this crash on their record, and those pilots would still be alive right now if there was not a back door people can make it through with enough money, and bypass their "Apprenticeship" where they get their experience and learn to make safe, sound decisions.
 
Re: Food for thought

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The Capt had 6900 hours total time, 150 hours as pilot in command CRJ. The F/O had 761 hours total time with 222 as SIC in the CRJ. ....



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WOW....that's why every regional should require at least over TT1300hrs. and 200 multi-time IMO. Cliche- aviation has been and will always be trial and error just like everything else-unfortunately
 
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Both the jets I've flown have had fuel filter lights. The fuel contamination scenario in the sim starts with one or both lights on. Then, there is a checklist procedure. I think you kinda got screwed on your sim ride if they gave you an engine failure then we you tried to balance fuel, they kill then other one and say "Guess what, that was fuel contamination, shouldn't have touched those crossfeeds". That could kinda be negative training in a way. What happens when you have a engine failure in real life and start thinking "well, we better not balance fuel cause it could be fuel contamination"

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Man I'm with you. Keeping the fuel balanced within limits is SOP, especially on a long divert. It's one thing if they said "we just wanted to put you through the flameout procedure", but if they are suggesting not to balance fuel, when there is no indication of contamination, that is not cool.
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Every pilot should give serious pause prior to balancing fuel after an engine failure.

Many times you will be on the ground prior to a serious imbalance....or if you must crossfeed...do it with a serious imbalance pending...and give it great consideration.

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After many years of V1 cuts around the pattern to an engine out landing, I can't think of an airplane that wouldn't at least be approaching imbalance limits on such a manuver. Most of the time would exceed. Now I don't think the airplane is going to fall out of the sky if it exceeds imbalance limits, but I think it would be a hard sell to the FAA to say "our new procedure is no fuel balancing, regardless of limitations being exceeded, just in case there might be a fuel issue."

Air Transat was a unique situation. They were late catching the excessive fuel consumption, then the captain refused to believe it for awhile. Don't know what relevance it has to an engine out situation.
 
I don't exactly remember the scenario and I think it was more of a lesson about securing the situation, flightpath and airspeed, and then taking a macro view of the situation instead of reacting to an annunciation by throwing switches, flipping buses and pulling levers.

Personally, if we chug one on departure and we're going back to the departure airport, if I were king I would lean against touching the crossfeed because it's unnecessary if you're with 15 minutes of touchdown in most cases. If we're going to be slothing along for 45 minutes towards a takeoff alternate, then I would.

The message I was trying to convey was "every situation is different and the world we live in thru the training environment isn't necessarily the way it's going to occur in the real world". Vis-a-vis, training isn't the only answer, experience certainly is.

It wasn't a testable scenario, just a "hey, here's something to think about" during some extra time in the sim when no one was scheduled after us.
 
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It wasn't a testable scenario, just a "hey, here's something to think about" during some extra time in the sim when no one was scheduled after us.

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OK, then I'm down with that, er, or something like that.
 
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