FAA Suspends Visual Separation In Class B/C for Helicopters Crossing Departures/Arrivals

Minuteman

Minuteman

Moⅾerator
Phrased using lawyer-talk, a change to JO 7110.65, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, will practically require the use of radar for traffic separation.

"EXCEPT FOR HELICOPTER OR POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT CROSSING THE FLIGHT PATH OF ARRIVING OR DEPARTING AIRCRAFT WITHIN CLASS B, CLASS C, OR TRSA AIRSPACE, VISUAL SEPARATION MAY BE APPLIED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT"

This doesn't seem controversial or heavy-handed, but might reduce efficiency/capacity in exchange. Any idea what this means for Van Nuys? What are the places where helicopters frequently cross traffic corridors?

 
NovemberEcho said:
It only effects B, C and TRSA
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So satellite Ds under the B/C are unaffected? Clearly this is directly aimed at the DCA crash, but I'm curious if it will will address the problem of low staffing, pushing tin and maximizing arrival/ departure rates? Just last week two 121s had a conflict at EWR, so the problem isn't specifically helicopter to jets. Separation is still a problem for intersecting runways, regardless of the traffic category.

Edit: Just to be clear - controllers are doing a bang up job with what you have to work with, so in no way am I taking a swipe at ATC. Just wondering why the SecTrans thinks helicopters are the only threat here.
 
CFI A&P said:
So satellite Ds under the B/C are unaffected? Clearly this is directly aimed at the DCA crash, but I'm curious if it will will address the problem of low staffing, pushing tin and maximizing arrival/ departure rates? Just last week two 121s had a conflict at EWR, so the problem isn't specifically helicopter to jets. Separation is still a problem for intersecting runways, regardless of the traffic category.

Edit: Just to be clear - controllers are doing a bang up job with what you have to work with, so in no way am I taking a swipe at ATC. Just wondering why the SecTrans thinks helicopters are the only threat here.
Click to expand...

If anything this increases workload. The easiest way now is just to deny the helicopter op. The FAA wanted to get rid of the helicopter route by DCA that caused the problem but the pentagon pushed back so instead they came out with this ridiculous rule.
 
NovemberEcho said:
If anything this increases workload. The easiest way now is just to deny the helicopter op. The FAA wanted to get rid of the helicopter route by DCA that caused the problem but the pentagon pushed back so instead they came out with this ridiculous rule.
Click to expand...

So basically some scented candles to treat glioblastoma, sounds about right.
 
As I understand it, it’s B, C and TRSA primary airports, or airports in the surface area of these airspace types. I figure, for the times where this would be an issue, it would involve an instruction for a helo to fly a particular heading or route/course until positive lateral and/or vertical separation requirements (by airspace type) via radar is maintained or assured between a helo and a landing/departing fixed wing. Being that the helo is the more maneuverable aircraft of the two, it will be the one giving way; it just can’t do it via visual separation in these two particular situations anymore, if the stated radar separation standards cannot be maintained.

This GENOT is the FAA answer for compliance with NTSB recommendations A-26-14 and A-26-17 in the AA5342 / PAT25 midair at DCA. I get it, in the DCA crash, the helo screwed up the visual separation by likely seeing the wrong traffic. The tower controller was depending on them to hold up their end of the visual separation agreement, including an instruction to pass behind the RJ, and they completely failed to. One person screws up, and in the DCA case screws up very big, knee jerk changes to everyone is often the result. Although there have been at least two other similar fixed wing / rotary wing losses of separation that I know of that caused a conflict resulting in go arounds or some last minute maneuvering, so it’s not just DCA.

This GENOT is only for addressing one of the failures of the DCA crash, and two of the NTSB recommendations. The others, such as safe helo route charting in terms of locations/altitudes of routes that cross runway final approach corridors; staffing issues of particular ATC facilities, and more, still remain to be addressed.
 
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