Exploits in GPS and ADSB system

Now - I am not a big airplane guy so I do not know the specifics of how the equipment actually functions, but I have often wondered if there were exploits in the aircraft's software that could be reached by a malicious signal. I mean if the exploit is there, what prevents someone from hacking into the flight control computers of fly-by-wire type aircraft?
 
The issue is, none of these systems really do anything to even attempt to verify the sender is actually who they are and where they are. A digital signature tied to each controlling authority and each tail number would really be the only way to accomplish that right now. This was never an issue before, because hackers didn't control the radar sites or build their own.
CPDLC requires an authentication to tail number with callsign to initiate log on, or it will not allow the flight to connect
 
I know but ADS-C provides position reporting. ADS-B provides a "radar" target when in range of an ADS-B receiver station (normally 200NM)

An airplane can be either B or C equipped or both. Such is my understanding. In my airspace we don't have any need for either yet, but Hudson Bay project I believe was one if the first ADS-B sites to become operational
position reporting how? Standard ADSB-Out transmits the aircraft's WAAS GPS location.
 
position reporting how? Standard ADSB-Out transmits the aircraft's WAAS GPS location.
As in auto position reports for oceanic airspace, automatically giving altitude Mach time over fix time over next fix

Not sure all of what is sent, but those are the basics.

Like I said there is a difference, but I'm not an expert on the matter.
 
Thats what I was curious about, is there enough to substantiate that the ghosts would not be moving?

Fear mongering should be rejected as it seems entirely plausible and the report posted is purely a matter of information. That being the case, the information leads me to beleive right now the system is vulnerable to tamper with by someone with malicious intent.

The problem I see is not so much putting false blips on a controller's screen, but rather misdirection of the real aircraft in the air. I don't even know what ELINT or TELINT or EW or ECM are. But if I did, I'd be more worried about the capacity to spoof the navigational systems directing the pilots and the aircraft than I would about putting recognizably false blips on a controller's screen. The pilots should be aviating and navigating their ownselves anyway, so ATC is largely a much appreciated courtesy, but not precisely a necessity. The pilot's ability to navigate his ship is a necessity. As I said in an earlier post in some other thread, the worst spoof is a small one that doesn't appear to be wrong to the pilots... until instead of landing on 30R, they hit a building. This would not be a particularly difficult feat to accomplish given the current state of the systems.
 
I bet you're fun at parties.

At Parties? I'm a Kitty* Riot, Влади́мир. In the field? I'm just a Riot.
Never let your schooling interfere with your education, and never let your drinking interfere with your debating.
And, if you do, always drink Gin and not Vodka. That way they'll know you're drunk and not stupid.

*And never let your auto censor kill a perfectly valid band name.
 
SSR site cost is approx 25M
ADS-B site is a fraction of the physical space, requires extremely little maintenance and costs just $1M per unit

This means once everyone gets ADS-B equipped (eventually even your piper cub) we will have "radar" like coverage everywhere.

My company is going to be one if the first in the world with ADS-B on a satellite, giving radar like coverage over the whole ocean.

The whole thing is beyond my complete understanding but that's what I've garnered from the briefs I've had about the future!
Turning off primary radar post-9/11 doesn't make any security sense, at all, to me. Never mind Joe Evil and his software defined radio screwing with your ADS-B screen; my concern with getting rid of primary radar lies more in "Hey, that airplane just disappeared, last seen on a course for (high value target)."
 
Turning off primary radar post-9/11 doesn't make any security sense, at all, to me. Never mind Joe Evil and his software defined radio screwing with your ADS-B screen; my concern with getting rid of primary radar lies more in "Hey, that airplane just disappeared, last seen on a course for (high value target)."
Good point

Is the massive update and maintenance cost of PSR radars worth it? Consider they only have a range of 80NM on average.

For now they are required to provide a terminal service to 3.0NM (here anyway)

My point is not every SSR site has PSR
 
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