Deal made on hours of training for co-pilots

:clap: yaaaay! but in my opinion....... bring it down to 250 hours + 1 year of jumpseating in a part 121 aircraft and scenario based training.

That would never work in the US because of all the RJs. A lot of times the jumpseat can't be used because of W&B.
 
That would never work in the US because of all the RJs. A lot of times the jumpseat can't be used because of W&B.

you telling me the W&B envelope is so tight on an RJ that it cant take an extra 180lbs up front?

As far as the original quote, Jump seating in an RJ doesnt give you experience. Total time doesnt really give you experience either. If I were in the position to hire someone, I would take someone with 1000PIC rather than someone with 2000TT, and 1500 of that being SIC.
 
you telling me the W&B envelope is so tight on an RJ that it cant take an extra 180lbs up front?

As far as the original quote, Jump seating in an RJ doesnt give you experience. Total time doesnt really give you experience either. If I were in the position to hire someone, I would take someone with 1000PIC rather than someone with 2000TT, and 1500 of that being SIC.

Depends on the RJ and it depends on the operator and how they do their W&B.

But many RJ's can't even take all the pax because they're weight restricted, so adding a jumpseater into the mix won't work.
 
The 250 hour wonders haven't crashed, but it wasn't for lack of trying. Just sit in a crew room in 2007-2008 and listen to stories from regional captains.
 
Just trying to present the other side of the story............

True. But hasn't a Gulfstream trained pilot been involved in every regional crash in recent memory? Off the top of my head, "4-1-0 it dude!", Comair at Lexington, and Colgan 3407.

The reason that you are seeing Gulfstream Trained pilots in these incidents is because there are over 1400 Gulfstream trained pilots working at the airlines. You are bound to run into them because they are out there working

The incidents you refer to (which are all the incidents that I know of as well) represent four (4) pilots out of over 1400 pilots. That is less than .002% of the Gulfstream pilots that have had an incident. That is an incredible safety record that probably beats any major flight training facility. Also every one of those incidents happened well AFTER the pilots had left Gulfstream. Perhaps the training the pilots received AFTER they left Gulfstream was deficient?

Those "250 hour wonders" were also hired in with pretty experienced captains. Had the hiring frenzy continued, you would have had the inexperienced F/Os upgrading very quickly, only to be paired with another low time wonder. The blind leading to blind comes to mind, and I don't think it would've been very pretty.

Well one could make a position that this might be a pretty effective way to bring in low time commercial pilots. Pair up a 250 hour pilot with a very experienced Captain so that the newer pilot can receive the wisdom and experience of the seasoned Captain. So far the safety record has been 100% on this.

No, but the background and experience of the captain may very well have. He had very little PIC time in any type of airplane, and it would seem that he was SEVERELY lacking in fundamentals when looking at his recovery techniques. Had he spent more time practicing hundreds of stalls and other maneuvers in the low speed regime with primary students, things may have turned out much differently.

The First Officer had 772 hours in this aircraft and she was also a flight instructor that most likely had practiced hundreds of stalls and other maneuvers in the low speed environment. She was also the one that dumped the flaps on 3407. So it's hard to make the argument regarding the CFI experience being able to have prevented this accident. Have you considered the training at Colgan might have been an issue here?

No doubt that fatigue and work rules are extremely important to safety, and likely played a large role in this accident. But I really disagree with those that would say the captain's primary training was not an issue. Clearly something wasn't right, as demonstrated by his performance that night and his numerous checkride busts.

I didn't know the guy and I don't want to talk bad about someone that is dead. This pilot had 3,379 hours. I don't know where he received his primary training. What I do know is that he held the FAA required certificates that qualified him to fly the aircraft. If the FAA issued those certificates, and for some reason he was not qualified, then the problem lies with the FAA.

I have been told that most of Captain Renslow's 3379 hours were flown in warm weather areas like Florida and Texas where icing conditions are not a common occurence. If this is true, and he had recently upgraded to this equipment flying out of EWR, then he could have very well been lacking the experience needed to fly in icing conditions. This "lack of icing experience" could have been easily overlooked at Colgan as this Captain moved through the upgrade process. I've never seen a logbook entry or employment application regarding icing experience.

Every time there is an accident, we all learn from it. We try to make the changes so that this same type of accident is not repeated. Flight 3407 will be no exception.
 
The safest airline will be the one which requires ELEVENTY Billion hours TT to be considered as a FO.


I guaran-dam-tee they will never have an accident.
 
JOEFRIDAY... from Ft. Lauderdale... Spitting out GIA PR statistics (1400 pilots).... hmm... do you have a conflict of interest you'd like to declare before continuing?
 
The incidents you refer to (which are all the incidents that I know of as well) represent four (4) pilots out of over 1400 pilots. That is less than .002% of the Gulfstream pilots that have had an incident. That is an incredible safety record that probably beats any major flight training facility.

What? Incident? Is a flaming hole in the ground called an "incident" down in GIA-land?
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The only crash that has had a GIA-trained pilot at the controls was 3407. In the CMR crash, the non-fly was the GIA-trained pilot, and he hadn't worked at GIA in years (where he had been an instructor, BTW). The 3701 crash involved a pilot who had worked at GIA, but he was hired at GIA as a street captain and had thousands of hours flying turbine equipment prior to ever getting hired at GIA.

Sorry guys, but you can't blame GIA. The fact remains that GIA has a spotless record with not a single fatality in twenty years of business, flying some of the oldest, least-automated equipment into some of the busiest airspace and some of the smallest strips in the islands. The best training I've ever received was at GIA, and I've got to say, some of the most professional pilots also. I can't remember flying with a single non-standard captain out of the dozens I flew with while I was there. Lack of professionalism simply wasn't tolerated.

Now, understand, that's not an endorsement of the PFT program by any stretch, which I still think is a horrible thing, and I tell everyone not to make the same mistake I did. However, setting the PFT issue aside, GIA is a well-run operation with a spotless record. Trying to pin safety issues on them is just disingenuous.
 
Now, understand, that's not an endorsement of the PFT program by any stretch, which I still think is a horrible thing, and I tell everyone not to make the same mistake I did. However, setting the PFT issue aside, GIA is a well-run operation with a spotless record. Trying to pin safety issues on them is just disingenuous.

Agree. Most people look at GIA and immediately glom onto the PFT thing, which as you mention, is an issue part and parcel from the specifics of their flying safety record as an airline.....two completely different things. People have to remove the emotion of the distasteful program that goes on there, and not attach it to the record of the flying that's accomplished there. It muddies the waters for no reason.

Again, PFT aside, I still think there are people who don't realize that GIA does hire pilots like any other airline......there isn't two low-time PFT-ers at the controls up front.
 
The only crash that has had a GIA-trained pilot at the controls was 3407. In the CMR crash, the non-fly was the GIA-trained pilot, and he hadn't worked at GIA in years (where he had been an instructor, BTW). The 3701 crash involved a pilot who had worked at GIA, but he was hired at GIA as a street captain and had thousands of hours flying turbine equipment prior to ever getting hired at GIA.

Sorry guys, but you can't blame GIA. The fact remains that GIA has a spotless record with not a single fatality in twenty years of business, flying some of the oldest, least-automated equipment into some of the busiest airspace and some of the smallest strips in the islands. The best training I've ever received was at GIA, and I've got to say, some of the most professional pilots also. I can't remember flying with a single non-standard captain out of the dozens I flew with while I was there. Lack of professionalism simply wasn't tolerated.

Now, understand, that's not an endorsement of the PFT program by any stretch, which I still think is a horrible thing, and I tell everyone not to make the same mistake I did. However, setting the PFT issue aside, GIA is a well-run operation with a spotless record. Trying to pin safety issues on them is just disingenuous.

As much as I hate to, i have to agree with you. Its easy to blame GIA for the problems, but it simply isnt true. If those pilots had gone to Riddle, you would dismiss them as bad pilots, but since they were PFJ, we looks for reasons to fault the program. As much as i would love to trash GIA about putting out crap pilots, the facts just dont support it.
 
I have heard that the upgrade at GIA is very demanding... essentially a single pilot typed checkride.

Hell, compared to every other checkride I've taken since then, even the FO oral and checkride at GIA are like single-pilot type rides. I still know more about the 1900 today, 10 years later, than I know about my current plane.
 
JOEFRIDAY... from Ft. Lauderdale... Spitting out GIA PR statistics (1400 pilots).... hmm... do you have a conflict of interest you'd like to declare before continuing?

Not sure what your asking, but I have never set foot in GulfStream Academy nor have I flown on a Gulfstream Aircraft as a passenger or a pilot.

I simply have researched this issue and become informed of the real facts. You ought to try it sometime.
 
Why don't you share with us your background that makes you such a subject matter expert?

This is, to some degree, an anonymous BBS but when someone suggests that a flight school has only produced 4 students (ever?? do other accidents not in 121 not count?) that have been involved in "incidents" and therefore have a 0.002% "accident rating" then I tend to laugh in their face unless I am cowed by many many years of experience.
 
Why don't you share with us your background that makes you such a subject matter expert?

This is, to some degree, an anonymous BBS but when someone suggests that a flight school has only produced 4 students (ever?? do other accidents not in 121 not count?) that have been involved in "incidents" and therefore have a 0.002% "accident rating" then I tend to laugh in their face unless I am cowed by many many years of experience.

Spira, we are discussing if hours or certain types of training are going to make a real difference regarding the safety and hiring of regional airline first officers in this thread.

There is no need to muddy up the thread with accidents or incidents not affecting regional airlines. I know of many flight schools that have had crashes where students were killed while in training. Every one of the big name flight training facilities has had them. That has absolutely no bearing on this discussion.

There are some that have tried to blame Gulfstream for the regional airline accidents. I can't find any evidence to support that position. The fact remains that Gulfstream has a great safety record. You might not like them, but the evidence suggests they are safe and the pilots they are turning out are safe and well trained.
 
on a side note, why didnt congress take a closer look at colgen and the fact that they kept passing the capt on his check rides. I've talked to one of the Check airmen that "felt pressure to pass him" and to me, that is the issue with the crash.
I can have 10 billion hours, but if I "shouldnt" be at the controls because I'm a bad pilot, then that is not going to help me.

So you have an FO that had little to no icing ecperience and a capt that was known at his airlines for being a bad stick . . . well that is a distaster waiting to happen. Heck, I'm suprised there wasnt a pool on that guy at the hubs!
Not that I want the FAA in my bussiness more thann they are, but GEEZ . . Colgen screwed this thing up and now the "drive by law makers" needing a feel good are adding a TT time cap on getting hired. This is great on the surface, but has a lot of holes. . . icing and multi CRM time will not safe lives as much as airlines or anyone else making sure their crews are well trained and fit for flight . . . AKA SLEEP, PAY, ECT.

The industry should take care of the 800 TT by itself, really. . . try getting a job right now at less than 1000 hours. . . Heck, it is hard for some folks to even get a fliight instrucing job right now.

I dont think there is a single simple easy answer, but I do think some fault and focus should be on the folks that allowed this to happen. They had to see the writing on the wall! And schedulers should also be able to know when a low time FO and a low time Capt are together. . .OH WAIT THEY GENERALY DO!!! (or so i'm told . . . I get to fly corporate . . . with my exteremly high time capt)
anyway, just putting it out there. .
Good discussion!
 
So you have an FO that had little to no icing ecperience and a capt that was known at his airlines for being a bad stick . . . well that is a distaster waiting to happen.

Just to jump in a bit here. The F/O had 772 hours in this plane. She also had a significant amount of recent icing experience with other Colgan Captains flying this piece of equipment. Several of those Captains wrote letters, detailing the icing, routes and dates of flights, that are in the accident report.
 
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