Dead Stick Leads to a Dead End

[MikeD]

I'm not sure what navigational aids the A-7D was working with, but I'm definitely used to a dearth of precision approach capability.

All good points made, and the purpose of my accident synopsis series is to provoke thought and learning, just like the disclaimer at the bottom of all my reports I write states. If we don't learn through the sacrifices of others, we could find ourselves the next one in a similar scenario, without the benefit of some extra cards in our bag of tricks that we could've potentially had.

Oftentimes, there's no one right answer. There could be, and often is, multiple ways of handling the same accident sequence, depending on what part of the sequence one finds themselves in.

To your point, the USAF A-7D would be a TACAN/ILS bird in terms of enroute/approach navigation. The USN A-7B/E was like what you're used to: TACAN-only and ASR/PAR.

In this accident, sadly once committed to a particular course of action, options very quickly became limited and doors of opportunity rapidly began to close, to where the choice made, was going to be the cards he had to play. Without definitive vertical guidance, I can see the hesitation in descending in order to avoid being short of the runway. But that risk of overshooting, which eventually happened, is equally as dangerous. It was just the worst of combinations for a single-pilot in a tactical jet, with cascading malfunctions and I would imagine a fair amount of "helmet fire" building as it came to pilot workload.

But all good points and food for thought you make, especially since with the jet you fly now, this could very well be you.

 

[///AMG]

I can totally see the urge to stay high. After all, a true flameout approach (at least in my steed) is on the order of an 11-17 degree glideslope…….so way more than an ASR or PAR. With an operative motor (albeit a failing one), you would eventually have to just commit to a stabilized approach without the benefit of being able to see outside and do the very stick and rudder/seat of pants stuff needed for a good F/O approach. Maybe a couple thousand AGL and a few miles, and just accept the risk versus the equally bad outcome that befell this poor fella. With a true flameout, I don't know that there is a good answer in IMC, other than having a good waypoint designation from the INS (or radar for that matter), putting it in the correct place in the HUD (which OBTW you will probably lose your INS platform for a little while in at least an F-16 flameout), and trusting that it is close enough for government work. There isn't a whole ton of slop between landing short, landing long, and safely making the runway, though I would always want to be high and/or fast within reason if I couldn't be on……..but again, in that scenario, you need visual references to make the appropriate corrections with gear/flaps/speedbrake to make the runway…..all things this guy was short on in this case. Bad bad day for anyone to be sure.