The best time to keep your shirt on is when you are hot under the collar......
20 October 1987
Indianapolis International Airport (KIND)
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ling-Temco-Vought A-7D Corsair II, 69-6207, c/s Chaps 24
4450th Tactical Group, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada
Tactical Air Command, USAF
1 minor (pilot), 9 Fatal (ground fatalities)
One of the toughest parts of being a pilot is dealing with an emergency situation with no prior warning. Most of general aviation is routine flying, with nothing exceptionally exciting or out of the ordinary going on. Emergencies that have prior warning or have a good amount of time to work on and solve, up the ante of making a situation more tense than normal. But it's the emergency situation that happens quickly, with little time to analyze and solve, which is where we earn our pay as pilots. The challenge these types of emergencies present to a pilot or crew is that oftentimes, if you're not already in a square corner, then you're rapidly heading that direction. You as a pilot may or may not have the luxury of time on your side to help keep you out of the square corner as much as possible. As such, any decision you make, or even decisions outside your control..... from the simplest to the most complex.....may be the difference between complete success, or complete failure. The best a pilot can do in this situation is to keep rolling the proverbial dice, and do what his knowledge, experience, training, and SA all collectively allow him to do within the constraints of factors outside his control. This is the situation that was faced by the pilot of A-7D 69-6207 on the morning of 20 October 1987, over Indianapolis, Indiana.
In the late 1970s, a revolutionary aircraft that became known as the Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter began to be constructed as a Top Secret "black program", to be based at the Tonopah Test Range airfield (ICAO: KTNX) located in the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). I personally have over 350 hours in the F-117A as a pilot and IP when it was later a grey program post-1992. When the F-117As began flying in 1981, they were still a black program not meant for any public viewing anywhere. Hence for pilot currency flights, the USAF needed an aircraft with the same flight characteristics and overall handling that the pilots of F-117As could fly, and still be seen in the open with. The LTV A-7D Corsair II was chosen to be this "companion trainer" for the USAF as it was readily available and cheap to operate. By this time in the early-1980s, the A-7D was no longer in use with the active-duty USAF, it was only in the Air National Guard (ANG). The cover story for this one active-duty unit of A-7D Corsairs was as a test unit based out of Nellis AFB, NV (ICAO: KLSV), which coincidentally was where the administrative support for the F-117A operation at Tonopah was located, as well as where the families of the men who flew the F-117A lived. Interestingly, during the black years from the late 1970s through 1988, the crews would commute from Nellis to Tonopah on Monday and return Friday on contract 727s flown by Key Air, without ever being able to tell their families where they went or what they were doing. The A-7Ds remained as companion trainers until 1989, when they were replaced by Northrop T-38A Talons.
On the early morning of 20 October 1987, an F-117A pilot flying one of the unit's A-7Ds was preparing to takeoff from Pittsburgh International Airport, Penn (ICAO: KPIT) on a return flight to Nellis AFB. The pilot had been in Pittsburgh attending the funeral of a fellow pilot who had perished in a fighter jet crash a week and a half earlier, and now was making the return trip home in A-7D 69-6207, callsign Chaps 24. 6207s pilot had departed uneventfully from Pittsburgh, and was at his cruise altitude of FL 320. Over the Ohio-Indiana border and about 75 miles east of Indianapolis, the pilot of 6207 began experiencing problems with the A-7s single engine, and declared an emergency with Indianapolis ARTCC. Some confusion occurred due to radio calls from civilian VHF traffic blocking ATC from hearing the pilots emergency calls on UHF, however it was established that the pilot of 6207 was losing power and needed to land immediately. Descent clearance was granted and radar vectors were provided to Indianapolis International airport (ICAO: KIND). Losing power towards idle, the pilot of 6207 deployed his Ram Air Turbine (RAT), began running emergency checklists, and started his descent on the vectors as provided. Indianapolis International was showing BKN-OVC008 and 1-2 miles visibility in fog. Descending into the tops, 6207 was handed off from ARTCC to Indianapolis TRACON and vectored for an ASR approach to RW 4L, due to the single-pilot being now task-saturated with running emergency checklists and flying in IMC. About 20 miles out, 6207 was picked up by the ASR controller and issued vectors for 4L (today, RW 5L: 11,200' x 150' runway) as well as being told to continue descent towards the MDA. Short vectors were being issued due to the engine problems becoming rapidly worse, and approximately 15 miles south of the field, the Corsair's engine began rolling back to idle. The pilot of 6207 was still high in relation to the recommended altitudes for his geographic location on the ASR approach and the GCA controller instructed the pilot a number of times to increase his descent rate, both to get down to MDA as well as to allow maximum runway available for landing. The pilot of 6207 did not want to descend too much faster than an average non-precision descent rate, especially while IMC and with the sick aircraft, for fear of ending up short of the runway. 4 miles southeast of the field, 6207s engine flamed out completely.
The GCA controller still issued vectors to the pilot, further insisting that he increase his descent rate in order to make the runway. The pilot of 6207 advised the controller that he might have to eject and inquired as to whether he was over a populated area. There was no response to this as the controller continued his vectors for the ASR. As it turned out, the pilot of 6207 appeared over the missed approach point, the runway 4L threshold, at 3100 MSL (2300 AGL) and too high to reasonably complete the landing on RW 4L. Due to this, the GCA controller instructed the pilot of 6207 to "go around again", even though 6207 had no engine power and was a dead-stick. The pilot declined this and requested a circling maneuver, and was granted a circle east for a 270 degree turn to land on RW 31 (today RW 32: 7280' x 150'). With the A-7D having poor glide performance and a high descent rate, the chance of making the circling maneuver was slim to begin with, but choices and options were getting fewer and fewer by this time. By the time the A-7 had reached the departure end of RW 4L to begin its right turn for the right downwind for RW 31, the pilot of 6207 was already down to 2000' MSL, or about 1200' AGL. Radar contact was lost at this time as 6207 continued its descent eastbound, east of I-465. Passing 500 AGL, the pilot of 6207 aimed the jet for an empty baseball field and initiated ejection from the aircraft. Canopy separation, ejection sequencing, seat-man separation, and parachute inflation were all uneventful from the A-7D Escapac ejection system, the pilot landing in a parking lot following a short descent. The A-7D however, began a left turn after the pilot left the aircraft. It clipped the roof of a Bank One branch located on the northeast corner of Executive and Bradbury streets, crossed Bradbury street, and hit an earthen embankment in front of the Indianapolis Airport Ramada Inn, located at the southeast corner of the same intersection. The embankment impact caused the aircraft to careen airborne again and it flew into the lobby of the Ramada, exploding into a fireball into the lobby and causing a massive fuel-fed fire from the lobby up to the 4th floor. Indianapolis Airport ARFF units, having been previously alerted and staged for the arrival of 6207, arrived on scene within 1 minute and began applying foam to the exterior and interior of the hotel. The main body of the fire was under control in approximately 4 minutes. 9 persons on the ground and in the hotel were fatally injured. The pilot of 6207 suffered minor injuries.
Probable Cause:
*Engine- Accessory Gearbox Failure- Total
*Engine- Oil Loss- Seizure
Secondary Factors:
*Weather- IMC
*ASR Approach- Executed
Tertiary Factors:
None
MikeD says:
This particular accident brings up two specific areas of discussion related to what happened that day, one technical and one philosphical:
1. Problems with the A-7Ds Allison TF41A-1 engine
2. Thoughts on dealing with a dead-stick aircraft
The Allison TF41A-1: The Allison TF41A-1 that the LTV A-7D aircraft utilized was a license-built version of the Rolls Royce RB-162 turbofan engine. The version used in the A-7D was 14,250 lbs/thrust and non-afterburning. The TF41 had been an engine that wasn't without troubles. The first problems noticed in 1970 with this engine were cracks in the fan disks, sometimes very early in the engine's life. This was noted to have been a factor in a number of US Navy A-7 accidents, both in CONUS as well as in combat in Vietnam. In November 1984, USAF engine mechanics had begun noticing excessive and early wear on the TF41 engine driveshafts of a number of A-7D aircraft. These findings generated a Safety Directive in June 1986 for all TF41 engines to have their driveshaft splines checked during any compressor work or engine teardown. The driveshaft splines are the gear teeth that connect the driveshaft to both the turbine as well as items such as the accessory gearbox on the engine. 69-6207 was found to have suffered a catastrophic destruction of a gear within the engine accessory drive gearbox. The disintegration of this gear tore open the engines oil lubricating system and sump, depleting the engine's oil. The engine immediately began to lose power and eventually seized from lack of oil. 6207s last major engine maintenance had been in February 1986, 4 months prior to the issuance of the Safety Directive, which would have been complied with during 6207s next scheduled major engine inspection.....an inspection that would never come.
Dealing with a Dead Stick Aircraft: By any measure, the pilot of 69-6207 had his work more than cut out for him in dealing with this emergency. From losing power in a single-engine jet, to having to work the EP by himself, to being forced into a descent into IMC, from having to manage an instrument approach, to having very little time to get his visual bearings once VMC and......finding himself outside a usable position to land....having to come up with an alternate plan in very little time. All of these factors happening at nearly the same time or closely overlapping, all equaled an extremely large amount of task saturation, even for the best of pilots with the highest of SA. But in being able to look back at what occurred and the sequence of events, easy to analyze at 0 airspeed and 1 G of course, some food for thought comes out of this accident.
The initial emergency happened pretty far from IND, and the major problems began 15 miles south of the airfield itself. Although the immediate concern when this emergency began progressing was to get the A-7D down at a suitable airfield; following the aftermath of this accident, the question has to be raised of the suitability or risk of bringing a knowingly sick single-engine aircraft from a geographical area that was relatively rural, into an area that was very urban. For each mile the A-7D came closer to Indianapolis and every bit of altitude the jet lost, the window for options and "escape routes" became fewer and fewer. As these options became fewer, the situation began to narrow down to a "make it or break it" situation. Had the pilot of 6207 broken out earlier and landed safely on RW 5L, we wouldn't be having this conversation and this accident synopsis wouldn't be getting written. The pilot would've been a hero and would've won his gamble. Unfortunately, as the options became fewer and fewer, the pilot ended up losing his last poker hand, and despite his best efforts and intentions, couldn't control or avoid where the aircraft would impact. Even though he ejected well below the safe ejection envelope for the Escapac seat and with a descent rate, risking his life to insure the jet went towards the baseball field, he couldn't control the left turn the jet took following his vacating it. Food for thought, and something to consider for later, is attempting to keep a sick single-engine aircraft away from populated areas as much as possible. Might it have been possible to keep the aircraft in a rural area and bail out there? Even though the pilot was forced to enter IMC, it was known by all that the jet was heading towards an urban; and with dead-stick being a truly "one-shot deal", it was a big gamble to take, whether anyone consciously knew it was being taken or not. Had the WX been VMC, would Indianapolis have still been an option? Or would another airport in a rural area have been a better place to land. I believe that had VMC prevailed, with physically being able to see population centers, that avoidance of those would've taken a far higher priority. As it was, the task saturation made simply flying the jet a handful to complete. Still, the pilot still had the peace of mind to inquire about avoiding populated areas, even there was no answer to his query from ATC. All of these are good takeaways to garner from this accident for future reference, insofar as the aftermath on the ground is concerned. It happened as it did, but could there have been better options? As I stated before, had the landing been successful, this conversation wouldn't even be occurring.
In an interesting irony, on 26 October 1978, nearly 9 years to the day prior to this accident, a USAF A-7D Corsair crashed into the University of Arizona campus in downtown Tucson while landing at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (ICAO: KDMA) following an engine failure, killing 2 civilians on the ground.
MikeDs Final Thoughts: This accident is one of those terrible tragedies whereby the deck was stacked against the pilot from the get go. The pilot of 6207 used every bit of his ability and SA to attempt to overcome the various factors that he faced, all of which were a hinderance and none of which were a help to him. If there is anything to take away from this accident, its that sometimes there will be an EP you'll have to deal with where you're playing catch-up with the situation, and your ability to stay ahead of the game is severely taxed. As the situation progresses, you'll begin finding yourself squeezed tighter and tighter into that square corner, the walls slowly moving in on you. It's up to you to do the best you can to remain out of that square corner for as long as possible, thus insuring that options stay open for you for as long as possible. Because when those options close, and you're in that corner for good, you're now just along for the ride. The pilot of 6207 at least had the option of an ejection seat, and had the A-7D impacted the empty baseball field, this story would be very different. But as it was, that wasn't to be. Even though the pilot was absolved of blame, in our hearts of hearts we as pilots know that we're responsible for where our aircraft end up, even if we had no control over it. This accident is a grim reminder of how we should do our best to insure that Dead Stick Doesn't Lead to a Dead End.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
News video of crash aftermath of A-7D 69-6207
Photos: 1. A-7D 69-6207 (courtesy: G Chambers)
2. Newspaper map of 69-6207 flightpath
20 October 1987
Indianapolis International Airport (KIND)
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ling-Temco-Vought A-7D Corsair II, 69-6207, c/s Chaps 24
4450th Tactical Group, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada
Tactical Air Command, USAF
1 minor (pilot), 9 Fatal (ground fatalities)
One of the toughest parts of being a pilot is dealing with an emergency situation with no prior warning. Most of general aviation is routine flying, with nothing exceptionally exciting or out of the ordinary going on. Emergencies that have prior warning or have a good amount of time to work on and solve, up the ante of making a situation more tense than normal. But it's the emergency situation that happens quickly, with little time to analyze and solve, which is where we earn our pay as pilots. The challenge these types of emergencies present to a pilot or crew is that oftentimes, if you're not already in a square corner, then you're rapidly heading that direction. You as a pilot may or may not have the luxury of time on your side to help keep you out of the square corner as much as possible. As such, any decision you make, or even decisions outside your control..... from the simplest to the most complex.....may be the difference between complete success, or complete failure. The best a pilot can do in this situation is to keep rolling the proverbial dice, and do what his knowledge, experience, training, and SA all collectively allow him to do within the constraints of factors outside his control. This is the situation that was faced by the pilot of A-7D 69-6207 on the morning of 20 October 1987, over Indianapolis, Indiana.
In the late 1970s, a revolutionary aircraft that became known as the Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter began to be constructed as a Top Secret "black program", to be based at the Tonopah Test Range airfield (ICAO: KTNX) located in the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). I personally have over 350 hours in the F-117A as a pilot and IP when it was later a grey program post-1992. When the F-117As began flying in 1981, they were still a black program not meant for any public viewing anywhere. Hence for pilot currency flights, the USAF needed an aircraft with the same flight characteristics and overall handling that the pilots of F-117As could fly, and still be seen in the open with. The LTV A-7D Corsair II was chosen to be this "companion trainer" for the USAF as it was readily available and cheap to operate. By this time in the early-1980s, the A-7D was no longer in use with the active-duty USAF, it was only in the Air National Guard (ANG). The cover story for this one active-duty unit of A-7D Corsairs was as a test unit based out of Nellis AFB, NV (ICAO: KLSV), which coincidentally was where the administrative support for the F-117A operation at Tonopah was located, as well as where the families of the men who flew the F-117A lived. Interestingly, during the black years from the late 1970s through 1988, the crews would commute from Nellis to Tonopah on Monday and return Friday on contract 727s flown by Key Air, without ever being able to tell their families where they went or what they were doing. The A-7Ds remained as companion trainers until 1989, when they were replaced by Northrop T-38A Talons.
On the early morning of 20 October 1987, an F-117A pilot flying one of the unit's A-7Ds was preparing to takeoff from Pittsburgh International Airport, Penn (ICAO: KPIT) on a return flight to Nellis AFB. The pilot had been in Pittsburgh attending the funeral of a fellow pilot who had perished in a fighter jet crash a week and a half earlier, and now was making the return trip home in A-7D 69-6207, callsign Chaps 24. 6207s pilot had departed uneventfully from Pittsburgh, and was at his cruise altitude of FL 320. Over the Ohio-Indiana border and about 75 miles east of Indianapolis, the pilot of 6207 began experiencing problems with the A-7s single engine, and declared an emergency with Indianapolis ARTCC. Some confusion occurred due to radio calls from civilian VHF traffic blocking ATC from hearing the pilots emergency calls on UHF, however it was established that the pilot of 6207 was losing power and needed to land immediately. Descent clearance was granted and radar vectors were provided to Indianapolis International airport (ICAO: KIND). Losing power towards idle, the pilot of 6207 deployed his Ram Air Turbine (RAT), began running emergency checklists, and started his descent on the vectors as provided. Indianapolis International was showing BKN-OVC008 and 1-2 miles visibility in fog. Descending into the tops, 6207 was handed off from ARTCC to Indianapolis TRACON and vectored for an ASR approach to RW 4L, due to the single-pilot being now task-saturated with running emergency checklists and flying in IMC. About 20 miles out, 6207 was picked up by the ASR controller and issued vectors for 4L (today, RW 5L: 11,200' x 150' runway) as well as being told to continue descent towards the MDA. Short vectors were being issued due to the engine problems becoming rapidly worse, and approximately 15 miles south of the field, the Corsair's engine began rolling back to idle. The pilot of 6207 was still high in relation to the recommended altitudes for his geographic location on the ASR approach and the GCA controller instructed the pilot a number of times to increase his descent rate, both to get down to MDA as well as to allow maximum runway available for landing. The pilot of 6207 did not want to descend too much faster than an average non-precision descent rate, especially while IMC and with the sick aircraft, for fear of ending up short of the runway. 4 miles southeast of the field, 6207s engine flamed out completely.
The GCA controller still issued vectors to the pilot, further insisting that he increase his descent rate in order to make the runway. The pilot of 6207 advised the controller that he might have to eject and inquired as to whether he was over a populated area. There was no response to this as the controller continued his vectors for the ASR. As it turned out, the pilot of 6207 appeared over the missed approach point, the runway 4L threshold, at 3100 MSL (2300 AGL) and too high to reasonably complete the landing on RW 4L. Due to this, the GCA controller instructed the pilot of 6207 to "go around again", even though 6207 had no engine power and was a dead-stick. The pilot declined this and requested a circling maneuver, and was granted a circle east for a 270 degree turn to land on RW 31 (today RW 32: 7280' x 150'). With the A-7D having poor glide performance and a high descent rate, the chance of making the circling maneuver was slim to begin with, but choices and options were getting fewer and fewer by this time. By the time the A-7 had reached the departure end of RW 4L to begin its right turn for the right downwind for RW 31, the pilot of 6207 was already down to 2000' MSL, or about 1200' AGL. Radar contact was lost at this time as 6207 continued its descent eastbound, east of I-465. Passing 500 AGL, the pilot of 6207 aimed the jet for an empty baseball field and initiated ejection from the aircraft. Canopy separation, ejection sequencing, seat-man separation, and parachute inflation were all uneventful from the A-7D Escapac ejection system, the pilot landing in a parking lot following a short descent. The A-7D however, began a left turn after the pilot left the aircraft. It clipped the roof of a Bank One branch located on the northeast corner of Executive and Bradbury streets, crossed Bradbury street, and hit an earthen embankment in front of the Indianapolis Airport Ramada Inn, located at the southeast corner of the same intersection. The embankment impact caused the aircraft to careen airborne again and it flew into the lobby of the Ramada, exploding into a fireball into the lobby and causing a massive fuel-fed fire from the lobby up to the 4th floor. Indianapolis Airport ARFF units, having been previously alerted and staged for the arrival of 6207, arrived on scene within 1 minute and began applying foam to the exterior and interior of the hotel. The main body of the fire was under control in approximately 4 minutes. 9 persons on the ground and in the hotel were fatally injured. The pilot of 6207 suffered minor injuries.
Probable Cause:
*Engine- Accessory Gearbox Failure- Total
*Engine- Oil Loss- Seizure
Secondary Factors:
*Weather- IMC
*ASR Approach- Executed
Tertiary Factors:
None
MikeD says:
This particular accident brings up two specific areas of discussion related to what happened that day, one technical and one philosphical:
1. Problems with the A-7Ds Allison TF41A-1 engine
2. Thoughts on dealing with a dead-stick aircraft
The Allison TF41A-1: The Allison TF41A-1 that the LTV A-7D aircraft utilized was a license-built version of the Rolls Royce RB-162 turbofan engine. The version used in the A-7D was 14,250 lbs/thrust and non-afterburning. The TF41 had been an engine that wasn't without troubles. The first problems noticed in 1970 with this engine were cracks in the fan disks, sometimes very early in the engine's life. This was noted to have been a factor in a number of US Navy A-7 accidents, both in CONUS as well as in combat in Vietnam. In November 1984, USAF engine mechanics had begun noticing excessive and early wear on the TF41 engine driveshafts of a number of A-7D aircraft. These findings generated a Safety Directive in June 1986 for all TF41 engines to have their driveshaft splines checked during any compressor work or engine teardown. The driveshaft splines are the gear teeth that connect the driveshaft to both the turbine as well as items such as the accessory gearbox on the engine. 69-6207 was found to have suffered a catastrophic destruction of a gear within the engine accessory drive gearbox. The disintegration of this gear tore open the engines oil lubricating system and sump, depleting the engine's oil. The engine immediately began to lose power and eventually seized from lack of oil. 6207s last major engine maintenance had been in February 1986, 4 months prior to the issuance of the Safety Directive, which would have been complied with during 6207s next scheduled major engine inspection.....an inspection that would never come.
Dealing with a Dead Stick Aircraft: By any measure, the pilot of 69-6207 had his work more than cut out for him in dealing with this emergency. From losing power in a single-engine jet, to having to work the EP by himself, to being forced into a descent into IMC, from having to manage an instrument approach, to having very little time to get his visual bearings once VMC and......finding himself outside a usable position to land....having to come up with an alternate plan in very little time. All of these factors happening at nearly the same time or closely overlapping, all equaled an extremely large amount of task saturation, even for the best of pilots with the highest of SA. But in being able to look back at what occurred and the sequence of events, easy to analyze at 0 airspeed and 1 G of course, some food for thought comes out of this accident.
The initial emergency happened pretty far from IND, and the major problems began 15 miles south of the airfield itself. Although the immediate concern when this emergency began progressing was to get the A-7D down at a suitable airfield; following the aftermath of this accident, the question has to be raised of the suitability or risk of bringing a knowingly sick single-engine aircraft from a geographical area that was relatively rural, into an area that was very urban. For each mile the A-7D came closer to Indianapolis and every bit of altitude the jet lost, the window for options and "escape routes" became fewer and fewer. As these options became fewer, the situation began to narrow down to a "make it or break it" situation. Had the pilot of 6207 broken out earlier and landed safely on RW 5L, we wouldn't be having this conversation and this accident synopsis wouldn't be getting written. The pilot would've been a hero and would've won his gamble. Unfortunately, as the options became fewer and fewer, the pilot ended up losing his last poker hand, and despite his best efforts and intentions, couldn't control or avoid where the aircraft would impact. Even though he ejected well below the safe ejection envelope for the Escapac seat and with a descent rate, risking his life to insure the jet went towards the baseball field, he couldn't control the left turn the jet took following his vacating it. Food for thought, and something to consider for later, is attempting to keep a sick single-engine aircraft away from populated areas as much as possible. Might it have been possible to keep the aircraft in a rural area and bail out there? Even though the pilot was forced to enter IMC, it was known by all that the jet was heading towards an urban; and with dead-stick being a truly "one-shot deal", it was a big gamble to take, whether anyone consciously knew it was being taken or not. Had the WX been VMC, would Indianapolis have still been an option? Or would another airport in a rural area have been a better place to land. I believe that had VMC prevailed, with physically being able to see population centers, that avoidance of those would've taken a far higher priority. As it was, the task saturation made simply flying the jet a handful to complete. Still, the pilot still had the peace of mind to inquire about avoiding populated areas, even there was no answer to his query from ATC. All of these are good takeaways to garner from this accident for future reference, insofar as the aftermath on the ground is concerned. It happened as it did, but could there have been better options? As I stated before, had the landing been successful, this conversation wouldn't even be occurring.
In an interesting irony, on 26 October 1978, nearly 9 years to the day prior to this accident, a USAF A-7D Corsair crashed into the University of Arizona campus in downtown Tucson while landing at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (ICAO: KDMA) following an engine failure, killing 2 civilians on the ground.
MikeDs Final Thoughts: This accident is one of those terrible tragedies whereby the deck was stacked against the pilot from the get go. The pilot of 6207 used every bit of his ability and SA to attempt to overcome the various factors that he faced, all of which were a hinderance and none of which were a help to him. If there is anything to take away from this accident, its that sometimes there will be an EP you'll have to deal with where you're playing catch-up with the situation, and your ability to stay ahead of the game is severely taxed. As the situation progresses, you'll begin finding yourself squeezed tighter and tighter into that square corner, the walls slowly moving in on you. It's up to you to do the best you can to remain out of that square corner for as long as possible, thus insuring that options stay open for you for as long as possible. Because when those options close, and you're in that corner for good, you're now just along for the ride. The pilot of 6207 at least had the option of an ejection seat, and had the A-7D impacted the empty baseball field, this story would be very different. But as it was, that wasn't to be. Even though the pilot was absolved of blame, in our hearts of hearts we as pilots know that we're responsible for where our aircraft end up, even if we had no control over it. This accident is a grim reminder of how we should do our best to insure that Dead Stick Doesn't Lead to a Dead End.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
News video of crash aftermath of A-7D 69-6207
Photos: 1. A-7D 69-6207 (courtesy: G Chambers)
2. Newspaper map of 69-6207 flightpath
Attachments
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