Children of the Magenta (Video)

One click to disconnect the autopilot, one click to silence the siren. On the throttles, it's the same. One click to disconnect the autothrottles, one more click to silence the beeper. Four clicks total.

Which is funny, because our 747-400s have two different logic sequences when you disconnect. Some can bypass the aural warning for the AP and some have a minimum of one disconnect aural warning.
 
I know this is an old thread, but I been looking for this video ....
...Anyone know where I can find this video again?

Edit, never mind, I found it!

 
Why was the left throttle retarded to idle in the crash mentioned in the movie? (Was it because cumulative setting was high , the computer compensated? But why would it retard as far as idle?)
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
His unusual attitude one belongs in an F4 Phanthom class. Not AA airliners.

There's some good theory involved that isn't bad to know, but it's mostly not useful for airline pilots.

And I think you know what I think about all of this disparaging talk of automation. :)
 
...
And I think you know what I think about all of this disparaging talk of automation. :)

I think its good. I teach in highly automated airplanes and I can tell you in my 3500 hours of dual given, automation is a major problem. Today my student, who was having troubles prioritizing tasks, benefited from this clip. I wish a few of the pilots on some of the recent crashes in the ocean watched this video.

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate
Automate

In that order.... and the shed the load in reverse when getting overloaded.
 
Fly_Unity said:
I think its good. I teach in highly automated airplanes and I can tell you in my 3500 hours of dual given, automation is a major problem. Today my student, who was having troubles prioritizing tasks, benefited from this clip. I wish a few of the pilots on some of the recent crashes in the ocean watched this video.

Don't you teach GA?

The problem is a lack of understanding of the automation, not an over reliance on it.
 
Don't you teach GA?

The problem is a lack of understanding of the automation, not an over reliance on it.


I do teach GA. I know this video is for 121. But I think in the single pilot world, this becomes even a bigger issue.

I see students (commercial pilots) who are very familiar with automation, but yet still get overloaded when trying to fly the airplane. I see it time and time again, ATC gives out five instructions at once and first priority for many is to program the FMS while totally oblivious to their current heading and altitude.
 
Fly_Unity said:
I do teach GA. I know this video is for 121. But I think in the single pilot world, this becomes even a bigger issue. I see students who are very familiar with automation, but yet still get overloaded when trying to fly the airplane. I see it time and time again, ATC gives out five instructions at once and first priority for many is to program the FMS while totally oblivious to their current heading and altitude.

GA is a different world than 121 with different concerns. The issues you have with automation may be legit with the average GA pilot flying something like a Cirrus, but I completely disagree with the conventional wisdom that there is an over reliance on automation in airliner cockpits.
 
GA is a different world than 121 with different concerns. The issues you have with automation may be legit with the average GA pilot flying something like a Cirrus, but I completely disagree with the conventional wisdom that there is an over reliance on automation in airliner cockpits.

Fair enough
 
Take what you need, whatever you find helpfull.

I agree. But just keep in mind the NTSB had harsh words for the VanderBurgh's AAMP. The wake turbulence scenario AA pilots were getting at the time in the sim was..... they were told they are taking off behind a heavy 747, that is all. Then the wake hits, the sim would show a slight bank to one side, say 10 degrees, followed by a sharp 90 degree bank to the other side. During this crazy bank set-up, the pilots input to the control yoke and rudders were disengaged. Only once the aircraft was one wing low almost 90 degrees on its side, the sim was 'released' and the pilots would recover based on what they learned in the video. The NTSB harshly came down on this for the obvious reasons: 1. pausing the sim actions until deeply established in the 90 degree bank could reinforce bad habits for a pilot in the initial reaction to wake turbulence. Remember, whatever they did in those first seconds didn't make a difference until the sim aircraft was on its side almost 90 deg bank. So this was negative training. 2. Level D sims these days just can't model severe unusual attitudes as one would think. The realism beyond 80-90 deg bank isn't the same. 3. And perhaps the most obvious, never in history of airliners has a widebody jetliner (like an A300) ever been flipped 90 degrees to its side due to wake. Even in an A320 the worst I've seen was ~ 20 degrees bank. You don't flip over unless you're in a Cessna or light business turboprop/light jet. Commercial narrowbody and widebody jetliners like AA has? No way would you enter anything close to a 90 degree bank for wake.
 
You don't flip over unless you're in a Cessna or light business turboprop/light jet. Commercial narrowbody and widebody jetliners like AA has? No way would you enter anything close to a 90 degree bank for wake.

I beg to differ. I got rolled 103 degrees (as pulled from the FDR) taking off behind a 330 on 9L in PHL one night long ago in a CRJ.
 
I bet you didn't tear off the tail with overly aggressive rudder movements.

Nope. But for about 3 seconds, as I watched the lights of the Old Philadelphia Navy Yard disappear out the BOTTOM of the window, I considered rolling all the way around.

My comment was more about the fact that Part 25, 121 Aircraft can most certainly get rolled hard.
 
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