CAS Turbo props

[Kingairer]

So I'm fascinated with the idea of the Bronco and or Super Tucano coming into real service in Afghanistan and other wars as a cheaper alternative to jet CAS.....So realistically how much firepower can something like this bring to the fight? Id be a little disappointed if I called in for air support expecting an A10 and a Tucano shows up shooting BBs.

 

[Lawman]

So I'm fascinated with the idea of the Bronco and or Super Tucano coming into real service in Afghanistan and other wars as a cheaper alternative to jet CAS.....So realistically how much firepower can something like this bring to the fight? Id be a little disappointed if I called in for air support expecting an A10 and a Tucano shows up shooting BBs.

So that last line kinda highlights the problem facing a lot of the discussion.

CAS is an effects based solution it is not specific to an aircraft, a weapons system, or a particular effect.

For example a commander may want demonstration fires for a persistent amount of time over a large area.... ok well even though a Hawg or an Apache may be a more optimized for ground attack aircraft, a B-1 dropping 500 lbs iron over a 3/4 mile long track would do that effect to a greater degree.

The question that should be driving acquisition is "what will do the job 95% of the time for the requirements we expect." Instead we keep getting wrapped around a most dangerous scenario imagined problem which leads down serious development rabbit holes.

Right now in the Stan or a similar fight in say Africa a hellfire and persistent ISR capability will solve nearly all of the problems you will find. More than that becomes massive overkill. While a Hawg will obviously carry more, it doesn't at all have to. In fact currently they simply aren't carrying anything near max ordnance because they simply don't need it. Having 16000lbs of 5 sticks of Mk 82s and cluster bombs would be needed in a Fulda Gap Russian horde of the 80s scenario, but it's a lot of mail to carry when your fight is against a guy in a Hilux or an IED emplacement team.

The main argument for the light weight turboprop is the ease of which they could be handed off to the nation we are doing the fight with. It's simple, it's rugged, and it's something they can probably operate without endangering themselves too much. It also keeps hours off our very expensive high end fleet of tactical aircraft. That in of its self could be priceless as we shrink the number of tails we own requiring more time per airframe and less available service lives.

 

[Hacker15e]

CAS is an effects based solution it is not specific to an aircraft, a weapons system, or a particular effect..

This x 100.

I never showed up at a TIC and had the JTAC or GFC say, "Aww, never mind Dude...we wanted A-10s. You guys are cleared off."

 

[Roger Roger]

This x 100.

I never showed up at a TIC and had the JTAC or GFC say, "Aww, never mind Dude...we wanted A-10s. You guys are cleared off."

But Tyler Rogoway said...

 

[killbilly]

I have learned so much about this topic here.

 

[killbilly]

The main argument for the light weight turboprop is the ease of which they could be handed off to the nation we are doing the fight with. It's simple, it's rugged, and it's something they can probably operate without endangering themselves too much. It also keeps hours off our very expensive high end fleet of tactical aircraft. That in of its self could be priceless as we shrink the number of tails we own requiring more time per airframe and less available service lives.

In your opinion, is this ever a mission that the Army could and should do with those kinds of aircraft?

 

[Hacker15e]

...here comes the "roles and missions" discussion....

 

[Lawman]

In your opinion, is this ever a mission that the Army could and should do with those kinds of aircraft?

Absolutely not.

The way the Army and Air components run and apportion the battlefield are night and day different.

Along with that the Army has no support functions (intel, fire support, logistics, etc) that are specifically aviation trained. We simply don't do a good enough job at aviation and it won't get better if we absorb the lower shelf of the air plan.

We use attack aviation in the Army as a maneuver element. To the ground commander they are no different than tanks. And because you've got literally 1 helicopter pilot at the brigade planning the ground mission they are usually poorly integrated and lacking all the things that make the AF air power so successful (integrated SEAD, Intel, airspace, etc).

We have great pilots who can and will move heaven and earth to protect the guys on the ground, but we suck as an aviation force.


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[killbilly]

Absolutely not.

The way the Army and Air components run and apportion the battlefield are night and day different.

Along with that the Army has no support functions (intel, fire support, logistics, etc) that are specifically aviation trained. We simply don't do a good enough job at aviation and it won't get better if we absorb the lower shelf of the air plan.

We use attack aviation in the Army as a maneuver element. To the ground commander they are no different than tanks. And because you've got literally 1 helicopter pilot at the brigade planning the ground mission they are usually poorly integrated and lacking all the things that make the AF air power so successful (integrated SEAD, Intel, airspace, etc).

We have great pilots who can and will move heaven and earth to protect the guys on the ground, but we suck as an aviation force.


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Good points all around. I should have phrased the question differently - you answered the one I asked, instead of the one I intended to ask. Your mind-reading skills suck.

What I should have asked - should the Army evolve itself - from an organizational and doctrinal perspective - to be able to do that kind of mission itself, instead of relying on the AF, who seem to have different priorities? In other words, should/could the Army suck less at the aviation part so that it could run its own aviation missions better and let the AF concentrate on things like space and nukes?

 

[Lawman]

Good points all around. I should have phrased the question differently - you answered the one I asked, instead of the one I intended to ask. Your mind-reading skills suck.

What I should have asked - should the Army evolve itself - from an organizational and doctrinal perspective - to be able to do that kind of mission itself, instead of relying on the AF, who seem to have different priorities? In other words, should/could the Army suck less at the aviation part so that it could run its own aviation missions better and let the AF concentrate on things like space and nukes?

No, in fact I think we need to rely on and have more input from the Air component elements at LNO positions outside what currently exists.

Right now you've got the TACP and the ALO (Tactical air control party and Air Liaison Officer) but they exist only in the ground Brigade Combat Team. They are there to provide planning but simultaneously being a separate service provides them protection from dumb Army stuff that wouldn't be afforded a more robust Army aviation element. We need those same people in the Aviation Brigade. It is ridiculous that the only person I have to plan SEAD and airspace integration is an artillery officer/NCO. This is 1/12 Aviation CABs and I have no Aviation expertise that isn't limited to what the Army does.

To give you an idea of what we are fighting against, every aviator in other services has a TS clearance and access to some sort of SIPR cafe/vault for planning purposes. We have 2 people in a 400 person aviation battalion who will have TS clearances (commander and S2) beyond that it's if the unit will pay for it. I can count on 1 hand the number of secret level pilots Friday aviator briefs I've participated in during my career, and I've given most of them fighting against the SP who wanted to have another class on "fundamentals of instrument flying" or some other inane day 1 aviator crap.


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[MikeD]

This x 100.

I never showed up at a TIC and had the JTAC or GFC say, "Aww, never mind Dude...we wanted A-10s. You guys are cleared off."

Yup. As alluded to already, CAS is a mission, not an aircraft/platform. Many aircraft/platforms do the mission of CAS. They do it different ways, using some different munitions, and are more effective in some situations and/or less effective in others; but they do CAS. Whether an MQ-9, an AC-130, an A-10, or an AV-8.

The question that should be driving acquisition is "what will do the job 95% of the time for the requirements we expect." Instead we keep getting wrapped around a most dangerous scenario imagined problem which leads down serious development rabbit holes.

Agreed.

Right now in the Stan or a similar fight in say Africa a hellfire and persistent ISR capability will solve nearly all of the problems you will find. More than that becomes massive overkill. While a Hawg will obviously carry more, it doesn't at all have to. In fact currently they simply aren't carrying anything near max ordnance because they simply don't need it. Having 16000lbs of 5 sticks of Mk 82s and cluster bombs would be needed in a Fulda Gap Russian horde of the 80s scenario, but it's a lot of mail to carry when your fight is against a guy in a Hilux or an IED emplacement team. .

To give you an idea, I never carried anything near the 15K of ordnance I supposedly could carry. Generally, our loadout in the Hog was 4 x Mk-82s, 1 x AGM-65, 2 x LAU-68/131 (7 shot rockets) [or 1 LAU and 1 SUU-25 dispenser for night operations], and 30mm gun. The AGM couldn't really be used for CAS as it wasn't optimal and would be last option, but the rest could. That's not a lot of ordnance at all. The USMC AV-8 squadron we had parked next to us carried even less: 1 x GBU-16, 1 external fuel tank, 1 x LAU of 7-shot rockets, 1 x targeting pod, and I think some 25mm. Neither of us were carrying much for a variety of reasons.......altitude/weight, time of year, performance, etc. Even in Desert Storm, the Hog wasn't carrying a large amount of ordnance, not much more than whats listed here.

 

[MikeD]

So I'm fascinated with the idea of the Bronco and or Super Tucano coming into real service in Afghanistan and other wars as a cheaper alternative to jet CAS.....So realistically how much firepower can something like this bring to the fight? Id be a little disappointed if I called in for air support expecting an A10 and a Tucano shows up shooting BBs.

A Bronco would generally bring 2 or 4 x LAU-131 rocket pods with 7 rockets each pod, and if installed, 4 x 7.62mm machine guns. Possibly an extra pod of rockets on each wing station, but maybe not. That was their basic ordnance loadout in Vietnam. Whereas the USAF used OV-10s for FAC duties, the USN used them as a dedicated light attack platform in that war with the VAL-4 squadron, that provided CAS support for riverine forces in the far south of South Vietnam, along with the UH-1B gunships of their sister helicopter attack squadron HAL-3.

 

[///AMG]

Interesting you mention the Mav was your last choice. I assume you weren't shooting LMAV in that case? Collectively, we shot a ton in Iraq. In a lot of common scenarios, it was the best thing we had in the SCL, other than maybe the gun (also used frequently).

 

[Lawman]

Interesting you mention the Mav was your last choice. I assume you weren't shooting LMAV in that case? Collectively, we shot a ton in Iraq. In a lot of common scenarios, it was the best thing we had in the SCL, other than maybe the gun (also used frequently).

Always interesting the love vs hate based of the service seeker of choice on Maverick.

Navy/Marines seemed to love the laser Maverick even though its shaped warhead actually restricts the the hell out of its lethality vs a 500lbs. Meanwhile the Air Force is slinging mostly TV or IR contrast lock on Mavericks (basically a walleye with a motor) and they are mostly there to be a silver bullet to keep you out of the wez of a ground threat.

Kinda similarly we have a different opinion of hellfire amongst services/communities. All the 60 guys from DAP or Navy communities would rather sling something else to include rockets. Hellfire is the primary for Army attack now that the Kiowa is out of the fight. With the Romeo model we're only scratching the surface because we can't actually reprogram the warhead yet from the seat until aircraft software catches up.

I just hope we hurry up and get JAGM so I can get some more standoff for a fight with actual ground threat because hellfire isn't nearly as long a spear as it used to be.

 

[MikeD]

Interesting you mention the Mav was your last choice. I assume you weren't shooting LMAV in that case? Collectively, we shot a ton in Iraq. In a lot of common scenarios, it was the best thing we had in the SCL, other than maybe the gun (also used frequently).

Always interesting the love vs hate based of the service seeker of choice on Maverick.

Navy/Marines seemed to love the laser Maverick even though its shaped warhead actually restricts the the hell out of its lethality vs a 500lbs. Meanwhile the Air Force is slinging mostly TV or IR contrast lock on Mavericks (basically a walleye with a motor) and they are mostly there to be a silver bullet to keep you out of the wez of a ground threat.
.

USAF didn't begin using a laser variant of the AGM-65 until somewhat recently, as for the longest time the E/F Mavericks were a USN/USMC thing only. In my time it was the B (EO) Maverick and D/G (IIR) Maverick, though I fired a number of A (EO) Mav's in my time as they reached the end of their shelf lives. The problem with using these particular versions around friendlies was the need to lock them onto the target prior to launch, but the possibility of them losing that lock just after launch and going stupid....impacting who knows where, or worse, locking onto something else. Those versions of the AGM-65, one of their 14 or so algoithms that the seeker head uses is called Launch Transient Assist. What LTA basically does is open the launch gates in the seeker head during the launch transient, when the missile is leaving the rail and all the experiencing acceleration/G's etc, so as to help it not lose the target its locked onto. However the LTA doesn't always work as advertised, particularly if the seeker is "having to work".....ie- off boresight or something where it can't necessarily be somewhat stable and looking off the nose. Having the Maverick lose lock on launch and go to who knows where, is an unacceptable risk of accidentally hitting friendlies.

During the battle for Khafji on the night of 29 January 1991 during the first Gulf war, elements of the USMCs D/1 LAI with their LAV-25s were the only unit available to repel Iraqi 6th Armored T-55 and T-62 tanks that were attacking en masse as a decoy. As they engaged the Iraqi tanks, requested CAS showed up in the form of A-10s, who were having difficulty sorting out the Iraqi tanks from the USMC LAVs in the darkness (this was pre-NVG and prior to A-10s having done any normal work in darkness) and one of the A-10s kicked out a few LUU-2 flares to attempt to illuminate the battle field for target ID. The Hog pilot spotted an Iraqi tank, locked it with a D model Maverick, and fired. The Maverick headed for the Iraqi tank, apparently lost lock and began to turn, then headed for one of the USMC LAV-25s....apparently having locked it up..... and impacted the back end of it, killing 7 Marines. That vehicle is pictured below.

Sadly, that wasn't the only blue on blue, as another USMC LAV-25/AT, with a full load of anti-tank missiles onboard, was hit by a missile from another LAV-25 that mistook it for an Iraqi tank, detonating the load of missiles onboard, destroying the LAV and killing its 4 crewmembers.

Since then, the non-laser Mavericks were mainly used for point targets or vehicles not in a TIC situation, due to the probably of the missile going stupid.

 

[zippy]

Right now in the Stan or a similar fight in say Africa a hellfire and persistent ISR capability will solve nearly all of the problems you will find. More than that becomes massive overkill.

Except for when such weapons are engineered and employed to minimize collateral damage so much so that they often have problems neutralizing the target.

 

[Flyinthrew]

USAF didn't begin using a laser variant of the AGM-65 until somewhat recently, as for the longest time the E/F Mavericks were a USN/USMC thing only. In my time it was the B (EO) Maverick and D/G (IIR) Maverick, though I fired a number of A (EO) Mav's in my time as they reached the end of their shelf lives. The problem with using these particular versions around friendlies was the need to lock them onto the target prior to launch, but the possibility of them losing that lock just after launch and going stupid....impacting who knows where, or worse, locking onto something else. Those versions of the AGM-65, one of their 14 or so algoithms that the seeker head uses is called Launch Transient Assist. What LTA basically does is open the launch gates in the seeker head during the launch transient, when the missile is leaving the rail and all the experiencing acceleration/G's etc, so as to help it not lose the target its locked onto. However the LTA doesn't always work as advertised, particularly if the seeker is "having to work".....ie- off boresight or something where it can't necessarily be somewhat stable and looking off the nose. Having the Maverick lose lock on launch and go to who knows where, is an unacceptable risk of accidentally hitting friendlies.

During the battle for Khafji on the night of 29 January 1991 during the first Gulf war, elements of the USMCs D/1 LAI with their LAV-25s were the only unit available to repel Iraqi 6th Armored T-55 and T-62 tanks that were attacking en masse as a decoy. As they engaged the Iraqi tanks, requested CAS showed up in the form of A-10s, who were having difficulty sorting out the Iraqi tanks from the USMC LAVs in the darkness (this was pre-NVG and prior to A-10s having done any normal work in darkness) and one of the A-10s kicked out a few LUU-2 flares to attempt to illuminate the battle field for target ID. The Hog pilot spotted an Iraqi tank, locked it with a D model Maverick, and fired. The Maverick headed for the Iraqi tank, apparently lost lock and began to turn, then headed for one of the USMC LAV-25s....apparently having locked it up..... and impacted the back end of it, killing 7 Marines. That vehicle is pictured below.

Sadly, that wasn't the only blue on blue, as another USMC LAV-25/AT, with a full load of anti-tank missiles onboard, was hit by a missile from another LAV-25 that mistook it for an Iraqi tank, detonating the load of missiles onboard, destroying the LAV and killing its 4 crewmembers.

Since then, the non-laser Mavericks were mainly used for point targets or vehicles not in a TIC situation, due to the probably of the missile going stupid.

That really hurts. We worked with A-10s at Nellis a few years ago who were carrying IR MAV. A lot of them went stupid after launch. We had no idea they were still a thing. The mitigating factor in the LMAV is that if it loses laser energy it safes the warhead and lofts so that it lands long. A few weeks later I went to the Warfighter School at Raytheon in Tucson where they were converting IR MAVs to AGM65-E2 variants, which is the newer LMAV. For a primarily air-to-mud dude that factory tour was better than the next two days of AMRAAM nerdery.

As for turboprop CAS, there's definitely a niche available for it. The T-6 and Super Tucano are both fine choices. It needs a good sensor/laser and to be quite honest, APKWS would be the perfect weapon for them. 2 7-shot LAU-68s would be light, lethal, precise, cheap, and symmetrical. It's not going to drop a house but it will put a pair of rockets through a window.

 

[Flyinthrew]

Except for when such weapons are engineered and employed to minimize collateral damage so much so that they often have problems neutralizing the target.

I've released a decent number of -54s on the same target a robot shooting a Hellfire had no effect on. A Hellfire is a tank's worst nightmare. Your survival as a person being chased by a Hellfire is a solid maybe. That said, I've watched people literally stand up out of a bomb crater and walk away.

 

[Lawman]

I've released a decent number of -54s on the same target a robot shooting a Hellfire had no effect on. A Hellfire is a tank's worst nightmare. Your survival as a person being chased by a Hellfire is a solid maybe. That said, I've watched people literally stand up out of a bomb crater and walk away.

We've had the same problem with Hellfire as well. Moon dust really throws all the engagement tables on Pk for a loop. The Romeo model really did it for that missile. The K2A or FA versions would totally take out Habib and his 2 buddies helping him dig a hole but once that frag sleeve was welded on it made the missile have issues against other target sets. Getting the multi use warhead on the Romeo was huge because I could replace my 2 missile cocktail of a N and a K2A with one missile and it was better at both jobs.

Once we go to cockpit selectable height above burst and get some more fuse settings it's really going to open up that weapon which is already doing most of the work in the coin fight.

Funny thing is for all the great work the robots have been doing they actually have a lot of unreached potential to do it better. Having expanded training programs for gunnery and sensors with more user optimization on shooting would grant them lethality they are only starting to see.


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[MikeD]

That really hurts. We worked with A-10s at Nellis a few years ago who were carrying IR MAV. A lot of them went stupid after launch. We had no idea they were still a thing. The mitigating factor in the LMAV is that if it loses laser energy it safes the warhead and lofts so that it lands long. A few weeks later I went to the Warfighter School at Raytheon in Tucson where they were converting IR MAVs to AGM65-E2 variants, which is the newer LMAV. For a primarily air-to-mud dude that factory tour was better than the next two days of AMRAAM nerdery.

The AGM-65 in general is a great weapon, its limitations in a fight like Khafji just werent known until that battle occurred, as it had never been tested or used to the extremes of its performance. Why the USAF didnt invest in making platforms able to use the E/F laser version earlier, i have no idea. In the Hog, it wasnt until well after targeting pods were installed that even LGBs were carried. We'd always had the ability to carry an LGB prior to that, but just never did due to someone else having to designate for it.

Another problem with the A/B/D/G versions were the lock-on and firing ranges. For the A/B EO versions, they required a 1x1 and a 0.5x0.5 mil min target size for the gates to lock onto. That equated to about a 3 mile and 4 mile, respectively, lock on range; and a 2 mile and 3 mile firing range, respectively, for the A/B Mav. Ranges well within any enemy AAA/SAM WEZ while you are a wings-level duck and heads into the cockpit trying to get a target lock on. The D/G IIR versions were about a 5-6 mile lock on, beyond that being too far for target visual ID in the screen or for the flashing cross in the screen to become steady prior to launch.