Another one - Page, AZ

I had a long response typed out, but suffice to say that pressures exist to sometimes push the limits of your abilities.
 
Pressures may exist but it is the sharp pilot, the head in the game pilot who may anticipate the result of those pressures. Such a pilot seeks to identify ways or means by which he may decouple the aircraft or flight crew from probable outcome. This even without properly identifying the exact nature of such pressures. In real time it is more necessary that the pilot ident the result than the cause itself.

Too, the best way to avoid operating outside the envelope is to continually expand the envelope. Even lacking a requisite experience to meet any pressure, whether it be external or internal, simply knowing one is outside the envelope is usually sufficient to put into play the series of responses to that unusual condition. This without even knowing or understanding what the heck just happened.
 
desertdog71 said:
I have no idea what you just said but, ok.
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A wing on fire...it is not necessary for you to know why the wing is on fire or to assess how that happened. Or, at least, that information is inferior to the knowledge that you need to put the thing on the ground right now. Precious time is lost as you consider how they wing came to be on fire, all the while not effecting a proper response. All you are concerned of is how to effect that expeditiously and in a safe manner. Risk Assessment 101

CFR rolls on a crash scene. Deplaning the personnel is task numero uno. How to effect that is important but only in that it aids in completing the primary task. Hot ejection seat, live ordnance, ballistic parachutes etc should be considerations but that is secondary - even though necessary - to the task. Even deplaning said personnel in a safe manner is secondary to the task of removing them from the wreckage. Aviators have incurred additional injuries while being extracted. That is unfortunate but it remains inferior to the primary task of rescue.

So far, I've addressed the hierarchy of 'life, limb, property'. This is only tangential to the original point. Getting back to that point, consider that there is a hierarchy in response to unusual conditions. Plane won't climb - check throttle at full power, wing flaps retracted to at least take off setting, etc. My point is there exists a hierarchy, a matrix, a decision tree which all constitute an established format by which we may more adequately meet and overcome the undesired condition. It is not necessarily necessary that we identify the nature of the condition, all that is necessary is that we recognize that Something Is Not Right.

However, knowledge is power. This especially rings true in an unusual condition. The proper response is built upon the ability to define the nature of the condition. There may exist more than one proper response but it is knowledge which allows us to determine which is the best. The obverse side is a flight crew which flails unknowing and ignorant about the cockpit. The result is something is being done but noe of which immediately corrects the problem. Even experience 121 crews have fallen into this trap Let the NTSB and others perform the forensic analysis.

I admit this may be overly esoteric of a subject. Yet how many, honest show of hands here, devote their time to regularly studying emergency procedures? The goal is to become familiar with the procedures.
 
In perhaps more relatable terms to desertdog, while flying tours out of Page, I had already decided that in the case of emergency there would be fatal injuries among my passengers. This in spite of my every attempt to anticipate, to run the 'what if' scenarios through my mind, or my time spent to become intimately familiar with POH emergency procedures. It was only by seriously thinking of the situation, while not belaboring the probability thereof, that I was able to rectify unto myself, that is, to 'condition' myself to that unhappy circumstance. IOW, I would not be unnecessarily encumbered by wasting assets in a zero sum game thereby better able to provide for the survivors yet avoiding myself being the 'victim' of circumstance. The reality of such a scene is troubling yet thank God I was not exposed to that reality. Nonetheless, it was my desire to be prepared for that event but without thought of the probability thereof. I do not insist we should involve ourselves with every conceivable probability but in this case the consequences are so large that it demands our reasoned thought.

Speaking only of myself it is a huge step forward in overcoming the psychological barrier which a passenger's fatal injury represents to the pilot. Once on the other side of that barrier I would presume to be more capable of my duties.
 
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Perhaps we're talking about two different things.

Fact is that all the operators at KPGA have the same goal. Revenue. Secondary to that goal is safety and passenger comfort. There comes that point when these (likely inexperienced) pilots are told to fly when conditions are questionable. Both from a passenger comfort point of view and also safety.

Example. The winds are 270 28G38 and lenticular clouds are sitting atop Navajo mountain. A bus load of French tourists with cash in hand arrives and they want to see Rainbow bridge.

Is the ride going to suck? Yes. Is it safe? Maybe but it depends on the pilot and the equipment. Is the operator going to turn away that revenue? Hell no.

With the eyes of the passengers, company, and fellow pilots willing to do it on you. Are you going to make the correct choice? Again it depends on the skill level, but we know how this is going to play out.

Now I don't know if this relates to the accident above because we don't know exactly what happened or the conditions at the time. Using the short crosswind runway should be a clue though.

So we have a likely inexperienced pilot in a 172 with high density altitude and likely some challenging winds. Using a less than ideal runway either for departure or arrival. We don't know which. Likely with the pressure to get the job done.

At least that is how I see it. It's unfortunate but it's also reality. I feel for all these pilots that find themselves in these situations.

People can down play it all they want but I know how it is. It was a great experience and I'm happy for having it, but I also see in hindsight how things could have ended badly a few times. Unfortunately it did for a few folks in recent years at PGA and Monument Valley in single piston aircraft, operated at max gross, in high DA and challenging conditions. I won't pretend that operating on the edge isn't at least part of the problem in these recent accidents.
 
desertdog71 said:
Perhaps we're talking about two different things.

Fact is that all the operators at KPGA have the same goal. Revenue. Secondary to that goal is safety and passenger comfort. There comes that point when these (likely inexperienced) pilots are told to fly when conditions are questionable. Both from a passenger comfort point of view and also safety.

Example. The winds are 270 28G38 and lenticular clouds are sitting atop Navajo mountain. A bus load of French tourists with cash in hand arrives and they want to see Rainbow bridge.

Is the ride going to suck? Yes. Is it safe? Maybe but it depends on the pilot and the equipment. Is the operator going to turn away that revenue? Hell no.

With the eyes of the passengers, company, and fellow pilots willing to do it on you. Are you going to make the correct choice? Again it depends on the skill level, but we know how this is going to play out.

Now I don't know if this relates to the accident above because we don't know exactly what happened or the conditions at the time. Using the short crosswind runway should be a clue though.

So we have a likely inexperienced pilot in a 172 with high density altitude and likely some challenging winds. Using a less than ideal runway either for departure or arrival. We don't know which. Likely with the pressure to get the job done.

At least that is how I see it. It's unfortunate but it's also reality. I feel for all these pilots that find themselves in these situations.

People can down play it all they want but I know how it is. It was a great experience and I'm happy for having it, but I also see in hindsight how things could have ended badly a few times. Unfortunately it did for a few folks in recent years at PGA and Monument Valley in single piston aircraft, operated at max gross, in high DA and challenging conditions. I won't pretend that operating on the edge isn't at least part of the problem in these recent accidents.
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By formal declaration in airport policy and in AA company policy, there are no departures from 7/25. Landings on 7/25 are permitted or allowed. Of course, a pilot may decide otherwise. Not gonna mention names but not only did I witness a series of C-208s depart in trail on 25 but the pilots themselves told me that they were going to do exactly that. That they were able to depart on 25 is evidential of capacity of the rwy. It appeared safe to me however I think the term 'safe' is open to interpretation per differing persons.

I've been in known turbulent conditions so violent that, against tight lap belt and shoulder harness, plastic pieces rained upon me with headset askew after I hit my head on the overhead. All pilots had prior knowledge of such conditions. That was not a singular occurrence. (In such instances, and there were many, I would play up to the pax that we're on our way to an airborne rodeo. Foreigners love all things Western, I simply exploited that but with the desire to calm jittery nerves. As always, a better informed pax is more apt to behave.) That said, there were several days over the course of the season when the pilots acted en masse to say no one will be flying. The only response available to the company was to formerly state to the tour guides that the fleet is grounded due to weather. Yes, some pilots did bow out voluntarily or if not, the CP made the decisions for them. In no instance that I observed were those pilots made the subject of ridicule. So, that seems to beat holes in your comment about profit over flight safety.

Once I became aware of the bump as 25 crosses 15/33 I had no problem using 25 for landing a 207 whether zero pax, minimum fuel or at gross weight whether in calm winds or strong gusts or strong winds.

Of course there was pressure from management. It is, after all, a commercial operation. It is requisite of pilots to resist that pressure, namely by knowing the FARs or Op Specs. Once, I was taken to task by company owner for being 'afraid' (yes, he actually accused me of being afraid) of flying with a non functioning wing flap motor. I simply said the item cannot be deferred. Problem solved, problem staying solved.


There is an update to the previous fatal accident at Page. Apparently that ex-GCA plane experienced partial engine failure. To me this is a reminder that even that outside of our collective consciousness should be considered as contributing cause therefore we should be more careful when presuming cause. I plead guilty in this regard.
 
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