Allegiant makes headlines

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Let's think about the accident chain. Both the dispatcher and the pilot in command (let's not forget about joint responsibility) missed the NOTAM. They're bound by a fuel policy that discourages carrying contingency fuel. The pilots don't fly much, so their skills are probably a bit rusty. KFAR, ATC, and the Blue Angels were unwilling, unable, or unprepared to handle an irregular operation.

So far the discussion is revolving around who's to blame. Perhaps, instead of fixing blame, we should be fixing the problem.
 
Let's think about the accident chain. Both the dispatcher and the pilot in command (let's not forget about joint responsibility) missed the NOTAM. They're bound by a fuel policy that discourages carrying contingency fuel. The pilots don't fly much, so their skills are probably a bit rusty. KFAR, ATC, and the Blue Angels were unwilling, unable, or unprepared to handle an irregular operation.

So far the discussion is revolving around who's to blame. Perhaps, instead of fixing blame, we should be fixing the problem.
Oh wise grasshopper, quit trying to be proactive. No one, I mean no one, in this industry is proactive.
 
Let's think about the accident chain. Both the dispatcher and the pilot in command (let's not forget about joint responsibility) missed the NOTAM. They're bound by a fuel policy that discourages carrying contingency fuel. The pilots don't fly much, so their skills are probably a bit rusty. KFAR, ATC, and the Blue Angels were unwilling, unable, or unprepared to handle an irregular operation.

So far the discussion is revolving around who's to blame. Perhaps, instead of fixing blame, we should be fixing the problem.

Problem was a lack of situational awareness by the dispatcher and the crew. The Navy is blameless, and this was not an irregular operation, it was a scheduled flight arriving behind schedule. These guys weren't running out of gas or on fire, they were just asleep at the wheel. Los Federales don't give a half a crap about how rusty the crew was. They were certified and qualified, they ought to know what they're doing.

The solution is the FAA asking questions to the dispatcher and the crew as to why they were arriving at an airfield that was NOTAM'd closed, with follow up as necessary considering the answers given. If the players in question had half a brain among them, they all submitted ASAP and.or NASA reports on this before the engines were cool.

I know we are all getting twisted around the prop about why they didn't just open the airfield. Irrelevant question. Concentrate on what happened, not what we wished would have happened.
 
Heres an interesting thought, this being a career oriented forum, maybe dispatchers shouldn't apply for work at a carrier like Allegiant? Going to such shady operators is putting your license at great risk and you may be better staying where you are or unemployed than putting yourself in an environment where you could lose your license or have a major violation.
 
Problem was a lack of situational awareness by the dispatcher and the crew. The Navy is blameless, and this was not an irregular operation, it was a scheduled flight arriving behind schedule. These guys weren't running out of gas or on fire, they were just asleep at the wheel. Los Federales don't give a half a crap about how rusty the crew was. They were certified and qualified, they ought to know what they're doing.

The solution is the FAA asking questions to the dispatcher and the crew as to why they were arriving at an airfield that was NOTAM'd closed, with follow up as necessary considering the answers given. If the players in question had half a brain among them, they all submitted ASAP and.or NASA reports on this before the engines were cool.

I know we are all getting twisted around the prop about why they didn't just open the airfield. Irrelevant question. Concentrate on what happened, not what we wished would have happened.

I'm concentrating on WHY something happened, and WHAT can be done in the future to prevent it. No less than three qualified aviation professionals apparently failed to correctly evaluate the ramifications of the NOTAM vis-a-vis their operating schedule. Or they missed it entirely. Why is that?

Stop and think about it. The pilots were the D.O. and the DIRECTOR OF SAFETY! You'd think that if anyone would be extra cautious, it'd be these two, particularly when you consider that they probably don't fly very often. And yet they BOTH missed a critical piece of information, along with the Dispatcher. I can see 1, possibly 2, people missing it. But all three?

When you consider this event in the light of Allegiant's operating history, I see a company that does not have a safety culture at work. So, yes, while these three individuals may be at fault, there's something else going on there. What is it?

On a side note, some are criticizing the pilots, saying they should have gone somewhere else. As a pilot, one of the first things I learned is that the best place to land in an emergency is the airport right beneath you. When you'd got a problem, you don't fly away from a perfectly serviceable airport because you don't want to inconvenience someone. Unless there's a big hole in the runway, I'm landing there, and everyone else can get out of the way.
 
@pljenkins

Thanks for the lesson in on-the-spot CRM.

It's not important, but we were lead to believe by TVC approach that the Blues would be done in "10 minutes," "Another 10 minutes," and "They're almost done...I just don't know when they'll be finished."

So, no big deal, we rolled out to GRR.

You ready to finish the lesson and tell me how I, as a flight crew member, acted inappropriately in the scenario I shared? lol

If the airport was closed, it was closed. We held. Managed our fuel appropriately. When it was time to call it a segment, we left the hold and landed at GRR. A non-event. Especially when compared to what Allegiant's superior Executive Pilots did (re: throwing a temper tantrum).

Points for using the right example of this phrase.

Oh word...[HASHTAG]#fistbump[/HASHTAG]
 
Flying Saluki said:
I'm concentrating on WHY something happened, and WHAT can be done in the future to prevent it. No less than three qualified aviation professionals apparently failed to correctly evaluate the ramifications of the NOTAM vis-a-vis their operating schedule. Or they missed it entirely. Why is that?

Laziness? Oversaturation? Lack of understanding of how to interpret NOTAMS? Making assumptions? Only they know the why.

Stop and think about it. The pilots were the D.O. and the DIRECTOR OF SAFETY! You'd think that if anyone would be extra cautious, it'd be these two, particularly when you consider that they probably don't fly very often. And yet they BOTH missed a critical piece of information, along with the Dispatcher. I can see 1, possibly 2, people missing it. But all three?

Well here's a potential problem I see off the bat: There are two part-time pilots in the cockpit. This in my opinion is an error. If management pilots are going to fly a trip they should be paired with a line pilot. The assumption that these guys are management and therefore good pilots is, well, an assumption. You have heard of the term "fail upwards", haven't you?

When you consider this event in the light of Allegiant's operating history, I see a company that does not have a safety culture at work. So, yes, while these three individuals may be at fault, there's something else going on there. What is it?

I'm sure the FSDO is asking the same questions as we speak. Those questions will be answered.

On a side note, some are criticizing the pilots, saying they should have gone somewhere else. As a pilot, one of the first things I learned is that the best place to land in an emergency is the airport right beneath you. When you'd got a problem, you don't fly away from a perfectly serviceable airport because you don't want to inconvenience someone. Unless there's a big hole in the runway, I'm landing there, and everyone else can get out of the way.

I don't think anyone is questioning what the pilots did after declaring an emergency. Once the captain uttered the E word the rules change, so yeah they got where they wanted to go, but sure as hell their phones were ringing before they got out of the airplane.

What I am questioning, and what the FAA is going to want answers on, is why, in the face of an EFC that clearly exceeded their fuel capabilities, did they still elect to hold until their fuel situation became such that it became necessary to declare an emergency. This is poor decision making and a lack of understanding of the situation. When they arrived in the hold they had plenty of gas to reach a suitable alternate, but my point is, and the FAA's point is, they should have never left the ground without verification that the airport could accommodate them?
 
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