Serious question, protecting it from what? The bulletproof, locked door isnt enough?
The pilots do come and go out of the cockpit during flight as you know, and the door is opened briefly. They are brought food and drink as well. Yes, someone is stationed there, but so what? The pilots use the forward lav as well. There may be times when they have to go back to the main cabin as well. There are other reasons that don't need to be gone into also, but Mike is correct when he said that their primary objective is to guard the flight deck and the pilots.
Robert MacLean - Former TSA Federal Air Marshal recently wrote:"
1. Install front galley “cable-gates” on all aircraft as used on a scant number of United Airlines aircraft
2. Equip every flight deck with modified shotguns
3. Make air marshal duty a one-year temporary detail available to all federal law enforcement officers
4. Keep a streamlined cadre of permanent Federal Air Marshal teams that can quickly react to specific threats, not blanket deployments
5. Reassign the majority of current Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) to be Special Agent / Criminal Investigators (Occupation Series 1811) to conduct ground-based operations in order to prevent hijackers from boarding aircraft, to prevent IEDs
from exploding in airports, and to prevent IEDs being smuggled into aircraft
6. Equip flight crewmembers with electric Taser devices and other non-lethal tools in order to subdue unruly passengers and defend the flight deck — air marshals should not be dealing with unruly passengers due to the possibility of an organized terrorist ruse
7. Armor flight deck firewalls on all aircraft
8. Require all non-air marshal law enforcement passengers carrying firearms to secure them inside the flight deck during flight
9. Terminate Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program once all aforementioned physical security measures are put in place
10. Pass and well publicize a law that gives flight crews, Captains, and/or air marshals the authority to deputize general passengers as air marshals
11. Implement biometric systems to positively identify air marshals, non-air marshal law enforcement officers, and pilots; and to free-up more security resources
12. Develop “Doomsday Procedure” in the case a terrorist cell smuggles excessive firepower onto aircraft.
Once you implement most or all of these changes, air marshals can be better deployed in tactical scenarios and not strategic ones.
No one on the aircraft should be formally notified that air marshals are on board until a situation warrants it. Then the pilot in command can communicate with the ground to get verification where the air marshals are seated and who they are.
No matter what scenario you think of, the flight deck is by far the most vulnerable and some attention needs to be focused there."
Sincerely,
Robert MacLean
Former Federal Air Marshal (2001 - 2006)
Interesting that the airlines don't seem to be concerned with revenue loss and the hundreds of thousands of deadheading crew members every year, but Air Marshals concern their pocketbooks suddenly.
How many airlines have reimbursed the government for the money given to them by taxpayers to upgrade the cockpit doors? How many airlines provide paid leave for their pilots to attend TSA federal flight deck officer training? How many airlines provide their crew members with paid time to attend TSA crew member self defense training? Have the airlines done anything to take ownership of their security responsibilities?