Highest I've ever hand-flown (admittedly neither Boeing nor Airbus) was FL370. I didn't like it. AP was inop (pre-RVSM days).
In the ole T-38, all we could do was hand fly up at those altitudes. A little finesse went a long way.
Highest I've ever hand-flown (admittedly neither Boeing nor Airbus) was FL370. I didn't like it. AP was inop (pre-RVSM days).
In the ole T-38, all we could do was hand fly up at those altitudes. A little finesse went a long way.
Thanks. I'm aware of the balancing act between stalling and overspeeding, but didn't know about the delayed response after making inputs, leading to PIO's. Makes sense though.Highest I've ever hand-flown (admittedly neither Boeing nor Airbus) was FL370. I didn't like it. AP was inop (pre-RVSM days).
Because of the thinner air the airplane tends to be less responsive, you need greater deflection of a control surface to achieve the same reaction of a lesser input in thicker air. Because the aircraft's reaction time for a given input (as compared to lower altitude) is increased, pilot's tend to over control the aircraft using larger inputs, and thus experiencing PIO.
The problem with that can be the so called coffin corner, where you may be near critical AOA for stall, but also near a speed at which the local airflow around the wing surfaces have reached Mach1. A shockwave over the wing develops and eventually can lead to mach tuck.
I'm not a fan of pilots intentionally hand flying an aircraft at altitude, but I am a fan of pilots receiving appropriate training in this area, especially concerning high altitude upset recovery.
Very good video here
(pre-RVSM days).
Oh reheheheheaaalllllllyyyyyy?
Yessir.. fall of 2004.
The actual flying itself, generally speaking, is the easy part of most emergencies. The troubleshooting of the emergency itself is the more difficult part. Hence it makes sense for the more experienced person to be working the EP, while the lesser experienced person need only keep the plane from hitting other planes, the ground or anything attached to the ground, while assisting beyond that to the best of their ability.
Well of course clearly, but when the control of the airplane is in serious question, the captain needs to step in more aggressively. What's that thing we learned/taught as instructors? Aviate Navigate Communicate. Fly the plane first. Aviating/Flying the plane was clearly not happening successfully at the hands of the first officer, and why I made the statement about the CA needing to step in in that moment. Besides it would be very distracting to run a QRH procedure (or whatever Airbus calls it) while the airplane is falling out of the sky screaming at you with a highly unusual attitude situation present...
Did you read post #30, by chance?![]()
I did. Somehow I thought you posted the one I replied to after that post this morning when I logged in on JC on my phone.![]()
I completely agree. You hold the stick at the aft limit in an Airbus, or a Cessna, and you're going to impact terrain/water. I think the important question is why are there professional pilots that think this is in any way an appropriate control input. The next question is why was there no positive exchange of control? I think these questions need to be explored before attention is turned to what the electronics can or cannot do.The issue in these accidents isn't the Airbus.
Generally when bad stuff happens, the copilot flies and the captain runs the ECAM. I really don't have any special powers in my left hand that a properly trained copilot doesn't have in his right.
Oh cool. I was afraid that maybe you'd gotten your uh "wires crossed" again. I mean, if I'm a-summin' correctly, you've got 831 hours of !*JET*! time, only some of which was accumulated after 2004. That's a pretty sweet gig! Tell you what, though...unless you were, like, 16 at the time, no more attempted old jokes, gramps.
I agree with this. I don't understand how that wasn't seen in the design phase. How did one of the human factors people they hire not step in and say... uh ya - this thing here where the other pilot is out of the loop from no feedback. Ya, change that.I also think from a human factors perspective, the Airbus flight control model of independent non-moving sticks with an override button and non-moving thrust levers with autothrust detents has failed.
I kind of wonder that if they changed it, someone would see it as admitting fault in design failure and have litigation problems.
The CA had over 20,000 hours and the FO over 2,200 hours including 1,300 (give or take a few hours) in the A-320, and both of them passed their most recent PCs without any issues so I'm not exactly sure how they can be low-time/low-skill unless you're referring to their FAC troubleshooting exposure time and electronic/computer systems engineering skills.
I'm curious as to what your suggested solution for these types of accidents would be . . . maybe make all pilots go through aircraft systems engineering school? Make them fly 1,500 hours in a C-172 or PA-28 that don't have anything resembling FACs or separate side-stick controls so that they can become proficient at basic stall recovery skills? Not to be rude or anything but if you're going to rant about crews like these being too low-skill and low-time to fly transport category aircraft, then the least you can do is tell us how our industry can solve your perceived issue.