Air Methods bankruptcy

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Based on what I’ve seen since they took over our turboprop program it’s kind of surprising, their expenses must have been pretty low since they never fly and they get paid just to have the airplane sitting there…
 
Unfortunately they chose a Customer Satisfaction strategy over an Operational Excellence strategy. There was no clear customer: was it the patient (who gets no say in the choice of medevac provider), was it the physician who orders the medevac (to him or her there was no perception that one provider was better than another - they were completely interchangeable), was it the floor nurse who goes to the Rolodex to see which medevac provider is next up (and who could be swayed a bit if you gave her loads of inexpensive swag), was it the insurance company that actually paid the invoice for services, etc? With no clear customer it’s really hard to build a strategy around Customer Satisfaction.

If they’d focused on Operation Excellence, and made certain they were the most efficient provider of transports they might have been able to decrease their operating costs and captured more flights.

And if they’d done something to eliminate the bogus flight turndowns, that would have helped, too: “Oh, I see thunderstorms 250 miles away and they’re moving this way at 25 mph. I better turn down this 30 minute flight.” [I’m looking at you, Jon]. “Oh, I see there’s a missing flake of gelcoat on the tail faring - the plane’s not airworthy.” [I’m looking at you, George]

American Securities, the private equity firm that controls Air Methods, has some really, really smart people on their staff, but none of them were able to see the poorly chosen strategy.

It was an . . . interesting . . . experience.
 
Unfortunately they chose a Customer Satisfaction strategy over an Operational Excellence strategy. There was no clear customer: was it the patient (who gets no say in the choice of medevac provider), was it the physician who orders the medevac (to him or her there was no perception that one provider was better than another - they were completely interchangeable), was it the floor nurse who goes to the Rolodex to see which medevac provider is next up (and who could be swayed a bit if you gave her loads of inexpensive swag), was it the insurance company that actually paid the invoice for services, etc? With no clear customer it’s really hard to build a strategy around Customer Satisfaction.

If they’d focused on Operation Excellence, and made certain they were the most efficient provider of transports they might have been able to decrease their operating costs and captured more flights.

And if they’d done something to eliminate the bogus flight turndowns, that would have helped, too: “Oh, I see thunderstorms 250 miles away and they’re moving this way at 25 mph. I better turn down this 30 minute flight.” [I’m looking at you, Jon]. “Oh, I see there’s a missing flake of gelcoat on the tail faring - the plane’s not airworthy.” [I’m looking at you, George]

American Securities, the private equity firm that controls Air Methods, has some really, really smart people on their staff, but none of them were able to see the poorly chosen strategy.

It was an . . . interesting . . . experience.
Sounds a lot like Kodak. We'll leave Enron, and Theranos, and FTX, and... and... and... alone for now. Those latter were actual crimes that got billions in funding.

Latter Day 'Murican Capitalism: Gullibility & Cash.

(Hint: the cash almost always runs out before the gullibility does.)
 
It’s amazing seeing some bases, and some shifts, who try to turn down flights for all kinds of questionable reasons; not realizing that there is high risk for their base to be closed due to lack of productivity. Air Methods is known to close bases with next to no prep or warning. Sure, there are any number of legitimate reasons to refuse a mission, but the number that seem to get refused for no good reason, seems to happen with some frequency.
 
And if they’d done something to eliminate the bogus flight turndowns, that would have helped, too: “Oh, I see thunderstorms 250 miles away and they’re moving this way at 25 mph. I better turn down this 30 minute flight.” [I’m looking at you, Jon]. “Oh, I see there’s a missing flake of gelcoat on the tail faring - the plane’s not airworthy.” [I’m looking at you, George]
Oh, so it wasn’t just the guys they sent up to our program? I had heard from other alumni that they were pretty good as medevac ops go, but maybe things changed or as with everything else in medevac it was just wildly base/program dependent
 
Oh, so it wasn’t just the guys they sent up to our program? I had heard from other alumni that they were pretty good as medevac ops go, but maybe things changed or as with everything else in medevac it was just wildly base/program dependent
Our fixed-wing base had a few pilots who had little PIC time (i.e., they were regional airline washouts). They had no experience making decisions: their entire career up to that point had been doing what they were told to do. So they didn’t know how to evaluate weather or runway conditions and therefore often made a no-go decision because it was the least risk for them. These same people became experts at putting flights on wx delay until the next shift arrived, and often the incoming pilot couldn’t accept the flight because the wx was now too close. So Management was at fault for a) hiring pilots who were unsuited for the job and b) failing to recognize the types of training pilots needed to help them make good decisions.

It didn’t help that management was fearful of the union and hadn’t figured out a non-confrontational way to work with pilots. The Chief Pilot didn’t hide his anger with the union and it filtered down into the regional management. Also, there were regional managers who went out of their way to jam up pilots, and that had the effect of discouraging pilot-initiated efforts to improve productivity. This combination of factors made it impossible to work collaboratively on changes that would have increased the number of flights.
 
On the rotary wing side, many of the pilots I run Into, are very young; and talking to them, it’s apparent that they didn’t bring much to the table experience wise and that the company (and likely many other medevac companies), have lowered the expectations for this. These guys just don’t have an SA bag of tricks and related background to dig from, unlike back in the day of what was expected and competitive. Could certainly be just the times today with a shortage of pilots, but it is ironic that lesser skilled and experienced pilots, are getting paid more than their experienced predecessors did.
 
On the rotary wing side, many of the pilots I run Into, are very young; and talking to them, it’s apparent that they didn’t bring much to the table experience wise and that the company (and likely many other medevac companies), have lowered the expectations for this. These guys just don’t have an SA bag of tricks and related background to dig from, unlike back in the day of what was expected and competitive. Could certainly be just the times today with a shortage of pilots, but it is ironic that lesser skilled and experienced pilots, are getting paid more than their experienced predecessors did.

We (Army) stopped have everybody pull thousand+ hour deployments ~10 years ago.

Results of not having a massive crop of retiring CW3 Hawk/Chinook guys retire every year with 3-4K hours predictable.


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Our fixed-wing base had a few pilots who had little PIC time (i.e., they were regional airline washouts). They had no experience making decisions: their entire career up to that point had been doing what they were told to do. So they didn’t know how to evaluate weather or runway conditions and therefore often made a no-go decision because it was the least risk for them. These same people became experts at putting flights on wx delay until the next shift arrived, and often the incoming pilot couldn’t accept the flight because the wx was now too close. So Management was at fault for a) hiring pilots who were unsuited for the job and b) failing to recognize the types of training pilots needed to help them make good decisions.

It didn’t help that management was fearful of the union and hadn’t figured out a non-confrontational way to work with pilots. The Chief Pilot didn’t hide his anger with the union and it filtered down into the regional management. Also, there were regional managers who went out of their way to jam up pilots, and that had the effect of discouraging pilot-initiated efforts to improve productivity. This combination of factors made it impossible to work collaboratively on changes that would have increased the number of flights.
Sounds pretty different than the guys we got. In fact the only ones who ever flew were the 2 younger guys. Of course one of them had carried over from the previous vendor and had a bunch of time flying for Hageland previously.
 
Our fixed-wing base had a few pilots who had little PIC time (i.e., they were regional airline washouts). They had no experience making decisions: their entire career up to that point had been doing what they were told to do. So they didn’t know how to evaluate weather or runway conditions and therefore often made a no-go decision because it was the least risk for them. These same people became experts at putting flights on wx delay until the next shift arrived, and often the incoming pilot couldn’t accept the flight because the wx was now too close. So Management was at fault for a) hiring pilots who were unsuited for the job and b) failing to recognize the types of training pilots needed to help them make good decisions.

It didn’t help that management was fearful of the union and hadn’t figured out a non-confrontational way to work with pilots. The Chief Pilot didn’t hide his anger with the union and it filtered down into the regional management. Also, there were regional managers who went out of their way to jam up pilots, and that had the effect of discouraging pilot-initiated efforts to improve productivity. This combination of factors made it impossible to work collaboratively on changes that would have increased the number of flights.
Were you somewhere in the Rockies? That is admittedly a pretty challenging environment to drop an FNG into. I’d much rather learn flying a Van in southeast than getting dumped into a PC12 in Idaho at 3 AM in November. But if that’s what they were doing that’s on the company for not attracting/retaining experienced dudes and not properly training/mentoring the new guys.
 
I am a little curious though roughly what percentage of their programs are vended vs branded…ie, how much of it do they get paid for regardless of how much they fly. I do wonder if we’ll start seeing more of this through the industry as the hospital system is so fubar that need for transport has skyrocketed, while costs of providing said transport have also skyrocketed but reimbursement rates haven’t kept up.
 
Were you somewhere in the Rockies? That is admittedly a pretty challenging environment to drop an FNG into. I’d much rather learn flying a Van in southeast than getting dumped into a PC12 in Idaho at 3 AM in November. But if that’s what they were doing that’s on the company for not attracting/retaining experienced dudes and not properly training/mentoring the new guys.
This was in western TN. Storms tracked from the west to the east and gave plenty of warning. Our area of operation stretched from roughly Rochester, MN - Dallas - north central Florida - Pennsylvania. So a lot of the country, and plenty of terrain, wx, and busy airports. It wasn’t a job well suited to guys who had never made a decision on their own (and, arguably, probably would never be able to due to their personal shortcomings).
 
I am a little curious though roughly what percentage of their programs are vended vs branded…ie, how much of it do they get paid for regardless of how much they fly. I do wonder if we’ll start seeing more of this through the industry as the hospital system is so fubar that need for transport has skyrocketed, while costs of providing said transport have also skyrocketed but reimbursement rates haven’t kept up.
Air Methods has mostly two types of programs: community-based and hospital-based. A community-based program meant a helicopter (or plane) was parked somewhere in a region, and generally served a geography. I never saw the revenue numbers, but I think this part of the business was less profitable. I’m told it depended on the “payor mix,” which I think is code for good insurance vs Medicaid. A hospital-based program is one where the helicopter(s) and/or plane were contracted to work directly with a hospital (and its affiliate clinics). I think these were more likely to be profitable. It’s a privately held company and revenue data was not readily available. So my hunches are driven by what managers shared.
 
Air Methods has mostly two types of programs: community-based and hospital-based. A community-based program meant a helicopter (or plane) was parked somewhere in a region, and generally served a geography. I never saw the revenue numbers, but I think this part of the business was less profitable. I’m told it depended on the “payor mix,” which I think is code for good insurance vs Medicaid. A hospital-based program is one where the helicopter(s) and/or plane were contracted to work directly with a hospital (and its affiliate clinics). I think these were more likely to be profitable. It’s a privately held company and revenue data was not readily available. So my hunches are driven by what managers shared.

The hospital based is definitely more profitable, as it’s guaranteed money, with the contract. Inter-facility transfers of patients was also guaranteed money. While these were not as dynamic as scene calls for helicopters were, the scene calls didn’t necessarily have guaranteed payouts.

It’s similar to the contract fire rescue work I do with my company. When we get a contract for fire rescue coverage of say an aircraft crash rescue assignment; for us, we make more money, the less we do, assuming a flat rate contract. If we have to respond to nothing, then thats no expenditure of resources…..fire suppression equipment and supplies, medical supplies, wear and tear on equipment and gear, the truck, etc. If the truck doesn’t move an inch during one of these contracts, all the better. Even though we are ready to go if something does occur.

One of the contracts we cover is fire rescue for a racetrack. Lately, it’s been easy money, as (big knock on wood) we have had zero accidents or incidents requiring our response. Truck sits parked with us inside geared up and ready to go. Besides a few incidents of both minor and serious medical events in the pit areas, we’ve mostly been the Maytag repairman, for those old enough to understand.
 
Have several medic and RN friends who were part of the recent Arizona base closures. Trash company from top to bottom. HEMS as a whole needs to be reigned in - this whole “dash for cash” mentality is highly unsafe


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I enjoyed my time flying air ambo for them, but I don't think I've ever worked at a more mismanaged company. Way too many chiefs, and not enough Indians. Business majors making ground level aviation management decisions, aviation managers making high level business decisions. It was pretty wild...
 
I enjoyed my time flying air ambo for them, but I don't think I've ever worked at a more mismanaged company. Way too many chiefs, and not enough Indians. Business majors making ground level aviation management decisions, aviation managers making high level business decisions. It was pretty wild...

Area managers getting replaced like musical chairs. At least around here.
 
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