Air India plane crash

Yes, you’re supposed to.

ALL FHE FOLLOWING IS ASSUMING A/T is ARMED for TAKEOFF:



Personally, I only reach up at THR Red when I know it’s going to come back to climb power and follow through with it (like we are supposed to).


I’ve never understood guys that immediately after liftoff, go hands on the power levers. Human instinct when something goes bad is to flinch, and that involves moving their extremities closer to the body. It’s just priming oneself to inadvertently move the thrust levers back, if something goes wrong. And a thrust reduction right after liftoff is bad juju.

From liftoff until just before thrust reduction at 800 ft, there just isn’t a reason to go hands on the power.

I saw this much more so as a FO with CAs. I don’t see it much as CA with FOs.
And that’s just your opinion I assume… not what’s in your book?

As an example, my book says hands and feet on all controls from gear retraction through 2500 ft.
 
And that’s just your opinion I assume… not what’s in your book?

As an example, my book says hands and feet on all controls from gear retraction through 2500 ft.

Our book has the verbiage in a couple posts above, about following through on movement of autothrottles (eg, when they move, you move with your hand on them). After throttle hold during the takeoff roll, the next time they move is at thrust reduction altitude. About 800 ft usually.

Of course, follow your own shop’s procedures.
 
I would think that the benefits of following the power levers during critical phases of flight and catching a potential A/T disconnect (think Asiana hitting the seawall and cartwheeling across SFO) would outweigh this potential flinching scenario, which probably not everybody does.

But I’m not a jet pilot so this opinion is worth the 1s and 0s it’s printed on.

On approach is entirely separate. AP is off and we are controlling the AT manually. Even if AP on and AT on, the power level moves with level odds and descents, so we have to follow through any way.
 
And this is why we can’t have nice things.





Part 121 – Red over Red

This air carrier crew encountered several challenges and distractions on approach to SFO, resulting in an undesired automation mode and flight path. They successfully stabilized the approach and executed a safe landing.

■ ATC cleared us to descend via arrival then at EDDYY transition to the Tipp Toe visual 28L. We set 6000 ft. Approaching EDDYY, ATC told us to descend to 4000 ft. PF (FO) select LVL CHG. ATC advised us traffic Aircraft Y going to 28R. While looking for the traffic, ATC asked us to slow down to 210 kts and if we have the airport and bridge in sight and the traffic. Finally saw the traffic and told ATC airport, bridge and traffic in sight. ATC told us to maintain separation and cleared us for the visual. So we dialed in 1800 ft on the altitude window. We were focusing to make sure we don't overshoot the path because of the traffic threat. Then ATC told us to slow down to 180 then 160 kts until the bridge. PF (FO) asked for gear and flaps configuration to slow down. Confirmed no overshoot. PM (Captain) realized we were inside the approach and asked to set TDZ while heads down to do the configuration changes asked by PF. ATC told us to switch to Tower. Both did not realize we were still in LVL CHG. (Tasked saturated) Accomplished landing checklist before 1000 ft. Approximately 4 NM from the runway. I saw 4 red dots then realized we were low. It was around 750ft. I told the FO to disconnect autopilot and arrest the descent and hand fly [to] get back on path. Realized we never re-engaged VNAV. Tower on their side told us to check altitude. Corrected the issue. Re-established the glide path. Stable and cleared to land. Landed normally. Exited runway and taxied to the gate. Debriefed it. Identified [that] traffic was the primary reason for distraction and ATC due to multiple instructions at the same time.
 
And this is why we can’t have nice things.





Part 121 – Red over Red

This air carrier crew encountered several challenges and distractions on approach to SFO, resulting in an undesired automation mode and flight path. They successfully stabilized the approach and executed a safe landing.

■ ATC cleared us to descend via arrival then at EDDYY transition to the Tipp Toe visual 28L. We set 6000 ft. Approaching EDDYY, ATC told us to descend to 4000 ft. PF (FO) select LVL CHG. ATC advised us traffic Aircraft Y going to 28R. While looking for the traffic, ATC asked us to slow down to 210 kts and if we have the airport and bridge in sight and the traffic. Finally saw the traffic and told ATC airport, bridge and traffic in sight. ATC told us to maintain separation and cleared us for the visual. So we dialed in 1800 ft on the altitude window. We were focusing to make sure we don't overshoot the path because of the traffic threat. Then ATC told us to slow down to 180 then 160 kts until the bridge. PF (FO) asked for gear and flaps configuration to slow down. Confirmed no overshoot. PM (Captain) realized we were inside the approach and asked to set TDZ while heads down to do the configuration changes asked by PF. ATC told us to switch to Tower. Both did not realize we were still in LVL CHG. (Tasked saturated) Accomplished landing checklist before 1000 ft. Approximately 4 NM from the runway. I saw 4 red dots then realized we were low. It was around 750ft. I told the FO to disconnect autopilot and arrest the descent and hand fly [to] get back on path. Realized we never re-engaged VNAV. Tower on their side told us to check altitude. Corrected the issue. Re-established the glide path. Stable and cleared to land. Landed normally. Exited runway and taxied to the gate. Debriefed it. Identified [that] traffic was the primary reason for distraction and ATC due to multiple instructions at the same time.
What is this?
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.
 
Here's another strange thing I noticed. The gear bogeys on the 787 tilt aft in the normal extended position. In some of the clearer shots from the videos, it looks to me like they are tilted forward.
Forward tilt is the first step of the retraction sequence (like you can see here up close during a gear swing
View: https://youtu.be/2ZwzACp-q9U?feature=shared
). Then again the doors should start opening almost immediately after and there's no sign of them actuating here. It makes me wonder if they did indeed select the gear up but something hydraulic or electrical interrupted the sequence.
 
An example of why you shouldnt set runway elevation.
Or just, hear me out, FLY THE GODS DAMNED VISUAL APPROACH VISUALLY. I’ve seen captains work so damn hard on those visual approaches in SFO just to keep the autopilot coupled until final flap extension like, my guy… needs a visit from the old car talk meteorologist Luke Outtavindow

Jesus I sound like MikeD
 
I would think that the benefits of following the power levers during critical phases of flight and catching a potential A/T disconnect (think Asiana hitting the seawall and cartwheeling across SFO) would outweigh this potential flinching scenario, which probably not everybody does.

But I’m not a jet pilot so this opinion is worth the 1s and 0s it’s printed on.

Jet pilot or not doing something stupid to prevent something stupid isn’t really a solution to anything. It’s probably just being pedantic and posting about it on the internet.
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.
That seems like an oddly specific pair of mistakes.
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.
The fact that this could be possible for an "advanced" airliner seems ridiculous. They can't program it to not allow anything below 1000' or take actual airspeed into consideration. I guess at some point you expect pilots to fly a plane. It seems to me a lot of incidents like this that have happened around the world stem from not just pushing the throttles forward first and then identifying a dead engine. I have zero big airplane experience so maybe that isn't a thing with an engine you worry will tear itself apart!?
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.

This seems plausible, as the field elevation is about 200’ MSL.
 
An example of why you shouldnt set runway elevation.



It’s funny, I see on the inbound field elevation is set. They did a non-ILS approach. Guys get in for their preflight and throw the FDs on. Alt cap, hold. They drive the Alt up to the expected altitude (say 5,000ft). Then they hit VNAV and select it again, only to see VS in white letters.


Confusion ensues.



That’s why every time I do a non ILS approach, I will always spin the altitude bug up after the flight so the next crew doesn’t inadvertently get any sort of Automation mismanagement.
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.

I mean, I don’t see anything else causing the roll back with current evidence so I could buy that as a good possibility. Not sure what approach the previous crew used to land, but a non ILS in path they could have set “dirt” and that was never corrected. With the threat of 200 vs 2000 as well…

I always roll a X900 when I set V2 RWHDG and FD’s. Let’s me know A, I’ve touched the knob and moved it from previous setting and B, I haven’t gotten the clearance yet.
 
Really good comment elsewhere from a current B-787 captain.

Crew set reduced thrust parameters incorrectly, but had enough to get off the ground.

They had 200' set instead of 2000 in ALT window.

At positive rate call, the PF called for gear up, ALT SET. The aircraft was at about 200', so auto-throttles rolled back to idle and the PF thought he had a dual engine failure.

Just passing this along.


Of all the things I’ve read, this sounds most plausible. Scary if true :(
 
If it were not for the video evidence I'd never speculate like this; but, I really think it's plausible they retracted the flaps instead of the gear and misinterpreted it as a loss of power (aka manually deployed the RAT).

It reminds me of the 777 departing JFK that encountered something similar in 2020. (
View: https://youtu.be/SO3xmzoLzfI?si=e2ixKVOslXb6aH-Y&t=66
)

So they retracted the flaps instead of the gear and then deployed the RAT? All in that time frame? I just don’t get this one. The captain was very experienced and my guess would have seen the FO do something like that pretty quickly considering that’s not a very easy ‘mistake’ to do with the flap and gear handles.
 
I mean, I don’t see anything else causing the roll back with current evidence so I could buy that as a good possibility. Not sure what approach the previous crew used to land, but a non ILS in path they could have set “dirt” and that was never corrected. With the threat of 200 vs 2000 as well…

I always roll a X900 when I set V2 RWHDG and FD’s. Let’s me know A, I’ve touched the knob and moved it from previous setting and B, I haven’t gotten the clearance yet.
6900 baby
 
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