Aftermath: The Mystery of Colgan Air 3407

Interesting concepts at work here- the company scapegoats the crews and processes inane policies directed at snowing the Feds.


Are things getting any better in recent days for Colgan pilots? ie, are they still hammering you?

Things have not gotten better... only worse... extended every trip I have flown this month... this sucks.


No. Our director of standards just started his O. E, fleet manager is typed and flew the line for a bit though.

Some did proving runs and stuff , but haven't touched one since. Mx controll pretty much has never actually seen one.

It's a joke. And then these people tell us how we are supposed to do it. I guess it also helps that we have RCPs that have never been a 121 pic before... And ground school instructors too for that matter.

Doesn't help that the new hires are being taught by 9E guys who haven't touched a Saab either at all or in quite some time and have zero operating experience here at 9L... effing brilliant of our leadership... who btw can't even meet their own deadlines... pathetic if you ask me.
 
Same corporate culture lead to a new profile that had us stowing the reversers by 75 kts. The call out the PM makes is "80 knots." People, by the time he or she finishes the CALL you've busted the new speed. Nevermind the fact that a profile like that would DIRECTLY lead to people slamming the reversers closed as soon as they heard someone start talking. It would only be a matter of time before someone landed on a contaminated runway, head "80 kts," slammed the reversers closed and took the thing off-roading....again. Luckily, they changed the profile back after we made a stink about it.

That's been our procedure here for a long time
 
...and the training of a tail plane stall.

NASA has some excellent information and data on tail stalls.

One of the (if not, the) biggest issues with recovery is it's completely opposite that of a wing stall.

Power to idle, flaps up, and yoke back.
 
NASA has some excellent information and data on tail stalls.

One of the (if not, the) biggest issues with recovery is it's completely opposite that of a wing stall.

Power to idle, flaps up, and yoke back.

I agree. Anybody that's a professional pilot should watch these videos from NASA on tail stalls:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1c4-aDB4k8
[YT]w1c4-aDB4k8[/YT]


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxjhnF_q0qI
[YT]MxjhnF_q0qI[/YT]


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1daPJJKhEE
[YT]S1daPJJKhEE[/YT]






That being said, the data shown on the Colgan 3407 FDR really doesn't lend itself to a scenario where the crew thought they were in a tail stall and were making recovery efforts to correct said scenario. They didn't announce it, they didn't follow tail stall recovery procedures, and I've never heard anybody advocate pitching to 30 DNU for a tail stall recovery.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxywEE1kK6I
[YT]lxywEE1kK6I[/YT]
 
I guess I kinda misunderstood your OP then, we call out 80 knots and start stowing the reversers then.

Yeah, that's what we did before and do now. They changed to calling at 80 kts and idle by 75 kts rather than 60, which realistically isn't gonna happen.
 
Is it 'stow' or 'idle thrust' by a certain speed for you guys?

"Idle thrust" by 60 kts (less than 30% N1 is considered idle per the books). Too many guys just slam them closed. If you get in that habit, you're running a risk of pre-loading yourself to slam them closed when the PM calls "80 kts." Not something you want to do on a medium to short contaminated runway like....oh, TVC.
 
We're actually not supposed to use anything over idle unless the runway is short or contaminated, so the 80 kt call essentially becomes a storing them call.
 
We're actually not supposed to use anything over idle unless the runway is short or contaminated, so the 80 kt call essentially becomes a storing them call.

yeah that. Except with us they don't say "don't use them" but instead "avoid using unless operationally necissary." which is open to interpretation.
 
yeah that. Except with us they don't say "don't use them" but instead "avoid using unless operationally necissary." which is open to interpretation.

Yeah same here the FAA had them change the limitations to reflect that wording

Ironically then they started complaining about brake wear increasing
 
As money conscious as we are over here, I'm really surprised they've never put any wording in as to only using the reversers when necessary.

We did just change our landing call to 90 knots from 80 knots as apparently the reversers weren't getting put back to idle thrust quickly enough from 80 to 75 to 60.
 
When means if you slide off the runway, they'll tell you that you should have kept them open.

Which would be interesting for us, because it says in our training that if you start to lose directional control, stow the reversers and use the brakes to max....
 
On the CRJ we have to be at less than 60% N1 by 75 knots and idle thrust (30% N1) at 60 knots. Hence we used to call out 80 knots on landing as a cue to start stowing the reversers and then 60 knots to ensure they are stowed. I've never looked to see what max reverse gives you for an N1 speed but I guess it's high enough above 60% that we moved the call out to 90 knots to give a bit of extra time to get below 60% by 75 knots.

The book says that in an emergency you can use the reversers all the way to a complete stop.

The danger comes from FOD damage at low groundspeeds. Even though they sit up high under the tail, as you slow down, all that forward directed thrust can kick up a lot of potential FOD in front of the engines the could get sucked in.

As far as why some companies prefer people NOT use them... each deploy and stow cycle counts against some number before they have to undergo MX. Also, increasing the engine thrust uses more fuel. I suppose FOD is a concern as well.

I think one of the ERJ operators actually has their reversers pinned so they can't use them at all.
 
On the CRJ we have to be at less than 60% N1 by 75 knots and idle thrust (30% N1) at 60 knots. Hence we used to call out 80 knots on landing as a cue to start stowing the reversers and then 60 knots to ensure they are stowed. I've never looked to see what max reverse gives you for an N1 speed but I guess it's high enough above 60% that we moved the call out to 90 knots to give a bit of extra time to get below 60% by 75 knots.

The book says that in an emergency you can use the reversers all the way to a complete stop.

The danger comes from FOD damage at low groundspeeds. Even though they sit up high under the tail, as you slow down, all that forward directed thrust can kick up a lot of potential FOD in front of the engines the could get sucked in.

As far as why some companies prefer people NOT use them... each deploy and stow cycle counts against some number before they have to undergo MX. Also, increasing the engine thrust uses more fuel. I suppose FOD is a concern as well.

I think one of the ERJ operators actually has their reversers pinned so they can't use them at all.

Buckets, if I remember correctly, are an option on the EMB-135/140/145 series. TSA didn't order that option.

At XJT we'd open the buckets, but rarely spool the engines up. If you needed to get stopped on a short runway, obviously you'd spool them up, but I might be able to count on one hand the number of times I remember thinking to myself, "I should probably actually use reverse on this one," and I think it almost always involved DCA or 11/29 in Newark.
 
*uninformed perspective alert*

From watching the NTSB animation of the FDR, the events leading up to the stall look exactly like what I'd expect from a crew where the FO was worn out and sick and the captain was ready to be done with a long day. Power comes back, drag comes out, nobody pays enough attention to the airspeed... I've seen that before with myself flying fatigued and with students who were out of it. Same thing with the botched stall recovery-It looked like an attempt to follow the procedure from Q training but hampered by being behind the airplane and surprised that a stall could occur in that situation.

Fatigue? I'm sure it had some role, but this accident still bothers me. All of the factors mentioned certainly help the snow ball keep rolling, but what put this airplane into the ground is just absolutely disturbing.

First of all, the Captain failed 3 PC's? He also failed numerous checkrides before the airlines? I don't have the information on his failures, but was there a trend here?

I've always said, that not everybody is cut out for this and that certain people should not be permitted to fly passengers - the lives of our friends and family - on board their airplanes. I had an examiner tell me once that after what he has SEEN, and the pilots that he has SEEN get hired by the airlines, that he only takes the train and discourages his family from flying. While that is a bit extreme, I HAVE flown with people who in good weather, with a good operating autopilot can do great. Put them into a weather situation and you wouldn't want your DOG in the back of that airplane. Some people just do NOT do well under pressure. Whether it is pressure from things inside the airplane, outside the airplane or self induced.

Fatigue, poor training, bad weather etc. these are all things that implement pressure on a pilot. Guess what? We deal with them all the time in this job. The majority can handle the pressure, some can not. And those that can not, will show you signs throughout their development that they can not handle the pressure. Did the Captain show those signs? Did he demonstrate a lack of ability to perform when the pressure got tough and he was forced to rely on instinct and quick decision making skills?

I am not trying to personally attack the Captain here. I am prior military, and operated in extremely stressful situations that would make some completely buckle. I am a former instructor who trained people for missions in extreme weather, under extreme pressure with incredible risk involved. We had people who just didn't cut it. People who in most missions could do just fine, but raise the stakes and raise the pressure and they completely fell apart. These people would show you signs early on of weakness. Some would develop beyond it and make excellent crew members, others not so. In the military, there is no remorse or no shame in having to tell somebody "I'm sorry, but you're not cut out for this.". I had to do it many times.

I believe what needs to be done in this industry, is a military-style, discipline oriented filtering process. If you fail 1 PC, its usually not a big deal. If you fail 2, those 2 failures should be looked at to search for a trend. If you fail 3, dude you're done. If you're interviewing for a 121 position and you have more than 2 checkride failures, you should be put through extensive evaluation. I know people will defend the checkride failures, but I will not. I passed every FAA checkride and I can say, that they are not hard. I know some folks who got stuck with a tough fed and got a pink slip. No big deal. But if you can't pass checkrides without failing more than 2, I think further evaluation needs to be done.

Additionally, the airlines need to step it up and tighten the reins. There is too much emphasis on recovering from the "indication" of a stall, and not enough emphasis on recovering FROM a stall and certainly not enough emphasis on BASIC AIRMANSHIP. It seems to be implied that when you reach the 121 world, that you no longer need to practice or be tested on your basic airmanship. This needs to change.

Auto pilot is nice, auto throttles are great, advanced technology in the cockpit displays is really cool. None of this replaces the basic airmanship skills - airspeed, altitude and heading (or attitude). EVERY pilot regardless of what equipment you fly, should think of those 3 primary duties right there. If you don't, you're asking for trouble.

I remember in training on the E-170 all of this technology was new to me. The 1900 DEMANDED that you follow those 3 basic airmanship skills, 7 legs a day, 4 days a week, in any weather. When I started getting frustrated in the sim with the automation on the 170, or when the automation wasn't doing what I wanted it to do, I clicked the whole damn thing off and hand flew. I eventually learned the automation, but even to this day, 3 years on the line, I DO NOT TRUST IT with my life. In cruise flight, I love it. Sit back and enjoy. But when in the approach phase, especially in bad weather, I am watching the airplane like a hawk over it's prey. I scan 3 guages - airspeed, altitude and heading! If you are too tired to closely monitor that, please step down from the cockpit.

I've flown tired, I've been fatigued as anything. When we flew the 1900 7 legs a day, in bad weather, with delays, believe me - we WERE TIRED. But never to the point of neglecting basic airmanship rules. It is called discipline folks. If you lack discipline, you shouldn't be in the cockpit. If you're too tired to maintain your discipline, don't fly.

On the FAA animation, the Captain calls for flaps and gear. He called for Drag. The altitude remained the same. The power remained the same. I am convinced that the Captain did not look at the airspeed. Did he even look at the PFD?? There was AMPLE time to see the red speed tape approaching. He didn't even look. The rest is history. I just don't believe that there is any excuse for that, I don't care how tired you are, I don't care how fatigued you are. You might as well just be asleep behind the controls. No pilot who is awake and conscious behind the controls should have such disregard for the very thing that is keeping you airborne - airspeed. And THAT is what bothers me about this incident. You can critisize the recovery until you're blue in the face, but I would hardly expect someone who doesn't even look at his airspeed in such a critical phase of flight to make a proper recovery of a stall.
 
Back
Top