Advice for a Friend

Hckey2477

Well-Known Member
One of my friends seems to be having a hard time with checkrides. He busted his private once, and in the past few weeks, busted his commerical Multi 3 times. He has asked me if there is any hope for his future in aviation. I myself have never busted a checkride, and don't have enough experience in the area to give him a solid answer. I told him to keep his head up and further down the road, if they don't ask, don't tell. I know that 1 or 2 busted checkrides is pretty easily looked over. but 4, I'm not so sure. I don't know. I feel for the guy, but think he is skating on thin ice. Any good advice that I can pass on?
 
Is it the oral or practical he busted on?
I can understand busting the private, but the CMEL three times! Has he gotten a second or third opinion from other instructors? How much multi time does he have?
 
I have tried that approach and he says he is trying to save money. I know, it's ridiculous because he has wasted more money on more checkrides. I do think he will take that into consideration after this last busted ride. I believe he is too anxious to get finished as well. As a smart JC'er once said. "Aviation isn't a race, it's a marathon" (don't remember which thread that was in, but it stuck in my head) :)
 
Is it the oral or practical he busted on?
I can understand busting the private, but the CMEL three times! Has he gotten a second or third opinion from other instructors? How much multi time does he have?

Oral once, Flight twice. Not sure about the second opinions I will ask. I believe he has about 40 multi or so.
 
Oral or Flight? And is he busting in different areas?

Yes, 3 different things. I helped him on systems for the oral (which he busted on). Then the other two were SE ILS, and Full Feather Shut-Down/Restart (flipped the wrong mags)
 
Could probably use some more practice. If money is an issue maybe he could hop in the plane on the ground and go through the flows. I've also found that it helps if I go up with another pilot (non-instructor), maybe someone who passed the ride recently. I find that I'm usually more relaxed and that it tends to be a prettly enjoyable ride. Usually when we get back on the ground they'll point out some areas to take note on--all in all it's what has worked for me.
 
Definitely a big one. It's not a good Idea to try and shut down one engine when the other is already shut down. I really try to help the guy whenever I can, but sometimes I just want to say "know when to hold'em know when to fold'em".
 
:drool: Wow.

Ah, wow. I don't want to seem rude or disrespet anyone, but lets get real for a second.

First, I am sure you are at least familure with stories of pilots who busted checkrides and still were either hired or retained by the airline. These type of pilot background in pre-9-11 took many airlines and pilots down. (I will post an incident below.)

Second, today in the market as tight as it is and in post-9-11, companies are not hiring people with sketchy pasts and off the record they are not getting wide spread support from fellow pilots anymore. Some from experience, some from CRM, and some just because its a bad call.

I'm sure your friend is a good person, but let your sence of protecting your passengers, the public, and the property of others take over and I think you will know what to do and today I think you will be supprised at the support you find. Besides the life you save could be your own.

You may also want to check out a post on help and aresst under this general topic. It is very related.

- Fly safe and good luck -:rawk:

..."ANY incident and it will catch up with you. You are a liabilty that the lawyers will attach to and crucify the airline you work for and your fellow pilots. Even if its not a fatal. Read NTSB AAR-95/07. American Eagle Jetstream 3201 on 13 December 1994, into RUD, NC. And that pilot flunked checkrides. The airline was responsible because they knew, but the pilot would have had far more responsibilty had he hid this information.
- Didn't mean to get preachy, just this is unfortunatly what keeps me employed. -"

From the Aviaition Safety Network:
<TABLE><TBODY><TR><TD class=caption>Status:</TD><TD class?desc?>Final</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Date:</TD><TD class=caption>13 DEC 1994</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Time:</TD><TD class=desc>18:34 EST</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Type:</TD><TD class=desc>British Aerospace 3201 Jetstream 32</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Operator:</TD><TD class=desc>American Eagle / Flagship Airlines</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Registration:</TD><TD class=desc>N918AE</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>C/n / msn:</TD><TD class=desc>918</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>First flight:</TD><TD class=desc>1990</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Total airframe hrs:</TD><TD class=desc>6577</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Engines:</TD><TD class=desc>2 Garrett TPE331-12</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Crew:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Passengers:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 13 / Occupants: 18</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Total:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 15 / Occupants: 20 </TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Airplane damage:</TD><TD class=desc>Destroyed</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Airplane fate:</TD><TD class=desc>Written off (damaged beyond repair)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Location:</TD><TD class=desc>7,4 km (4.6 mls) SW of Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU) (United States of America) </TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Phase:</TD><TD class=desc>Approach (APR)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Nature:</TD><TD class=desc>Domestic Scheduled Passenger</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Departure airport:</TD><TD class=desc>Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC (GSO/KGSO), United States of America</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption><NOBR>Destination airport:</NOBR></TD><TD class=desc>Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU/KRDU), United States of America</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Flightnumber:</TD><TD class=desc>3379</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Narrative:
Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3000t. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2100 feet for a runway 5L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the no. 1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4nm SW of the runway5L threshold.
The aircraft had logged 6577 flying hours.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "1) The captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed and 2) the captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery.
Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of AMR Eagle/Flagship management to identify, document, monitor and remedy deficiencies in pilot performance and training."
 
:drool: Wow.

Ah, wow. I don't want to seem rude or disrespet anyone, but lets get real for a second.

First, I am sure you are at least familure with stories of pilots who busted checkrides and still were either hired or retained by the airline. These type of pilot background in pre-9-11 took many airlines and pilots down. (I will post an incident below.)

Second, today in the market as tight as it is and in post-9-11, companies are not hiring people with sketchy pasts and off the record they are not getting wide spread support from fellow pilots anymore. Some from experience, some from CRM, and some just because its a bad call.

I'm sure your friend is a good person, but let your sence of protecting your passengers, the public, and the property of others take over and I think you will know what to do and today I think you will be supprised at the support you find. Besides the life you save could be your own.

You may also want to check out a post on help and aresst under this general topic. It is very related.

- Fly safe and good luck -:rawk:

..."ANY incident and it will catch up with you. You are a liabilty that the lawyers will attach to and crucify the airline you work for and your fellow pilots. Even if its not a fatal. Read NTSB AAR-95/07. American Eagle Jetstream 3201 on 13 December 1994, into RUD, NC. And that pilot flunked checkrides. The airline was responsible because they knew, but the pilot would have had far more responsibilty had he hid this information.
- Didn't mean to get preachy, just this is unfortunatly what keeps me employed. -"

From the Aviaition Safety Network:
<TABLE><TBODY><TR><TD class=caption>Status:</TD><TD class?desc?>Final</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Date:</TD><TD class=caption>13 DEC 1994</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Time:</TD><TD class=desc>18:34 EST</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Type:</TD><TD class=desc>British Aerospace 3201 Jetstream 32</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Operator:</TD><TD class=desc>American Eagle / Flagship Airlines</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Registration:</TD><TD class=desc>N918AE</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>C/n / msn:</TD><TD class=desc>918</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>First flight:</TD><TD class=desc>1990</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Total airframe hrs:</TD><TD class=desc>6577</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Engines:</TD><TD class=desc>2 Garrett TPE331-12</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Crew:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Passengers:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 13 / Occupants: 18</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Total:</TD><TD class=desc>Fatalities: 15 / Occupants: 20 </TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Airplane damage:</TD><TD class=desc>Destroyed</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Airplane fate:</TD><TD class=desc>Written off (damaged beyond repair)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Location:</TD><TD class=desc>7,4 km (4.6 mls) SW of Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU) (United States of America) </TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Phase:</TD><TD class=desc>Approach (APR)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Nature:</TD><TD class=desc>Domestic Scheduled Passenger</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Departure airport:</TD><TD class=desc>Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC (GSO/KGSO), United States of America</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption><NOBR>Destination airport:</NOBR></TD><TD class=desc>Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU/KRDU), United States of America</TD></TR><TR><TD class=caption>Flightnumber:</TD><TD class=desc>3379</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Narrative:
Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3000t. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2100 feet for a runway 5L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the no. 1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4nm SW of the runway5L threshold.
The aircraft had logged 6577 flying hours.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "1) The captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed and 2) the captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery.
Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of AMR Eagle/Flagship management to identify, document, monitor and remedy deficiencies in pilot performance and training."


I pretty much agree with you. However, it is entirely laughable that after the RDU accident, its aftermath uproar in hiring practices and the ensuing PRIA legislation as a result...that the industry, regulators and legislators permited Part 121 pilots to be hired with as little as 25 to 50 hours of multi engine time and sometimes as low as 300 total time.

Now that's a much bigger problem than trying to help someone through their CMEL checkride. After this guy has a couple thousand hours of CFI and freight/charter time...he could be a really good pilot. However, we are allowing these guys with no experience into a Part 121 jet cockpit.
 
He's not SOL yet. Do you know if his nerves are getting the better of him? Does he have the same examiner he uses every time? If so, he may want to find a different one. A LOT of pilots blow a checkride. I've laid an egg or two myself, it CAN be over come. The thing that hurts him is blowing the same ride more than once. I also wonder how well his CFI is preparing him if he's going up and tanking this often.

One other point: I can certainly appreicate him wanting to save money, but if he's skimping out on a few extra flights to prepare himself for a checkride, he's really shooting himself in the foot. He'll be ready when he's ready. This career is expensive, and he needs to realize when investing more money in his training is appopriate.

Blowing his CMEL is not as big a deal as blowing an airline sim program, or a line check. Those are killers, but not so much the ones before you get on with a 121 or 135 outfit.

Don't get me wrong, he's dug himself a bit of a hole, but he can get out of it.

The above probable cause about the pilot failing checkrides being a contributing factor to the accident is not necesarily a dig on the pilot, it COULD be, but I see that as more blame toward the company for not realizing he was struggling, and letting him slip through the cracks. There is a difference there that's important to take note of. It's their job to train you to fly their airplanes, or wash you out.

If/when he's asked about failed checkrides, he'll have to own up to them. So he will need to figure out why this has been happening.
 
Does a jetstream have that little power on one engine? A 1000 ft. descent rate at 1800 feet
 
He's not SOL yet. Do you know if his nerves are getting the better of him? Does he have the same examiner he uses every time? If so, he may want to find a different one. A LOT of pilots blow a checkride. I've laid an egg or two myself, it CAN be over come. The thing that hurts him is blowing the same ride more than once. I also wonder how well his CFI is preparing him if he's going up and tanking this often.

One other point: I can certainly appreicate him wanting to save money, but if he's skimping out on a few extra flights to prepare himself for a checkride, he's really shooting himself in the foot. He'll be ready when he's ready. This career is expensive, and he needs to realize when investing more money in his training is appopriate.

Blowing his CMEL is not as big a deal as blowing an airline sim program, or a line check. Those are killers, but not so much the ones before you get on with a 121 or 135 outfit.

Don't get me wrong, he's dug himself a bit of a hole, but he can get out of it.

The above probable cause about the pilot failing checkrides being a contributing factor to the accident is not necesarily a dig on the pilot, it COULD be, but I see that as more blame toward the company for not realizing he was struggling, and letting him slip through the cracks. There is a difference there that's important to take note of. It's their job to train you to fly their airplanes, or wash you out.

If/when he's asked about failed checkrides, he'll have to own up to them. So he will need to figure out why this has been happening.

Yes the checkrides have been with the same guy. I have advised him to change it up a bit, and fly with another guy. He said he is going to try again in a week or two with somebody else.
 
After this guy has a couple thousand hours of CFI and freight/charter time...he could be a really good pilot. However, we are allowing these guys with no experience into a Part 121 jet cockpit.


100% agree.


Safety Engineer:

I mostly agree with you, but I wanted to add that we're also seeing issues with overconfident pilots that have perfect training records. Thinking that you're more capable than you really is just as hazardous as the guy that was allowed to float through training after multiple failures.


There are those that have blown rides and those that will. Sure, the original poster's friend has a lot of explaining to do, but I can tell you that some of our BEST check airman are the ones that struggled through some portion of their training. Nothing is worse than sharing a cockpit with a dude that has no empathy for a new guy (new to the airplane).

Sure, there's a liability issue. HOWEVER, if the airline can prove that the individual received remedial training, there should be NO issue. That's what I took from the report you attached to your post. It wasn't the fact that he failed, but more of the fact that his deficiencies weren't remedied.

No one is perfect, we're all human.
 
we had a guy at flight school that failed EVERY checkride at least once. A couple were 2, 3 times. He was hired at Xjet and probably is a capt there now. He wanted to get through the program so quick he just didn't care what happened. It was crazy.
 
The oral just requires study time. IMHO it can't be stated enough that you need to over-prepare for the oral portion of a checkride. Doing well in the oral will boost your confidence and also give the examiner the impression that you put the work in to prepare for the test.

In regard to dealing with emergencies, sounds like he is reacting before analyzing the situation. Tell him to slow down (just a little) and identify the problem before pulling levers and throwing switches.
 
Maybe he should come up to New Jersey, and look up B-water, I guarantee you he will pass his oral

Hah!

Suggesting someone go to Broadwater who can't pass is as bad as being Broadwater himself.

THOP - sounds like your friend needs to study harder. While I dont think it is overall a job limiter, your buddy is going to have a heck of a time in any initial class and sim if s/he doesn't buckle down.
 
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