NovemberEcho
Dergs favorite member
Sometimes you need every last inch
777 strikes approach lights on departure 9/15
- Thread starter fholbert
- Start date
fholbert
Mod's - Please don't edit my posts!
Did my wife put you up to this?
smack300
Well-Known Member
Landis
Well-Known Member
FloridaLarry
Well-Known Member
The other side of safety culture is that when you do something either (a.) so bloomin' stupid as knowingly taking off from a too-shortened runway, or (b.) so bloomin' careless (same cause) that you put the aircraft and its on-board souls at major risk (consider Comair 5191 at LEX), there are consequences and there should be. IMHO, that reinforces a safety culture of not doing brainless things that jeopardize lives. Even within the multiple contributing factors theory of accidents.
'Fessing up helps - just ask Richard Nixon about how a cover-up worked for him at the Watergate.
In a case of termination vs morgue, it's easy to pick.
'Fessing up helps - just ask Richard Nixon about how a cover-up worked for him at the Watergate.
In a case of termination vs morgue, it's easy to pick.
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
Well, I would agree when pilots are careless and negligent.
In the Qatar incident that was not the case. You would have to look at their training and procedures to even begin to see where the genesis of the error occurred. Then you would have to look at human factors issues, such as the major issue of naming the onboard performance tool selection RWY09#T1, meaning temporary notam 1 when there just happens to be an intersection T1 on the very same runway.
This incident is a good case study of why the procedures for onboard performance tool use and data entry must be very robust. It is not in the Boeing FCOM, nor is it taught in standard Boeing courses to check the OPT database runway distances TORA, TODA, ASDA against the charted distances. That simple check, which is practiced by more experienced operations, would have helped to prevent this incident from occurring because then the pilot would have seen the distance that the OPT was using to calculate his data.
Funny, because the first place I learned about this check was on a departure from Doha in my initial B777 training at another operator. The old Doha runway 15 computation in our OPT was for full length. It was very easy to depart from intersection A with full length data because that's the normal departure point and it is the end of the taxiway. To get the actual full length you have to back taxi and do a 180. That plus the runway is 15,000 feet long so it leads to a false sense of security even when departing from intersection A. Look deeper and there is a selection for intersection A in the OPT and compared with the chart you see that it is quite a bit shorter.
Typhoonpilot
In the Qatar incident that was not the case. You would have to look at their training and procedures to even begin to see where the genesis of the error occurred. Then you would have to look at human factors issues, such as the major issue of naming the onboard performance tool selection RWY09#T1, meaning temporary notam 1 when there just happens to be an intersection T1 on the very same runway.
This incident is a good case study of why the procedures for onboard performance tool use and data entry must be very robust. It is not in the Boeing FCOM, nor is it taught in standard Boeing courses to check the OPT database runway distances TORA, TODA, ASDA against the charted distances. That simple check, which is practiced by more experienced operations, would have helped to prevent this incident from occurring because then the pilot would have seen the distance that the OPT was using to calculate his data.
Funny, because the first place I learned about this check was on a departure from Doha in my initial B777 training at another operator. The old Doha runway 15 computation in our OPT was for full length. It was very easy to depart from intersection A with full length data because that's the normal departure point and it is the end of the taxiway. To get the actual full length you have to back taxi and do a 180. That plus the runway is 15,000 feet long so it leads to a false sense of security even when departing from intersection A. Look deeper and there is a selection for intersection A in the OPT and compared with the chart you see that it is quite a bit shorter.
Typhoonpilot