I guess now that I've sat and thought about a few things and have read the report over again.
Engines don't normally go "splat" at V1. We train these things that way because they're the worst case in terms of aircraft performance and pilot ability each,
not because it's a terribly realistic case. But it also makes the failure, and failed engine, itself incredibly obvious. That might not actually help with the more mundane task of recognizing which one's misbehaving but still producing some thrust (1.4 ish EPR, in the accident case while MCT was apparently 1.91). It might behoove operators and the regulator to introduce more banal ("Engine
Limit, Surge or Stall;" emphasis deliberate) cases -- like this one -- to initial and continuing qualification. As lame as this sounds, recognition without a crew alerting system telling you which one is out isn't a "nothing" topic too.
If I were King, the pilot flying would be the one who would move the thrust lever/throttle/whatever to idle for obvious reasons of recognition of "whoops, wrong one." Rhoades apparently did adopt this as procedure.
EPR is a
stupid way to indicate engine thrust. If the fan is rotating at ordered RPM, it's producing the thrust you're demanding.
Then there's this, which, well, yeah. Glad the FAA closed the barn door after the house got out, as regards the operator: