Air India plane crash

[NovemberEcho]

Agree. I don't ever remember a time when an RA didn't overrule an ATC clearance.

I’d always heard it was optional on the pilot to listen to the RA or ATC and after this RA became mandatory

Edit:

This is from the wiki. More that it was contradictory in the manual

The accident raised questions as to how pilots must react when they receive conflicting orders from TCAS and ATC. TCAS was a relatively new technology at the time of the accident, having been mandatory<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>Note 2<span>]</span></a> in Europe since 2000.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 45">: 45 </span> When TCAS issues a resolution advisory (RA), the pilot flying should respond immediately by directing attention to RA displays and maneuvering as indicated, unless doing so would jeopardise the safe operation of the flight, or unless the flight crew can assure separation with the help of definitive visual acquisition of the aircraft causing the RA.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>35<span>]</span></a>

In responding to a TCAS RA that directs a deviation from assigned altitude, the flight crew should communicate with ATC as soon as practicable after responding to the RA. When the RA is removed, the flight crew should advise ATC that they are returning to their previously assigned clearance or should acknowledge any amended clearance issued.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>35<span>]</span></a>

While TCAS is programmed to assume that both crews will promptly follow the system's instructions, the operations manual did not clearly state that TCAS should always take precedence over any ATC commands.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 103">: 103 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 12<span>]</span></a> The manual described TCAS as "a backup to the ATC system", which could be wrongly interpreted to mean that ATC instructions have higher priority.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 80">: 80 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 13<span>]</span></a> This ambiguity was replicated in the Tu-154 Flight Operations Manual, which contained contradictory sections. On the one hand, chapter 8.18.3.4 emphasised the role of ATC and describes TCAS as an "additional aid",<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 53">: 53 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 14<span>]</span></a> while chapter 8.18.3.2 forbade manoeuvres contrary to TCAS.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 103">: 103 </span> The BFU recommended that this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of obeying TCAS advisories even when these were in conflict with ATC instructions.

 

[Boris Badenov]

<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 103">: 103 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 12<span>]</span></a> The manual described TCAS as "a backup to the ATC system", which could be wrongly interpreted to mean that ATC instructions have higher priority.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 80">: 80 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 13<span>]</span></a> This ambiguity was replicated in the Tu-154 Flight Operations Manual, which contained contradictory sections. On the one hand, chapter 8.18.3.4 emphasised the role of ATC and describes TCAS as an "additional aid",<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 53">: 53 </span><a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>BFU 14<span>]</span></a> while chapter 8.18.3.2 forbade manoeuvres contrary to TCAS.<a href="2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a><span title="Page / location: 103">: 103 </span> The BFU recommended that this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of obeying TCAS advisories even when these were in conflict with ATC instructions.

This is why they don't let you people type.

 

[Roger Roger]

This is why they don't let you people type.

Imagine your CPDLC coming through with a bunch of HTML garbage

 

[Boris Badenov]

Imagine your CPDLC coming through with a bunch of HTML garbage

"Ack". SEND.

 

[///AMG]

"Ack". SEND.

"Load". SEND. "Execute"

 

[Pilot Fighter]

"Ack". SEND.

HTML 2.0 should fix this.

 

[Roger Roger]

"Load". SEND. "Execute"

“You like?”

 

[///AMG]

Read an article that is mostly clickbait garbage about this, but it did get me thinking. Apparently AI training dudes hopped in the sim and tried to replicate what might have happened. Seems weird if true, since they can likely just pull data from the FDR, but whatever. It mentioned seeing if the fuel switches being in the wrong position could cause it. According to the article, the answer was no. Anyway, does the 787 have the same silly overhead panel with manually switched fuel pumps? And if so, if one were to leave it in the same configuration we do for a long ground stop in the 737 (i.e. all "OFF"), and someone didn't do their flows right, and nobody caught it in a checklist, what would happen? Would non-boosted fuel flow be sufficient for takeoff thrust? Would it only be sufficient from ground taxi/operation? I probably should look at our own systems handbook (not handy at the moment), and I'm probably also suggesting something that isn't a "thing" on a modern 787. But it did make me wonder

 

[Roger Roger]

Read an article that is mostly clickbait garbage about this, but it did get me thinking. Apparently AI training dudes hopped in the sim and tried to replicate what might have happened. Seems weird if true, since they can likely just pull data from the FDR, but whatever. It mentioned seeing if the fuel switches being in the wrong position could cause it. According to the article, the answer was no. Anyway, does the 787 have the same silly overhead panel with manually switched fuel pumps? And if so, if one were to leave it in the same configuration we do for a long ground stop in the 737 (i.e. all "OFF"), and someone didn't do their flows right, and nobody caught it in a checklist, what would happen? Would non-boosted fuel flow be sufficient for takeoff thrust? Would it only be sufficient from ground taxi/operation? I probably should look at our own systems handbook (not handy at the moment), and I'm probably also suggesting something that isn't a "thing" on a modern 787. But it did make me wonder

I doubt the fuel system on the 78 is anywhere near as antiquated and pilot-intensive as the guppy.

Probably also uses jet pumps for the main pumps and the electrics are just backup. You know, like every turbine airplane designed after 1970

 

[///AMG]

I doubt the fuel system on the 78 is anywhere near as antiquated and pilot-intensive as the guppy.

Probably also uses jet pumps for the main pumps and the electrics are just backup. You know, like every turbine airplane designed after 1970

Yeah, I imagine you are correct. Especially on the first part. Likely on the second too. In my other plane, motive-flow only is sufficient for "non afterburner thrust", and that design dates back to the 1970's originally.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Read an article that is mostly clickbait garbage about this, but it did get me thinking. Apparently AI training dudes hopped in the sim and tried to replicate what might have happened. Seems weird if true, since they can likely just pull data from the FDR, but whatever. It mentioned seeing if the fuel switches being in the wrong position could cause it. According to the article, the answer was no. Anyway, does the 787 have the same silly overhead panel with manually switched fuel pumps? And if so, if one were to leave it in the same configuration we do for a long ground stop in the 737 (i.e. all "OFF"), and someone didn't do their flows right, and nobody caught it in a checklist, what would happen? Would non-boosted fuel flow be sufficient for takeoff thrust? Would it only be sufficient from ground taxi/operation? I probably should look at our own systems handbook (not handy at the moment), and I'm probably also suggesting something that isn't a "thing" on a modern 787. But it did make me wonder

There’s so many garbage articles about this accident cause. They all read as if it is the official cause.

 

[Roger Roger]

Yeah, I imagine you are correct. Especially on the first part. Likely on the second too. In my other plane, motive-flow only is sufficient for "non afterburner thrust", and that design dates back to the 1970's originally.

So it looks like big airliners don’t generally use jet pumps to feed engines the way smaller turbine aircraft do as they don’t scale up to the kind of flow rates needed very well. Somewhat common for scavenging fuel/water from various tank low points though.

 

[MikeD]

And if so, if one were to leave it in the same configuration we do for a long ground stop in the 737 (i.e. all "OFF"), and someone didn't do their flows right, and nobody caught it in a checklist, what would happen?

We leave ours on. And we don’t dim all the displays that have a dimmer knob. And we use flaps 2.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

Yeah, I imagine you are correct. Especially on the first part. Likely on the second too. In my other plane, motive-flow only is sufficient for "non afterburner thrust", and that design dates back to the 1970's originally.

The start flow of the EMB 175 is glorious:

- timer start
- start switch on

All the stuff you do after that in the 737 is done automatically in the 175. Most ish corporate aircraft too aside from a King Air 90/200.

It even neurotically throws the anti ice off and on with the ignitors going when you’re flying. The cabin temperature is managed without your help too.

I imagine a 787 is the same ish. But I’ll never know.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

We leave ours on. And we don’t dim all the displays that have a dimmer knob. And we use flaps 2.

“iF yOu DoN’t diM tEh ScReNe tEh PoWeR bILl WiLl rUin oUr PrOfiT sHaRiNg”

 

[///AMG]

The start flow of the EMB 175 is glorious:

- timer start
- start switch on

All the stuff you do after that in the 737 is done automatically in the 175. Most ish corporate aircraft too aside from a King Air 90/200.

It even neurotically throws the anti ice off and on with the ignitors going when you’re flying. The cabin temperature is managed without your help too.

I imagine a 787 is the same ish. But I’ll never know.

Yep, basically same thing for the F/A-18. All electrical and fuel systems are fully automatic, though we do retain switches to turn various things *off in non-normal scenarios (which I imagine you'd have in the 175 too?). No "packs", we just twist the bleed air knob to on and everything turns on. There's a little temp control knob that I never move from full cold. Like I tell guys who ask, everything manual in the 73 is automatic/hands off in the -18, and everything that is automated, we have no version of (other than very rudimentary autopilot/autothrottle functions). No FMS, no FD's, no VNAV, no form of vertical autopilot.

 

[Roger Roger]

The start flow of the EMB 175 is glorious:

- timer start
- start switch on

All the stuff you do after that in the 737 is done automatically in the 175. Most ish corporate aircraft too aside from a King Air 90/200.

It even neurotically throws the anti ice off and on with the ignitors going when you’re flying. The cabin temperature is managed without your help too.

I imagine a 787 is the same ish. But I’ll never know.

I hitched a ride home in the old ride yesterday.

It’s much better looking and I miss EICAS and automated everything.

 

[Skåning]

But I’ll never know.

Because you’re old

 

[///AMG]

I hitched a ride home in the old ride yesterday.

It’s much better looking and I miss EICAS and automated everything.

Not directly related, but since we have a quorum here. Why is it that when trying to non-rev, on our metal, half the flights go from 40+ open seats a few days prior to -6 open the morning of, there are 17 listed, and then suddenly the flight closes and there are actually 15 seats open and 12 listed. Everyone gets on. Offline dude sits in the JS even though there are seats open in back. Im really confused. And I think the FAs know a real number too, since multiple times they've been like "oh yeah, you're good" before they actually start seating the non revs. Is this the best we can do? I'm not even a real commuter, and it annoys me. Granted if youre commuting online, you get head of line code, but still.

 

[Roger Roger]

Not directly related, but since we have a quorum here. Why is it that when trying to non-rev, on our metal, half the flights go from 40+ open seats a few days prior to -6 open the morning of, there are 17 listed, and then suddenly the flight closes and there are actually 15 seats open and 12 listed. Everyone gets on. Offline dude sits in the JS even though there are seats open in back. Im really confused. And I think the FAs know a real number too, since multiple times they've been like "oh yeah, you're good" before they actually start seating the non revs. Is this the best we can do? I'm not even a real commuter, and it annoys me. Granted if youre commuting online, you get head of line code, but still.

I haven’t seen that really. I wonder if it’s to do with the new auto seat assign for non revs? That was giving gate agents real heartburn for a while.