UPS MD-11 crash at SDF

[Rosstafari]

As bad as those videos were the still picture series this morning just seems worse to me, oddly.

Same.

I think we look at these not out of morbid curiosity but in the hope that there’s something we can learn from them, as a few commenters also said.

When it’s just crash footage, horrible as it is, we can comfort ourselves with the thought that we might’ve done something differently to gain a modicum of control over the situation. But when it’s the evidence of an unavoidable tragedy… now we’re forced to confront the sad reality that for some of us, our number is just called too soon.

This one hits hard.

 

[HeyEng]

Are you just trying to stir the pot? You posted the airplane had been inspected in '21, what does "compressed/modified nature of the C check" mean? Are you saying folks are sending their jets overseas to get a "quick" C check? That might be happening but apparently UPS does not engage in that behavior because as far as I know San Antonio is still considered domestic.

No, I am not trying to stir the pot, I will leave that to CC and the ASA folks. I'm only speaking as to what I have read that seems to be happening in the industry. Even the USAF has been doing it (not offshoring) with heavy maintenance.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

One thought about pilot training that comes to mind is that I can only recall one circumstance in which I was presented a (simulated, mind) engine separation, and that was during initial qualification on the E-jet. It was not on the syllabus, and was done in the spirit of "let's see what these guys do with it."

The left side of the EICAS going all dashes as in "you've lost this engine—no, you do not actually know where it is, other than no longer attached" was kinda interesting. As far as how 'realistic' an experience it was? I don't know, and moreover, I'm not eager to find out.

But it occurs to me that it's irrelevant for this accident, too.

 

[HeyEng]

The MD-11 could be dead, with final trips to the boneyard.

Elsewhere in the multiverse, UPS and FedEx double-down on the MD-11 and Trump sells the KC-10 fleet for a buck a piece. I think the KC-10 fleet is still pretty fresh by airline standards.

In my little bit of digging, it didn't look like any of the KC-10s sold at the GSA auction. Two of the planes were bid on but the reserve wasn't met.

One thought about pilot training that comes to mind is that I can only recall one circumstance in which I was presented a (simulated, mind) engine separation, and that was during initial qualification on the E-jet. It was not on the syllabus, and was done in the spirit of "let's see what these guys do with it."

The left side of the EICAS going all dashes as in "you've lost this engine—no, you do not actually know where it is, other than no longer attached" was kinda interesting. As far as how 'realistic' an experience it was? I don't know, and moreover, I'm not eager to find out.

But it occurs to me that it's irrelevant for this accident, too.

I don't think that practicing that in the sim would be too fruitful since all the maneuvers/etc. have to be programmed into the sim. It's been a number of years, but I don't ever recall an "engine separation" fault being designed/installed/certified in a sim.

I do recall that when I was training for flight test, we used the sim to "prepare" for some of the procedures we would do...such as clean/dirty stalls which were indeed programmed. Nonetheless, none of the planes really stalled like the sim, they all had different (but subtle) differences. Not sure why that was, I just figured it was because of old jets with various "imperfections" that created unique handling characteristics.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

In my little bit of digging, it didn't look like any of the KC-10s sold at the GSA auction. Two of the planes were bid on but the reserve wasn't met.

I don't think that practicing that in the sim would be too fruitful since all the maneuvers/etc. have to be programmed into the sim. It's been a number of years, but I don't ever recall an "engine separation" fault being designed/installed/certified in a sim.

I do recall that when I was training for flight test, we used the sim to "prepare" for some of the procedures we would do...such as clean/dirty stalls which were indeed programmed. Nonetheless, none of the planes really stalled like the sim, they all had different (but subtle) differences. Not sure why that was, I just figured it was because of old jets with various "imperfections" that created unique handling characteristics.

Yeah. They had a button for it, which means they could do it, but the validity is a big question mark. Seeing "all dashes" helped in future failure recognition, but who knows how valid the flight dynamics were (probably not at all beyond the asymmetric thrust situation). I think the memory item was the same as for fire on that airplane, so drilling that was handy I suppose. I suppose.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

No, I am not trying to stir the pot, I will leave that to CC and the ASA folks. I'm only speaking as to what I have read that seems to be happening in the industry. Even the USAF has been doing it (not offshoring) with heavy maintenance.

I didn’t stir the pot on anything here for UPS or the MD11? I’m just saddened by it all.

 

[TUCKnTRUCK]

Yeah. They had a button for it, which means they could do it, but the validity is a big question mark. Seeing "all dashes" helped in future failure recognition, but who knows how valid the flight dynamics were (probably not at all beyond the asymmetric thrust situation). I think the memory item was the same as for fire on that airplane, so drilling that was handy I suppose. I suppose.

Generally post major system failure - like the previous MD-11/10 engine failure/separation accident, the scenario and indications will be built into the sim. Generally will simulate what the crew saw/heard so far as what they bc a get from the CVR/FDR etc. largely recognition based training only and not certified.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

When it’s just crash footage, horrible as it is, we can comfort ourselves with the thought that we might’ve done something differently to gain a modicum of control over the situation. But when it’s the evidence of an unavoidable tragedy… now we’re forced to confront the sad reality that for some of us, our number is just called too soon.

I kinda wrote this then deleted it then rewrote it, then kicked it around, and understand that I'm not attempting to reduce how tragic this whole thing truly is because it is, but I really don't want to call it inevitable or unavoidable.

I reject and push back against the notion that it was 'unavoidable' (I'm sure the NTSB will reject that premise, too). I don't think anyone has any business getting killed at work nowadays. We haven't conquered the air, necessarily, but we've taken some amazing strides to that point, and I think "nobody gets killed for commercial aviation" is an entirely appropriate strategic safety goal. Something, somewhere, was wrong, and a bad call was made by someone, somewhere. Whether it was the engineer who designed the thing, the guy who built the thing, the guy who maintained the thing, the system that surveilled and regulated the thing, and so on, or a combination of all of that—something, somewhere, did go wrong, and while it was not necessarily foreseeable, it was controllable.

This isn't to suggest criminalization or the like, though I realize it could be read as veering that way. It isn't. I think that's plenty inimical to safety, too. It is to suggest that the system be held to account and be fixed, though. Because it shouldn't happen again, and I am not prepared to skip direct to acceptance.

The lives lost are only truly wasted if nothing changes.

The accident probably, almost certainly was unavoidable for the accident crew, as evidenced by the whole-ass engine sitting by the side of the runway and other things. I suppose that's what everyone means by that, as there's little to nothing about this sort of thing that we (pilots, that is) directly control.

 

[knot4u]

No, I am not trying to stir the pot, I will leave that to CC and the ASA folks. I'm only speaking as to what I have read that seems to be happening in the industry. Even the USAF has been doing it (not offshoring) with heavy maintenance.

I might've overreacted to your post, but it's probably because it's starting to look like the airplane failed structurally and the pilots had zero options and MX is going to be under a microscope because the airplane had just come out of some sort of MX event. Here's the thing about that, MX folks don't plan what work is going to be accomplished during any event. The work cards are distributed to the appropriate people and then the work is assigned. I've come across situations when there's an issue that was kind of indicated but no one is quite sure and management comes back with basically "That's a nice list, but that's not what we're here to do.", that's a literal quote from a supervisor. Sometimes mechanics have their hands tied as well and squawking something they weren't assigned to look at could cost them their job if their issue caused an airplane to be grounded and the schedule disrupted. I've dealt with this for a long time and I hated it. I'm not saying anything about the MX that was done on this MD-11 last month but apparently someone looked at that aft pylon mount when they lubed the bearing, or maybe they didn't. I don't know. That's also why my log entries always had a disclaimer stating I was only claiming responsibility for the work described in the log entry, I used to go to some odd places and work on some dodgy airplanes, I couldn't claim the entire airplane was airworthy.

 

[Rosstafari]

The accident probably, almost certainly was unavoidable for the accident crew, ... I suppose that's what everyone means by that

Correct.

 

[MikeD]

The accident probably, almost certainly was unavoidable for the accident crew, as evidenced by the whole-ass engine sitting by the side of the runway and other things. I suppose that's what everyone means by that, as there's little to nothing about this sort of thing that we (pilots, that is) directly control.

That what I think most people mean when saying unavoidable; that the totality of the circumstances in this particular accident, and the compounding events that occurred and the timing of when they occurred, all added up to unavoidable. Occurred 30 or so knots sooner? No thrust degradation on a second engine after the loss of the first? Clean engine separation with no fire afterwards? Any one of those things or possibly more may have changed that. But all of them together, at the time they occurred….

 

[MikeD]

I might've overreacted to your post, but it's probably because it's starting to look like the airplane failed structurally and the pilots had zero options and MX is going to be under a microscope because the airplane had just come out of some sort of MX event. Here's the thing about that, MX folks don't plan what work is going to be accomplished during any event. The work cards are distributed to the appropriate people and then the work is assigned. I've come across situations when there's an issue that was kind of indicated but no one is quite sure and management comes back with basically "That's a nice list, but that's not what we're here to do.", that's a literal quote from a supervisor. Sometimes mechanics have their hands tied as well and squawking something they weren't assigned to look at could cost them their job if their issue caused an airplane to be grounded and the schedule disrupted. I've dealt with this for a long time and I hated it. I'm not saying anything about the MX that was done on this MD-11 last month but apparently someone looked at that aft pylon mount when they lubed the bearing, or maybe they didn't. I don't know. That's also why my log entries always had a disclaimer stating I was only claiming responsibility for the work described in the log entry, I used to go to some odd places and work on some dodgy airplanes, I couldn't claim the entire airplane was airworthy.

I’ve gotten UH-60 Blackhawk helos that have been at a rework facility for X check. One came back with a hairline cracked dorsal structural beam that is one of the mounting points for the transmission. Another one had a ceiling throttle quadrant that was so out of rig, it needed to be replaced. Had an A-10 with an intermittent fuel pump come out of depot, along with about 12 other deferred items. All of these aircraft when the situation was brought up to management, had the same response: not part of the Statement of Work. Not in the contracted work. So wasn’t checked or wasn’t discovered, or maybe one or the other.

intermediate and higher (depot) level maintenance is pretty specific on what they work on, based on either the check being performed, the statement of work, or what’s being contracted to be fixed/installed/removed/replaced. At least in the military, they became this way due to abuse by line-level units. Line unit maintenance would send aircraft to depot with all kinds of problems and old parts installed, expecting the depot to repair or replace these items. These were things that were the line unit’s responsibility to repair, but they didnt want to spend the time, parts, or their own allocated dollars on, or have to report longer term down aircraft to higher HQ. Problem was, these extra problems weren’t what the aircraft went to the intermediate or higher depot for. I remember when in country in Qatar, one of the Air Guard C-130 units would send their crappiest C-130s over to the Middle East theatre, so that they’d break there and it would be CENTCOM’s money coffers repairing them, and not the ANGs. Some similar things I see on the civil government side also related to this. And I can’t help but think similar things occur on the pure civilian side.

 

[scooter2525]

 

[scooter2525]