Came across this today and thought it was fascinating.
@MikeD did they get anything glaringly wrong?
View: https://youtu.be/1zjcnnx7igc?si=ccqUjLYwQ8kQBLti
Pretty accurately done here. We never had a GPS munitions capability in the aircraft until a couple years prior to retirement, but we had one bomb that had its own internal GPS and could be GPS guided to its preprogrammed target, and also be refined by laser if the target appeared visually. This bomb would only be used in bad weather conditions, otherwise we’d just use our usual selection of laser guided munitions. It wasnt until the last 2 years of service, that a 1760 bus was finally installed to allow the jet to “talk” to normal GPS-guided munitions such as the GBU-38 version of the Mk82 500 pound low drag bomb.
The bombs we carried were of the Paveway II class, namely the GBU-10 and GBU-12, 2000lb Mk 84 and 500lb Mk82 bomb versions, respectively. We couldn’t initially carry the Paveway III series of bombs such as the GBU-24 Mk84 2000lb because the Paveway III tail kit was too large for the F-117 bomb bay. So a PWII rail kit was mated to a PWIII nose sensor to create the GBU-27, which would fit in the bomb bay. The sole combo GPS/Laser bomb I mentioned above, was the EGBU-27. Like I mentioned, it was an expensive bomb that was only used for dropping in bad Wx where laser guidance wasn’t able to be accomplished due to the target not being able to be seen. However it could also be refined by laser guidance in addition to its self-contained GPS capability, but it was an expensive bomb and really had to be used against very high military value targets .
The big limitation to the F-117 was its limited job. It was really only useful for the first week or so of any war, as it’s job was to kick the door down, so to speak, of an enemy Integrated Air Defense System, in order to allow “regular” aircraft to go to work and do their jobs. After that, the F-117s job is done, as it’s not going to be used for any routine work that any other fighter/attack aircraft can perform, as it’s not worth the risk. Basically, our job was to take town the early warning radars such as TALL KING, SPOON REST, or BAR LOCK. And take out other initial high value targets such as command and control centers and such. We didn’t necessarily target individual SAM systems, as that was a Wild Weasel function that the F-4Gs and later F-16s did, what we did was take out the long range eyes of said SAM systems.
Defensive-wise, for mission planning, we only concerned ourself with known fixed SAM sites to plan against route-wise. We weren’t concerned with mobile SAM systems for two reasons. One, they are mobile, you don’t know really where they are. And two, they are generally low-possibly medium altitude, and we were usually above their effective altitudes anyway. It was the fixed strategic SAM systems that we concerned ourselves with, the ones that had serious medium-high altitude capability.
The description of the loss of aircraft 806 over Serbia was kind of generic. Its loss was mostly bad and lazy mission planning on our part, which eventually bit us in the ass. A lesson we learned from the first few nights of Operation LINEBACKER II in December 1972, but somehow forgot.
What eventually killed the program was the fact that it only did one job, and there wasn’t money for single mission aircraft. Everyone had to be able to do multiple jobs to be cost effective. And with the F-22 coming out, we were keeping money from the F-22 due to our very high Mx man hours per flight hour, which was very high in having to maintain the Gen 1 stealth coatings and such. We basically became uneconomical to exist anymore. Though the F-22 is itself a single mission aircraft, for the air dominance role, that is accepted to have that, as the F-15 single seaters always had except for their first couple of years.