There are lots of lousy pilots out there, and that's not Cirrus' fault. But with Cirrus, it's a bit of a catch 22. Without the assumption they can rely on the chute, a lot of Cirrus pilots wouldn't harbor the kind of complacency that encourages them rely on the chute.
The required CAPS system has been marketed brilliantly by Cirrus as a "we care sooooo much that we're doing this for your family" safety device. Whatever. Marketers are going to lie. It's what they do.
The real problem with CAPS is it normalizes a kind of complacency and some really questionable procedures for precisely the kinds of pilots worst suited for that complacency and those procedures. In CSIP training, they ask instructors, "You've just taken off and climbed to 500AGL when you lose your engine. What are you going to do?" The expected - and required - answer is, "Pull the Chute." OK, fine, if you have the presence of mind to do so timely. But what happens when you learn to fly in a Cirrus and then sit down at the controls of almost any other airplane? Huge negative transfer at the very least. A well trained pilot who has internalized proper basic and emergency flow patterns and procedures could likely swap back and forth between a Cirrus and another airplane with no more trouble than swapping between a jet and twin piston. But your typical Cirrus pilot/owner is not a professional aviator and probably hasn't even preflighted, 'cause, you know, "I'll get all that info on my XM". If they stay in the Cirrus, they might be ok. But even then, the other problem creeps in... the even greater, insidious complacency engendered by the mere presence of that chute. "I can go, 'cause if I get into trouble, I'll just pull my chute." Sure, if you pull below max Vpd of 140kts and everything works correctly. But many a Cirrus pilot is not going to even recognize the problem early enough to fix it. The classic is the Cirrus pilot who iced up over the Sierra, lost climb ability, stalled, entered a dive, and broke through 200kts before he even recognized the problem. When he pulled the chute, it predictably departed the aircraft. The chute was designed and implemented for stall/spin recovery. Developing a sense - or worse, an assumption - that one can rely on it for any other scenario is a fools errand.