Hawker Down near AKR

They are not required if memory serves me correct. The Lears I flew didn't have AOA but they had stall indicators or some crap.

Either way, the shaker is a warning of an impending stall. Whatever happened to recover at the first sign of a stall?

Whatever happened to not arguing about getting to slow, and descending at 2k feet a minute, in IMC, on an approach, and knowing how bases are reported?
 
dumb question I'm sure, but are there jets out there (this one included) that do not have AoA indicators? Seems like a pretty simple solution to the Vref question.

I'm fairly sure there is not a single airliner with AoA indication at all regimes of flight, and not particularly useful ever.
The only thing we get in my jet is Alpha floor. And only when they deemed it important to have.


If my memory is correct, AoA indicators are a requirement for part 25 aircraft.
It's not. Or at least it's not a requirement to let the pilots know what the AoA is.
 
It's not. Or at least it's not a requirement to let the pilots know what the AoA is.

You're right, I went back and took a quick look. 25.1324 requires it to be heated but doesn't require an AoA gauge to be installed.
 
As @Derg pointed out in the French jet, you have to dig in the FMS to find the AOA. It's not something we monitor, ever. Fly the profile and you'll be fine.
Flying a transport jet isn't difficult. Making the decision(s) prior to getting into the poop is the hard part.
 
As @Derg pointed out in the French jet, you have to dig in the FMS to find the AOA. It's not something we monitor, ever. Fly the profile and you'll be fine.
Flying a transport jet isn't difficult. Making the decision(s) prior to getting into the poop is the hard part.
No but it'd be even easier with AoA. Specifically approaches.
 
Whatever happened to not arguing about getting to slow, and descending at 2k feet a minute, in IMC, on an approach, and knowing how bases are reported?

I'm with you, but this is charter in a nutshell. Even the good companies, there is no SOP, there is no legitimate CRM training, it's "you did a type or recurrent at FSI or CAE so you meet the requirements" and that is the benchmark for operating thousands of aircraft. This chain of events would never happen like this at a large company, there are too many tools in place to stop the error chain from continuing. Why was this guy flying unstabilized the entire approach? The 121 world and large fractional companies define stabilized approaches and if you're not stabilized, you go around, it's that simple.

I have flown for 2 charter conpanies, 1 was terrible, the other was really good. For the things they share in common, are the reasons I don't EVER want to fly charter again.
 
It floors me that one of the first things we learn as new student pilots is, "the wing doesn't stall at a particular speed, it stalls at critical AOA" -- IIRC, this is even a question on the FAA private pilot written. Yet, from that point on (in the civilian flying world), we never, ever actually discuss or reference actual AOA in the aircraft.

Instead, we primarily rely on speeds (directly to the contrary of what we learn right from the beginning)...how does that make any sense?

The F-15E and T-38 both had AOA indicators and most everything was primarily guided by that AOA indication and not indicated airspeed. Why has civilian flying has virtually eliminated AOA from cockpit instruments?
 
It floors me that one of the first things we learn as new student pilots is, "the wing doesn't stall at a particular speed, it stalls at critical AOA" -- IIRC, this is even a question on the FAA private pilot written. Yet, from that point on (in the civilian flying world), we never, ever actually discuss or reference actual AOA in the aircraft.

Instead, we primarily rely on speeds (directly to the contrary of what we learn right from the beginning)...how does that make any sense?

The F-15E and T-38 both had AOA indicators and most everything was primarily guided by that AOA indication and not indicated airspeed. Why has civilian flying has virtually eliminated AOA from cockpit instruments?
They're appearing in light GA aircraft now, either retrofitted or from the factory
 
As @Derg pointed out in the French jet, you have to dig in the FMS to find the AOA. It's not something we monitor, ever. Fly the profile and you'll be fine.
Flying a transport jet isn't difficult. Making the decision(s) prior to getting into the poop is the hard part.

But it a situation of being set up for success or set up for failure. If you have a good SOP, good CRM environment it is really easy to do the right thing. None of these companies have AOMs or go above and beyond the FAA minimum for communication in the cockpit, or having policies in place to have the ability and authority to take controls from another pilot, or increase the level of command given to another pilot if he/she is doing something wrong.

The captain wasn't in command of that airplane, should he not have been a captain? Was this accident really obvious to those who had flown with these 2? Why was the FO not responding to callouts like he should have? Why was that plane allowed to be flown so slow for the ENTIRE approach?! Why was a dive and drive 2,000fpm approach allowed to be conducted for as long as it did? Lack of a REAL SOP is my first guess. Not everyone is Joe Maverick when it comes to the cockpit, but you should be able to fly a jet with people like an ATP would, all the time.
 
@Inverted :
That was my point. 121 has profiles galore, which make a horrible pilot good enough, and an outstanding pilot good enough. Fly those and 99% of the time you'll be fine.

I alluded that a superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid using his superior skill.

One of the frustrating, more so annoying, is that in Army aviation we don't have standard callouts or procedures per se (compared to 121). We have an SOP but it's not really meaty in the sense of CRM. It's more geared towards outside the cockpit situations.
 
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All this stressing about AOA, but really you should know your aircraft, and where it shouldn't be. In straight and level flight you're only doing 1G, and for 1G at a specific weight and configuration you should have a good idea what your stall speed is going to be within reason. Operating transport category aircraft, or a turbojet you shouldn't be getting so slow that you're worrying about riding the stall speed. Don't we operate at a Vref of 1.3 Vso on final anyways? Unless we're pulling Gs on a straight in instrument approach airspeed should be plenty of indication you're not where you're suppose to be. They painted themselves into a corner, and neither one of them stopped to think *Hmmmm this is really dumb, I'm not configured, I'm too slow, and I'm doing 2,000 FPM on an instrument approach which really only requires a 3 degree glide path in a flat part of the country...*
 
Why was the FO not responding to callouts like he should have? Why was that plane allowed to be flown so slow for the ENTIRE approach?! Why was a dive and drive 2,000fpm approach allowed to be conducted for as long as it did? Lack of a REAL SOP is my first guess. Not everyone is Joe Maverick when it comes to the cockpit, but you should be able to fly a jet with people like an ATP would, all the time.

Well apparently everyone here thinks it's because they didn't have an AOA indicator.
 
I'm with you, but this is charter in a nutshell. Even the good companies, there is no SOP, there is no legitimate CRM training, it's "you did a type or recurrent at FSI or CAE so you meet the requirements" and that is the benchmark for operating thousands of aircraft. This chain of events would never happen like this at a large company, there are too many tools in place to stop the error chain from continuing. Why was this guy flying unstabilized the entire approach? The 121 world and large fractional companies define stabilized approaches and if you're not stabilized, you go around, it's that simple.

I have flown for 2 charter conpanies, 1 was terrible, the other was really good. For the things they share in common, are the reasons I don't EVER want to fly charter again.

I've flown at three different charter ops. One was single pilot, so out the window it goes. The other two, CRM was decent. While there was no SOP for it, it was still there, thanks to the people I flew with. The other, "don't think that because you were a CFI, you all of the sudden know how to fly a jet!" So many issues there, I saw the writing on the wall.
 
No but it'd be even easier with AoA. Specifically approaches.

Not that I fully disagree, but I don't wholly concur with this.

There is no substitute for situational awareness.

"Does this look right?"

"Am I sure where I am?"

"Do I have 'operational inertia' or am I executing a sound plan?"

Seems like there was a massive loss of SA and no one confidently flying the jet.
 
All this stressing about AOA, but really you should know your aircraft, and where it shouldn't be. In straight and level flight you're only doing 1G, and for 1G at a specific weight and configuration you should have a good idea what your stall speed is going to be within reason. Operating transport category aircraft, or a turbojet you shouldn't be getting so slow that you're worrying about riding the stall speed. Don't we operate at a Vref of 1.3 Vso on final anyways? Unless we're pulling Gs on a straight in instrument approach airspeed should be plenty of indication you're not where you're suppose to be. They painted themselves into a corner, and neither one of them stopped to think *Hmmmm this is really dumb, I'm not configured, I'm too slow, and I'm doing 2,000 FPM on an instrument approach which really only requires a 3 degree glide path in a flat part of the country...*

Aircraft are all-attitude vehicles. If the flight environment were so predictable so as to always remain straight and level at 1G, we wouldn't even need pilots, much less instruments to indicate aircraft performance for pilots to interpret.

It is all well and good to say, "the aircraft shouldn't have been in that position in the first place," but the fact is, we live and operate in a chaotic world where things occasionally happen that are not ordinary, or even planned for. Sometimes we get into those situations because of lapses in SA or decisionmaking, despite high levels of training and experience. In these situations, we have to use airmanship and knowledge of the aircraft to get back to safety. In many cases, these involve being in unusual attitudes or near the edges of aircraft performance capability.

FWIW, it is generally people who have substantial time flying in aircraft with AOA gauges that are stridently for having them, and people who haven't flown with them who say they're not needed. Correlation or just coincidence?
 
Well apparently everyone here thinks it's because they didn't have an AOA indicator.

Is there even a single person in this thread that has stated that, much less actually believes that? Don't distort the discussion of one thing into being about another -- that's just patently untrue.

Everyone is firmly agreed that this was a judgment/decisionmaking issue, and not an aircraft instrumentation issue. The discussion of one, however, led to a discussion of the other.
 
Sometimes we get into those situations because of lapses in SA or decisionmaking, despite high levels of training and experience. In these situations, we have to use airmanship and knowledge of the aircraft to get back to safety. In many cases, these involve being in unusual attitudes or near the edges of aircraft performance capability.

Don't blaspheme and bring that word around here, else some may take huge offense and accuse you of being a cowboy!
 
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