Colgan 3407 afterthoughts

Again, the absence of an accident does not indicate safety. Personally I think is a matter of time as the elements that contributed to Colgan 3407 are still there. It had nothing to do with 1500 hours- both pilots had more than that. It had everything to do with poor training.

The captain on that flight had 328 hours when he was hired to fly 121. He had 618 when he applied to Colgan.
 
One of the good things that came out of the 1500hr rule rewrite was the 1000 121 required before you could operate as 121 PIC.

I have been in a flight deck where the total combined experience between me and the FO I was flying with was 1750 hours and a total time of 11 calendar months with the company between the both of us - 10 months and 1520hrs for me, 1 month and 230hrs for the FO. I was so green I had no clue what I didn't know. (which was whole heck of a lot that I didn't know as I discovered later.) - a very classic case of the blind leading the blind.

As a sub-500hr FO, I had flown with 1500hr new hire captains who were junior to me, but they were captain only because they had the 1500hrs and I didn't. They moved from flight instructor straight into the captain seat but had no 121 experience. (And between us we had a total 3 months of company seniority and part 121 experience - 2 months for me and 1 for the captain.)

Neither situation was a good situation to be in and I was surprised that I survived without a mark on my FAA airman record. Some of my fellow captain upgrades in my upgrade class were not so fortunate, with the worst incident being the captain who sheared off all their prop blades during engine start and nearly decapitating the tug driver with one of the flying prop blades.


I did run into a pilot who was in newhire class with me 12 years ago at the airline where I was a wet behind the ears 1500hr captain as he was riding in the jumpseat commuting to work. He's still an FO, not because he doesn't have the seniority to upgrade, it's because he had no business being in a flight deck - his flying skills were really bad. But he passed every 121 check ride he was given, and he was given a lot more PCs than the normal 12 month periodicity because most captains he flew with (including me) complained about this guy's flying skills and lack of situational awareness. He just had no business flying in the real world. But he still has a job as a pilot because he can and does pass every 121 check ride he's been given so far.

He has the seniority to upgrade (and be a very senior captain at the airline) and he still talked about trying to upgrade soon so that he could move up to the major airlines when he was sitting in my jumpseat. And for the first time I was very thankful for his airline's pilot contract, which requires two letters of recommendations from a captain in order to bid for captain upgrade. It's not that hard to get two guys to recommend you for upgrade, it's almost a formality, but anyone's that flown with the guy would be very hard pressed to give him a recommendation.

I am convinced that if he ever made captain he'd be in an accident some day if he got paired with an FO who didn't have all of his stuff straight. So for now it's the pilot contract and the captains that are flying single pilot with him that's keeping the airline he's with from having an accident.
 
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Operated plenty of less than two years swept wing turbo fan experience in both seats just fine. You sound like the pinnacle crew room chatter.....

I think he was trying to say something along the lines of those folks up front might not know what they don't know.
 
I was listening to a conversation about something that was off the record, but what I can tell you is that an accident that killed several people was caused by the one person whom no one expected.

Another accident, the "FO" was going to be "that guy." This unlucky SOB happened to be in the seat, but it was the "Check Airmen" that caused the accident, and resulting damage. (No injuries). While the CKA was on the controls, it was a breakdown of CRM that greatly contributed to the accident.

So, I submit to many of you, total hours don't mean jack squat.
 
I was listening to a conversation about something that was off the record, but what I can tell you is that an accident that killed several people was caused by the one person whom no one expected.

Another accident, the "FO" was going to be "that guy." This unlucky SOB happened to be in the seat, but it was the "Check Airmen" that caused the accident, and resulting damage. (No injuries). While the CKA was on the controls, it was a breakdown of CRM that greatly contributed to the accident.

So, I submit to many of you, total hours don't mean jack squat.
Total hours in and of itself no. It's what you do with those hours, how much you have in type and in the applicable operation. That was part of my point with the Air France crash. The pilots had flight hours- one of them I think about 8,000. But almost all of it was international flying in the Airbus. Not much diversity, not much hand flying.
This is why I make it a point to go out on a nice day and take a J-3 around the patch at the local grass strip; and at least once a year I go to an aerobatics instructor and do some flying upside down and spins.

One of my disappointments is that much of the "intro" commercial flying where pilots could learn and make mistakes, perhaps even kill themselves (without taking other people with them), are going away. My first job outside Army helicopter flying and CFI was hauling checks in a beat up PA-34. After doing that for about six months the regionals called. As one interviewer said, I had not killed myself, scared myself out of flying or gotten violated so I must be ok.
 
Total hours in and of itself no. It's what you do with those hours, how much you have in type and in the applicable operation. That was part of my point with the Air France crash. The pilots had flight hours- one of them I think about 8,000. But almost all of it was international flying in the Airbus. Not much diversity, not much hand flying.
This is why I make it a point to go out on a nice day and take a J-3 around the patch at the local grass strip; and at least once a year I go to an aerobatics instructor and do some flying upside down and spins.

One of my disappointments is that much of the "intro" commercial flying where pilots could learn and make mistakes, perhaps even kill themselves (without taking other people with them), are going away. My first job outside Army helicopter flying and CFI was hauling checks in a beat up PA-34. After doing that for about six months the regionals called. As one interviewer said, I had not killed myself, scared myself out of flying or gotten violated so I must be ok.
That's where I go back and forth on the 1500 hour rule (which I do not yet possess, so full disclosure here.) Has it helped drive up pay, yes, that's a great thing for pilots. But looking at 3407, while both pilots involved may have had fewer then 1500 hours when they were hired, they each had well above that when it happened. Unfortunately I don't think there's a way to qualify "quality vs quantity" of hours. Does the kid whose dad buys an old 152 for him to burn 1000 hours over the course of 2 years on VFR days make a better pilot then the guy who has instructed for 200 & is only at say 750 hours? I think a lot of us would probably say it's the CFI, but according to the law, he's less qualified then the kid smashing bugs in the pattern in his 152 on CAVU days.

I dunno, there's pros and cons, obviously I'm God's gift to airplanes, and could fly an SR-71 if you show me how to start it :sarcasm: . I'd love to see mins dropped, or some sort of selective 121 training program okay'd after an exhaustive review of a sub 1500 hour guys logbook by some "qualified" panel. What changes in my abilities from hour 1499 to 1500? I dunno.
 
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The super critical wings on the CRJs are not very forgiving. Being able to land an airplane well is hardly a good indication. This is the kind of statement that worries me. As an old CW4 once told me, "The person who will have the next accident is person who says they won't have the next accident."
Can you please tell us how super and critical a CRJ wing is?
 
Can you please tell us how super and critical a CRJ wing is?
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How about increased paranoia and inflated sense of piloting skills. I've only met 1 type of pilot who likes to talk about their "supercritical" wing type like they're flying the space shuttle. Guess what they fly? It was quite prominent from one side of PINNAcolaba.

Post of the year.
 
There won't be another accident like this one because the cause was so elementary. A pilot pulled back on the yoke at the first sign of the stick shaker, and then did it again three times. Who does that? Yes there were contributing factors, fatigue, chatter below ten etc. For all the analysis, and attention that this accident got, it comes down to one of the most fundamental aspects of flying, something we are exposed to in lesson one two or three, and have to be able to handle by our first solo.

The best thing that came out of this is now airlines take a closer look at failures, as this guy had multiple issues with aircraft handling throughout his flying career.
 
What he said. One of the things that keeps me up at night is the thought of a cockpit with less than two years swept wing turbo fan or 121 experience between the two pilots operating it. Heck, I've heard of pilots becoming 121 instructors after less than a year. There have already been some close calls.
I firmly believe the only reason there are not more accidents is because of the automation. You put some of those same guys in sons older jets, and take out the EICAS, GPS, and FADEC, it would put a dent in the safety record. Most guys are good and do what they need to to ge safe pilots, but there are definitely those that skate by.
 
Come on guys, give it a rest already. We get it. 99% of us are gonna fold like a house of cards when something goes wrong. We get it, move along. Find another dead horse to beat.
 
That's a bold statement Cotton.
In the few other accidents where pilots stalled an airliner into the ground there was usually some other factor, I.e. pitot tubes blocked (Not saying that pilots shouldn't be able to fly pitch and power). I can't think of any accidents where a perfectly good functioning airliner was stalled.
 
There won't be another accident like this one because the cause was so elementary. A pilot pulled back on the yoke at the first sign of the stick shaker, and then did it again three times. Who does that? Yes there were contributing factors, fatigue, chatter below ten etc. For all the analysis, and attention that this accident got, it comes down to one of the most fundamental aspects of flying, something we are exposed to in lesson one two or three, and have to be able to handle by our first solo.

The best thing that came out of this is now airlines take a closer look at failures, as this guy had multiple issues with aircraft handling throughout his flying career.

I firmly believe the only reason there are not more accidents is because of the automation. You put some of those same guys in sons older jets, and take out the EICAS, GPS, and FADEC, it would put a dent in the safety record. Most guys are good and do what they need to to ge safe pilots, but there are definitely those that skate by.

Ever hear of Air France 447 and Asiana 214?

Now, why don't you rethink what you typed...
 
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