Pilot Error to Blame in PHL Aborted T/O

I'm aware of this. I'm arguing that we should train, and brief, that the PF should always do the abort.

But you said the PNF can see problems happening faster, so your argument leads to the conclusion that the PNF should always do the abort.

But what you're really saying is that it's arbitrary that the captain will always do the abort no matter whether they're flying or not. It's that or you don't realize you're making two arguments at once.

That's not factually driven, that's arbitrary. We either trust first officers to not crash the airplane or we don't, but if we don't they shouldn't be doing take offs or landings. If we trust first officers, we should train them to fly the plane from the start of the take off roll to the roll out. Or, if you're saying the facts back it up, we should have the PNF always do the abort.

But if we're going to say captains should always do the abort because they're captains, just say it.

I've also never been a big fan of the high speed control transfer that happens on an abort with the FO as the pilot flying. It's especially challenging with something that affects your directional control.
 
There's a good white paper at the FAA on this: http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/takeoff_safety.pdf
That -5 knots (roughly 1 second reaction time) is already built in. Plus another second for the configuration changes to occur. It takes time to begin to spool down an engine, deploy speedbrakes, and build brake pressure.

That's like saying the batteries are certified to go a full 30 minutes so you will have 30 minutes.


From that document:
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One common and misleading way to think of V1 is to say "V1is the decision speed." This is misleading because V1 is not the point to begin making the operational go/no-go decision. The decision must have been made by the time the airplane reaches V1 or the pilot will not have initiated the RTO procedure at V1. Therefore, by definition, the airplane will be traveling at a speed higher than V1 when stopping action is initiated.
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All the more reason for a V1 - 5 kts for the V1 callout.

What's your reaction time? 1 second like the FAA says?
 
I've also never been a big fan of the high speed control transfer that happens on an abort with the FO as the pilot flying. It's especially challenging with something that affects your directional control.

That's why when it comes to xferring control, it's "ABORT.... (the thrust levers have been slammed to idle and make sure you're matched up on the pedals) I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT." Note the pause!

It's been proven far safer to have one person making the abort call when you need to be in a go mindset in the high speed regime.
 
That's why when it comes to xferring control, it's "ABORT.... (the thrust levers have been slammed to idle and make sure you're matched up on the pedals) I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT." Note the pause!

It's been proven far safer to have one person making the abort call when you need to be in a go mindset in the high speed regime.
"OW! I mean reverse two green."
 
That's like saying the batteries are certified to go a full 30 minutes so you will have 30 minutes.


From that document:
------------
One common and misleading way to think of V1 is to say "V1is the decision speed." This is misleading because V1 is not the point to begin making the operational go/no-go decision. The decision must have been made by the time the airplane reaches V1 or the pilot will not have initiated the RTO procedure at V1. Therefore, by definition, the airplane will be traveling at a speed higher than V1 when stopping action is initiated.
--------------

All the more reason for a V1 - 5 kts for the V1 callout.

What's your reaction time? 1 second like the FAA says?

The rational that V1 needs to be a decision speed is different that how that is worked into a SOP. SOPs are not signed off by the test pilots and engineers that designed and test flew the airplane.

The airplane was bought or leased by your airline and SOPs were written by individuals and signed off on by individuals, based on numbers written by other individuals, all of whom are very likely not the same people and less likely to have the same mindset of the original test pilots and engineers, who were likely reusing data created by OTHER engineers, test pilots, and pioneers. Telephone Game, anyone?

If I've learned anything about performance numbers in this industry it's by the time the performance numbers get to us, they've been padded a bit because we don't have time to accurately do the real math. It would require a lot of data and calculation.

I don't buy your rationale that the title "decision speed" is not what is actually happening, therefore we should be subtracting from it. The title is wrong. I've always been taught that when you hear "V1", the time to abort has passed. That makes it apparent that V1 should be called "Go Speed". The fact that V1 is supposed to account for all conditions and reaction time tells me that we should not be further padding it with even more conditions. The only place I've ever read that is in my airline's SOP (we do V1-5, also). If the FAA says that they've accounted for human reaction times into their requirements for V1 calculation, then they've decided that any further human reaction time at V1 does not cut it. You will likely dispute that what I say is convincing and to that I ask:

Under which conditions is it acceptable to abort once you hear "V1"? Every FAA Inspector and DE I've ever worked with would observe an abort once "V1" is stated and call it "UNSAT". "V1" at V1-5? That's not V1. Any engineer would wonder WTF that is supposed to mean. Performance-wise, to successfully abort at V1, it would have to be immediate. That's why when you hear "V1", it's too late to abort. V1-5? That's presumptuous and confusing. It's "V1". There is no minus 5. That was created by presumptuous safety-minded individuals who don't understand what V1 is, probably because it's incorrectly referred to as "Decision Speed".
 
The rational that V1 needs to be a decision speed is different that how that is worked into a SOP. SOPs are not signed off by the test pilots and engineers that designed and test flew the airplane.

The airplane was bought or leased by your airline and SOPs were written by individuals and signed off on by individuals, based on numbers written by other individuals, all of whom are very likely not the same people and less likely to have the same mindset of the original test pilots and engineers, who were likely reusing data created by OTHER engineers, test pilots, and pioneers. Telephone Game, anyone?

If I've learned anything about performance numbers in this industry it's by the time the performance numbers get to us, they've been padded a bit because we don't have time to accurately do the real math. It would require a lot of data and calculation.

I don't buy your rationale that the title "decision speed" is not what is actually happening, therefore we should be subtracting from it. The title is wrong. I've always been taught that when you hear "V1", the time to abort has passed. That makes it apparent that V1 should be called "Go Speed". The fact that V1 is supposed to account for all conditions and reaction time tells me that we should not be further padding it with even more conditions. The only place I've ever read that is in my airline's SOP (we do V1-5, also). If the FAA says that they've accounted for human reaction times into their requirements for V1 calculation, then they've decided that any further human reaction time at V1 does not cut it. You will likely dispute that what I say is convincing and to that I ask:

Under which conditions is it acceptable to abort once you hear "V1"? Every FAA Inspector and DE I've ever worked with would observe an abort once "V1" is stated and call it "UNSAT". "V1" at V1-5? That's not V1. Any engineer would wonder WTF that is supposed to mean. Performance-wise, to successfully abort at V1, it would have to be immediate. That's why when you hear "V1", it's too late to abort. V1-5? That's presumptuous and confusing. It's "V1". There is no minus 5. That was created by presumptuous safety-minded individuals who don't understand what V1 is, probably because it's incorrectly referred to as "Decision Speed".

What is so complicated about it? You don't say V1 minus 5, you just say V1. For many airlines that V1 callout comes at V1 minus 5. At real V1 itself if you abort you are already late on the ball game.

You shouldn't be aborting in the high speed regime unless something is seriously wrong. That 5 knots savior is adding to reaction time about 1 to 1.5 seconds. It is safe and prudent to do so. With this method, if an abort is done at the "V1" callout, by the time plane physically hits V1 at 5 knots later, the power would already be at idle.
 
What is so complicated about it? You don't say V1 minus 5, you just say V1. For many airlines that V1 callout comes at V1 minus 5. At real V1 itself if you abort you are already late on the ball game.

You shouldn't be aborting in the high speed regime unless something is seriously wrong. That 5 knots savior is adding to reaction time about 1 to 1.5 seconds. It is safe and prudent to do so. With this method, if an abort is done at the "V1" callout, by the time plane physically hits V1 at 5 knots later, the power would already be at idle.

It's far less absolute than you're making it with the universal bugging 5 knots below V1.

A v1 cut, for example, in the Airbus AFM assumes an engine begins to fail 1 second prior to V1. Continuing the takeoff before that can negate performance criteria.
 
A very apt comparison.

Had this happened on a Runway 1 departure at DCA, I don't think there would have been very many selfies taken....

They were actually producing more thrust than if they had put in the FLEX temp. This is not a valid comparison, since the plane actually had added performance to their planned setting.

They just didn't understand what they were seeing on their FMA and ECAM (message system= EICAS)
 
What is so complicated about it? You don't say V1 minus 5, you just say V1. For many airlines that V1 callout comes at V1 minus 5. At real V1 itself if you abort you are already late on the ball game.

You shouldn't be aborting in the high speed regime unless something is seriously wrong. That 5 knots savior is adding to reaction time about 1 to 1.5 seconds. It is safe and prudent to do so. With this method, if an abort is done at the "V1" callout, by the time plane physically hits V1 at 5 knots later, the power would already be at idle.

I mostly agree. V1 is too late to abort.
 
It's far less absolute than you're making it with the universal bugging 5 knots below V1.

A v1 cut, for example, in the Airbus AFM assumes an engine begins to fail 1 second prior to V1. Continuing the takeoff before that can negate performance criteria.

Do you guys use AeroData? The performance derived by that service might factor the V1-5 call.
 
They were actually producing more thrust than if they had put in the FLEX temp. This is not a valid comparison, since the plane actually had added performance to their planned setting.

They just didn't understand what they were seeing on their FMA and ECAM (message system= EICAS)

Gotchya, interesting. (I don't have any Airbus time)

So if you put the thrust levers into the FLEX detent, with no temperature entered, what thrust setting do the engines go to? I made the assumption that because the airplane was so adamant about the thrust levers being in the TOGA detent that they may not have been making TOGA power.

You also hit on one of my massive pet peeves as an instructor, pilots calling out FMA changes out of reflex rather than reading what's on the actual tube.
 
They were actually producing more thrust than if they had put in the FLEX temp. This is not a valid comparison, since the plane actually had added performance to their planned setting.

They just didn't understand what they were seeing on their FMA and ECAM (message system= EICAS)
Ok, didn't realize that. So they aborted not for lack of performance but due to an annunciator they did not interpret properly? I may have missed it earlier, but did their programming oops effect vspeeds, and if so did that play into it at all?
 
"Reverse green, decel"



:)
Not yet, Holmes.

Although I love my autobrakes.

Under which conditions is it acceptable to abort once you hear "V1"? Every FAA Inspector and DE I've ever worked with would observe an abort once "V1" is stated and call it "UNSAT". "V1" at V1-5? That's not V1. Any engineer would wonder WTF that is supposed to mean. Performance-wise, to successfully abort at V1, it would have to be immediate. That's why when you hear "V1", it's too late to abort. V1-5? That's presumptuous and confusing. It's "V1". There is no minus 5. That was created by presumptuous safety-minded individuals who don't understand what V1 is, probably because it's incorrectly referred to as "Decision Speed".
I can think of at least one reason to stop beyond V1, on the theory that it would be better to go off the end and into the clearway at 30 knots with your brakes white hot, vs. smacking into the fence at 180+ knots, and it's a flight control malfunction. It's sort of hard to fly without elevator control, and if you pull and get nothing, and pull some more and STILL get nothing, it might be time to consider stopping. (For instance.)

I can think of things that go wrong (basically, anything that is related to the "stopping department") on a takeoff roll that will result in us going airborne anyway even with a malfunction below V1, too.

I sort of think that we've done ourselves a bit of a disservice by focusing on an engine failure as the worst thing that can happen on the takeoff roll. I don't think it necessarily is. Something that is confusing or counter-intuitive is, judging from this accident, not a great thing.

Ok, didn't realize that. So they aborted not for lack of performance but due to an annunciator they did not interpret properly? I may have missed it earlier, but did their programming oops effect vspeeds, and if so did that play into it at all?
It's my personal goal to not be stumped by something that pops up on EICAS. "What the eff does that mean" is not a game to be played during the takeoff roll.

I don't like "hidden" memory items. On the 145, ATTCS* FAIL (a warning) required thrust levers to MAX if presented above V1, but wasn't in a box anywhere on our checklist, and by the time you fished out the AOM to figure that out, you were already cleaned up and out of takeoff thrust. You might argue it's "correcting the obvious," but that's pretty tenuous. (Below V1, it was an abort - which was obvious, because when the airplane goes DING DING DING! you're going to stop.)

In this case, the airplane (ECAM) TOLD them, whilst thundering down the runway:
Code:
ENG THR NOT SET
THR LEVERS - SET TOGA
or something to that effect. "Hey, you screwed up, not sure what you mean by FLEX without a FLEX temp, so uh, you wanna get max rated takeoff thrust or what?"

('Bus drivers chime in and correct this)

* Automatic takeoff thrust control system, a system that provides additional (reserve) thrust in the event of an engine failure. Advancing the thrust levers to MAX on that airplane bought you T/O Reserve thrust.
 
Not yet, Holmes.

Although I love my autobrakes.


I can think of at least one reason to stop beyond V1, on the theory that it would be better to go off the end and into the clearway at 30 knots with your brakes white hot, vs. smacking into the fence at 180+ knots, and it's a flight control malfunction. It's sort of hard to fly without elevator control, and if you pull and get nothing, and pull some more and STILL get nothing, it might be time to consider stopping. (For instance.)

I can think of things that go wrong (basically, anything that is related to the "stopping department") on a takeoff roll that will result in us going airborne anyway even with a malfunction below V1, too.

I sort of think that we've done ourselves a bit of a disservice by focusing on an engine failure as the worst thing that can happen on the takeoff roll. I don't think it necessarily is. Something that is confusing or counter-intuitive is, judging from this accident, not a great thing.


It's my personal goal to not be stumped by something that pops up on EICAS. "What the eff does that mean" is not a game to be played during the takeoff roll.

I don't like "hidden" memory items. On the 145, ATTCS* FAIL (a warning) required thrust levers to MAX if presented above V1, but wasn't in a box anywhere on our checklist, and by the time you fished out the AOM to figure that out, you were already cleaned up and out of takeoff thrust. You might argue it's "correcting the obvious," but that's pretty tenuous. (Below V1, it was an abort - which was obvious, because when the airplane goes DING DING DING! you're going to stop.)

In this case, the airplane (ECAM) TOLD them, whilst thundering down the runway:
Code:
ENG THR NOT SET
THR LEVERS - SET TOGA
or something to that effect. "Hey, you screwed up, not sure what you mean by FLEX without a FLEX temp, so uh, you wanna get max rated takeoff thrust or what?"

('Bus drivers chime in and correct this)

* Automatic takeoff thrust control system, a system that provides additional (reserve) thrust in the event of an engine failure. Advancing the thrust levers to MAX on that airplane bought you T/O Reserve thrust.

I was referring to the speed itself and what it means, but that is a GREAT topic, of which humbled me very much on my ATP ride. One of those "short icy runways (1900 Triple Bus Failure) you really gonna abort?!? You really wanna take THAT in the air?!?" Well, I, uh...
 
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