Great CRM: 767 uncontained engine fire/tear drop return with CVR/FDR.
- Thread starter ChasenSFO
- Start date
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
I'd be wiling to give the benefit of the doubt on the V1, not knowing what the actual V1 speed was. It could be the F.O. hesitated in calling V1 and rotate because he was distracted by the fire bell. But if the fire bell did happen before V1 the proper procedure is to stop. There is no decision. Boeing makes it quite easy. Basically just have to remember that if the airplane yaps at you prior to V1 you stop. If it doesn't, you go. At least that is the case in the later models they build. The only caveats to that general rule are aircraft unsafe/unable to fly and some windshear scenarios after 100 KIAS.
"Blew" is a generic term, I know that the fuse plugs melted. Maybe not appropriate in this instance but that can often be avoided, even with overweight landings, if one uses a little bit of thought on landing performance and set the proper autobrake setting.
Fly as you train, train as you fly. Agree there can be variables that are not possible to induce in the simulator, but if effort is made in the simulator it can get pretty close. No reason to just throw out every proper procedure because it's real life.
I did say at the beginning it worked out okay in this instance, but it is not what I would prefer to see. I do not want to come off as a know it all, but nor do I wish to let impressionable younger pilots think this example is the best way to handle an engine fire on takeoff.
TP
bucksmith
Did you lock the doors?
Best conversation I've read on here in a while, thanks guys, good stuff...
The thing I noticed, despite possible faults from the captain, was him stopping to ask if the fo was "alright" with everything. That's a pretty critical thing, but I think I would have changed the tempo of my speech for that question to ensure I "slowed" his brain down for a moment to increase my odds of getting a more accurate answer... (notice I said, "I think"
)
The thing I noticed, despite possible faults from the captain, was him stopping to ask if the fo was "alright" with everything. That's a pretty critical thing, but I think I would have changed the tempo of my speech for that question to ensure I "slowed" his brain down for a moment to increase my odds of getting a more accurate answer... (notice I said, "I think"
)
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
ENGINE FIRE/SEVERE DAMAGE
- ESSENTIAL POWER - OPERATING GENERATOR
The rest of the items for fighting the fire, securing the engine, and other integrated checklist items are in the QRH. The rest of the fire fighting checklist and securing is read, verify with the other crewmember then do it. You do not want to inadvertently shutdown a good engine and possibly hydraulics.
We used to have several items to do from memory then there was a change in philosophy several years ago. This was changed to prevent crews from inducing issues by trying to run checklists seldom used from memory under pressure. The Saab too even has less memory items that it used to.
Boris Badenov
Fortis Leader
I don't think anyone disputes that a lot of approved procedures no longer have engine shutdowns/fire bottles as memory items. Some do.
Neither of these facts seems to be germane to the inevitable finger-wagging, chiding, and sermon-gifting one must come to expect from the Interwebz any time a video of another pilot doing anything is produced.
Neither of these facts seems to be germane to the inevitable finger-wagging, chiding, and sermon-gifting one must come to expect from the Interwebz any time a video of another pilot doing anything is produced.
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
A high speed abort below v1 is Captains discretion and a lot of factors need to be taken into account before you start down the runway in regards to this. I personally give PIC's a lot of latitude in this department as long as they can articulate why they did what they did in a reasonable fashion.
Some of the factors I personally look at:
Runway Condition
Runway Length
Passenger, live cargo, hazmat, explosives, etc
What's off the end of the runway
surrounding terrain
Day/Night/low IMC
In my experience if you are near v1 you are most likely better off taking it in the air and coming back to land and having an idea of what the problem is and using the full runway and having CFR ready. I haven been through a demonstration of why not to do a high speed abort below v1. One such item is a blown tire, i have been through this several times in the SIM and aborting over 100 for a blown tire is ugly. Stopping distance increases and there are directional control problems. Taking the plane in the air was far easier and landing with the blown tires was relative painless and runway length is much less of factor then.
KLEX is an airport you may want to consider your options before performing a high speed abort. The overrun on 22 is short and there is a steep drop off. If for some reason it doesn't stop its going to be very very bad.
Type of cargo is another consideration. If one is hauling aquatic mammals, bovine, or equine you could end up dropping them to the floor and severely injuring them with the sudden deceleration of the aircraft.
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
you can take the same airplane form 3 different air carriers and you could end up with three different sets of memory items and drastically different procedures across the carriers for them. It is all what they submit to FSDO or governing agency for approval. I have been told if you stray from what Boeing's published procedure and it doesn't turn out well you won't be able to point the figure at Boeing as much
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
Sorry you see it that way. Another way to look at it is a good example to learn from.
What this captain did was acceptable 30 years ago. Today it is not. That is progress from a safety, procedural, and safety point of view.
If you do not wish to participate from advances in modern aviation practices then please excuse yourself from the discussion.
TP
Boris Badenov
Fortis Leader
I'm not sure what "participate from" is meant to connote, but I'm quite certain that I'll engage in whatever public forum discussions I care to.
Boris Badenov
Fortis Leader
Right. He saved the airplane and everyone on it, but he didn't observe the proper self-impressed procedural orthodoxies, so he did it Wrong. I'd wager that if he'd flown a proper 15 mile final and the wing had fallen off, you'd explain to us that it was sadly inevitable.
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
I'll agree there could be room for discussion on some aircraft types and different types of operations.
That said, in a heavy jet the margin for error is pretty slim. That is why Boeing has designed the alert inhibits the way they have in modern aircraft. It makes the stop/go decision quite easy. There really isn't time for diagnosis when approaching V1. A properly trained crew will stop with an audible alert prior to V1. We have to train to the lowest common denominator. Meaning that we are training for the weakest pilot in the company. Overall that is the safest course of action.
Blown tire is a tough one. My previous company had two high speed airports at max gross takeoff weight for blown nose tires. The pilots both felt that it fit under the "aircraft unsafe/unable to fly" definition because it was a very loud bang and rumble just prior to V1. The company felt otherwise and thought they should have taken them into the air. There was significant damage to the underside of the airframe from the tire debris in both cases. Hard to say what I would do in that situation. I agree with the concept of going like you because you're right, it would be easier to stop from a stable approach, but the startle factor might cause an abort reaction like it did with the two pilots it happened to for real.
TP
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
V1 aborts are not black and white, it just isn't that simple
We also don't have their procedures for their acel. Every airline I have flow for has used a different acel alt calculation.
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I see mistakes there were made but not as glaring as see. The EVAC would have happened either way. Most EVACS will have injuries when slides are involved. Heck in our demo evac on the E170 a pilot ended up injured going down the slide.
August of 62 vs Feb of 63. Planes are basically the same age...
Still memory items / critical action procedures for military, and tested on it.
Still remember it from the F-117, it was so ingrained:
ENGINE OVHT/FIRE OR FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF
If decision is made to stop:
1. ABORT
THROTTLES - IDLE
CHUTE - DEPLOY
HOOK - DOWN
[those were the memory items, there were 4 more non-memory steps on that one, but were essectially memory items since you can't reference the checklist during the abort]
If takeoff is continued:
1. THROTTLES - MAX
2. AOA - LESS THAN 10 DEGREES
3. GEAR - UP
4. STORES - JETTISON (if required)
5. FUEL DUMP - ON (if required)
[plus one more non-memory step that refers you to the checklist appropriate to what is wrong with the engine and follow-on items]
The above was all a memory item that had to be regurgitated correctly, or more importantly, had to be performed correctly.
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
My comment that you quoted was not in regards to stopping or not stopping, but many of the other things he did in the procedure, or lack thereof. Just one example has already been mentioned. He did not do any confirmation of switches during the initial shutdown.
TP
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
WIth the blown tire I can see why they stopped. Is it part of the training sylybus? If not it should be added at least at PT's if nothing else. ti was an eye open for me in the 727 the first time I got it in the SIM.
I don't recall enough about the 170 but I know the Saab would still give warning for any of the red lights (except auto trim fail) at any speed during the takeoff roll. I think the E170 was the same. Cautions and minor items got inhibited until in the air.
Are you saying the new boeings won't even give you a master warning from v1 till airborne?
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
I would like to see their checklist this though before we crucify the guy, especially being a foreign carrier.
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
Even better.
Engine failure warning is inhibited from V1 - 6 knots to allow for the reaction time. So even with an engine failure at V1 -6 knots one would likely still go so as to fit with the proper definition of V1 as the speed at which the first action must be taken to stop.
Engine fire warning bell and master caution is inhibited from V1 to 400 feet RA or 25 seconds after inhibit begins. The EICAS message and lights in the fuel control switch and fire handle still illuminate.
There is also a whole list for cautions, which are inhibited after 80 knots as well as Predictive Windshear warnings on the takeoff roll.
That is why I say in modern Boeings the stop/go decision is pretty easy except for some of the specific items we have already discussed.
....and please do not think that I am frying the crew. Just discussing this in an academic sense. It could very well be they had no procedures and were/are somewhat of a cowboy outfit. I sort of doubt that, but as you say we don't really know. The point is that this event is not really an example of "great CRM" or the currently accepted safest practices in handling an engine fire on takeoff with subsequent return.
TP
Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
TP
I agree there is room for improvement on that flight and CRM was sub par and they rushed to get it back.
have to love new stuff. The 727 has a freaking school bell in the cockpit for a fire bell and its deafening when it goes off...
I agree there is room for improvement on that flight and CRM was sub par and they rushed to get it back.
have to love new stuff. The 727 has a freaking school bell in the cockpit for a fire bell and its deafening when it goes off...
Autothrust Blue
”…trusting ze process…”
Protect essential!
We have a laundry list of memory items (and quick reference checklist items, which we have to know are in the first page of the QRH - they used to be memory items) on the Bro.
Were I in charge, the only things that would be memory items would be:
(1) Breathe
(2) Feather that darned prop if it's windmilling or overspeeding (this is about aircraft controllability and critical performance - you're damned right we're doing that below MFRA)
(3) Grab the trim wheel and mash on the quick disconnect button if you need to
Our evacuation checklist is really a from-memory flow, too. Makes some sense to me, striking the balance between quickness and correctness. Most guys get the movements right, 100% in recurrent.
The Company was also not strapped to the several tons of airplane at 140 knots...