UPS 1354 (BHM) CVR Transcript

What strikes me, is that the article is going about blaming a software issue and not mentioning anything about the long conversation going on in the cockpit about how tired they were.
 
Maybe I missed something, but what did they do wrong? They were high, not low?

There's a very big hill you fly over on approach to runway 18. The PAPI is greater than 3 degrees, and flying it a dot low (3 red, 1 white) gives you something like 70 feet of clearance over the hill that UPS hit.
 
Someone somewhere is banging their head on their desk over the rest discussion.

Read the Human Factors Chairman's report, too. Discussions of interviews with friends and spouses about how tired the accident crew members had talked about being on numerous occasions throughout the months leading up to the accident. The captain had apparently mentioned to several people that the numerous legs and schedule "flipping" were "going to kill" him. Very telling. This should be a huge media event. But sadly, because passengers weren't involved, it won't get the attention that it deserves.
 
I hate to say it but management would just say call in fatigued you have that right.
 
Its pathetic that it will likely take one slamming into a neighborhood, killing dozens before getting a second look. All the while, the evidence to avoid it is on that CVR.
 
Whose policy isn't?

Well, to Southwest's credit, ours isn't. I called in fatigued late last year because scheduling tried to flip my schedule from PM to AM. No questions asked, no requirement to fill out a report, and I got full pay for it. That's company policy. I don't give SWA credit for much, but I definitely applaud them for how they handle fatigue calls. It truly is a no-fault policy.
 
Well, to Southwest's credit, ours isn't. I called in fatigued late last year because scheduling tried to flip my schedule from PM to AM. No questions asked, no requirement to fill out a report, and I got full pay for it. That's company policy. I don't give SWA credit for much, but I definitely applaud them for how they handle fatigue calls. It truly is a no-fault policy.
Wow. Awesome.
 
Whose policy isn't?

Most aren't.

I just attended the twice yearly ALPA safety council with the rest of the central air safety chairmen from each airline and I think I could speak for the group in saying that we only noticed a couple of all the carriers there having major issues with their fatigue policy. I don't need to name the few on here on the forum, but most have a working policy where pilots did not feel like there will be adverse consequences if they call in fatigued, whether those adverse consequences could be discipline, 'pushing' or intimidation, or simply loss of pay.

From what I can tell, and I've been going to safety council for a couple years now, bad fatigue policies are more of an anomaly than the norm.

That means, it's even more important than ever to fix this cargo schedule nonsense before another crash happens.
 
As I was reading this, the local morning news had a thirty second blurb about the transcript and did mention the preflight conversation they were having about the lack of equal rest requirements. It's not much but it is more than I was expecting to hear about this in the media.

Edit - a similar blurb on the Today Show just now as well
 
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http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/55000-55499/55307/550789.pdf

very interesting charts,pilot ( on CVR) complained about ATC keeping them high. If i am reading them correct it appears the pilot never decended to 2300 msl after established on the Loc and He not ATC that kept the A/C high on the profile. Looks like he was level 2500 msl 2.8 miles before the FAF.

At my airline at least we generally don't descend down to the FAF alt just for the hell of it, I would hang out at 2500 and just pick up a normal 3 degree from there. In that case you would start descending a bit earlier than FAF DME, not to descend below 2300' until crossing the FAF. For a non prec, descent rate must be monitored if using this technique. For the most part there's no point in destabilizing yourself and changing the power to descend a whole 200'.

Edit: looked at your profile so I'll explain this since you don't fly "big" stuff yet. When we say they're keeping us high, we mean to the point where the speed brakes are coming out to get down to an altitude and speed that you can get configured at. Leaving you high means ATC puts you in a position where it is difficult to get configured and stable on the approach, not clearing you for the approach 200' above FAF altitude.
 
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