Exploits in GPS and ADSB system

Just because a vulnerability exists, doesn't mean there is a high probability of attack, especially with physical systems (GPS/VOR jammers).

Until substantial intel states otherwise, there probably isn't a high enough likelihood of such an attack that justifies a probable $Billion expenditure to address it.

In the words of that once doddering fellow, "there you go again". We've become so inured to paying Shmecktel and Bland and the Generals billions of dollars that we have now been taught like Pavlov's dogs to assume that security (and darned near everything else the military/industrial protection racket buys) needs to cost billions of dollars. It systems are designed with the proper perspective (e.g. design the security -or other desired quality- into the system from the get go), they need not be so expensive. Of course, then the don't properly support the real aim of the whole apparatus, which is not so much to protect or serve anybody, but rather to hit a profit targets.
 
In the words of that once doddering fellow, "there you go again". We've become so inured to paying Shmecktel and Bland and the Generals billions of dollars that we have now been taught like Pavlov's dogs to assume that security (and darned near everything else the military/industrial protection racket buys) needs to cost billions of dollars. It systems are designed with the proper perspective (e.g. design the security -or other desired quality- into the system from the get go), they need not be so expensive. Of course, then the don't properly support the real aim of the whole apparatus, which is not so much to protect or serve anybody, but rather to hit a profit targets.

I bet you're fun at parties.
 
Sure they could throw 50 targets on my screen.... and so what? None of them will be tagged up, and none of them will be moving.

Even if they did move, any controller would easily identify them as splats and/or a ring around radar return.

It's not like they're going to show up in the approach stream with a call sign or even a proper relative altitude.

Fear mongering, at least on that part.
 
Sure they could throw 50 targets on my screen.... and so what? None of them will be tagged up, and none of them will be moving.

Even if they did move, any controller would easily identify them as splats and/or a ring around radar return.

It's not like they're going to show up in the approach stream with a call sign or even a proper relative altitude.

Fear mongering, at least on that part.

Thats what I was curious about, is there enough to substantiate that the ghosts would not be moving?

Fear mongering should be rejected as it seems entirely plausible and the report posted is purely a matter of information. That being the case, the information leads me to beleive right now the system is vulnerable to tamper with by someone with malicious intent.
 
Sure they could throw 50 targets on my screen.... and so what? None of them will be tagged up, and none of them will be moving.

Even if they did move, any controller would easily identify them as splats and/or a ring around radar return.

It's not like they're going to show up in the approach stream with a call sign or even a proper relative altitude.

Fear mongering, at least on that part.
You're right, 50 targets might not be an issue. How about 100 billion? 999 trillion? Could the systems handle it? I guarantee they weren't developed to handle that load. One just has to hope there were safeguards built-in to prevent a denial of service attack like that.
 
You're right, 50 targets might not be an issue. How about 100 billion? 999 trillion? Could the systems handle it? I guarantee they weren't developed to handle that load. One just has to hope there were safeguards built-in to prevent a denial of service attack like that.
Has to have a valid, registered ICAO code to show up. I know that from experience. So unless there are 999 trillion valid registered ICAO codes out there it's a no go.
 
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You're right, 50 targets might not be an issue. How about 100 billion? 999 trillion? Could the systems handle it? I guarantee they weren't developed to handle that load. One just has to hope there were safeguards built-in to prevent a denial of service attack like that.
Any target that's not on a filed plan is just a splat with a squawk code

If a terrorist is so determined to bring down ATC, why wouldn't they do it physically? Not saying it would be easier , but technically speaking it requires less effort
 
You guys know that there will still be pilots in these airplanes that can do some amazing things.

Like turn off the automation and look out the window.

We're in VMC 90% of the time, if not more. Looking outside the window and saying, "Things just went a little nuts, let's land right there" is a pretty reasonable backup safety system.
 
<-- Not worried. Revert to radar and, if needed, time over fix like we do over the Atlantic.

We still have ADS over the ocean but it's largely invisible to most of us, but some of the 76's had a sweet display of ADS data.

The GPS units can take a dump, but remember we've got IRU's and the GPS units merely update the IRU's in many airplanes. If they go all cattwumpus, a lot of aircraft revert to IRU positioning with DME updating and that circle of probability grows a bit.

When I was on the 767, several of our airplanes didn't have GPS at all and you wouldn't know the difference.
 
<-- Not worried. Revert to radar and, if needed, time over fix like we do over the Atlantic.

We still have ADS over the ocean but it's largely invisible to most of us, but some of the 76's had a sweet display of ADS data.
Are you guys ADSB out equipping yet?
 
Not in the states. ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillence-Broadcast.
I know but ADS-C provides position reporting. ADS-B provides a "radar" target when in range of an ADS-B receiver station (normally 200NM)

An airplane can be either B or C equipped or both. Such is my understanding. In my airspace we don't have any need for either yet, but Hudson Bay project I believe was one if the first ADS-B sites to become operational
 
I know THE guy from LockMart/the FAA on ADS-B. Outside of the engineers actually building the ADS-B systems he probably knows more about it than anyone else in the world.

He's not worried, so neither am I.

Also remember that secondary surveillance radar will continue to be in use and transponders will be required for the foreseeable future.

Finally, spoofing VOR/ILS/SSR returns isn't exactly rocket surgery and we've not had a problem with that.

I'm not worried to the point it is keeping me up nights either... I mean, I fly aircraft with no radar / VOR / xpdr / ADS-B most of the time anyway, and somehow seem to survive.

On the other hand, one reason that you don't see phony VORs or ILS systems spoofing signals - those things are really, really expensive, and radiate a fair bit of power. I mean, you can see those antenna installations at the airport, and you couldn't run it on batteries, and you physically need to have it there... ADS-B, pretty cheap stuff, anyone can hack together one and output whatever they like. Certainly more potential for nefarious folks.

It doesn't matter much now, because there is still radar. And beside, ACARS goes in the clear over VHF (ARINC), easier to spoof that, possibly more dangerous.
 
The plan is for radar to go away eventually...
SSR site cost is approx 25M
ADS-B site is a fraction of the physical space, requires extremely little maintenance and costs just $1M per unit

This means once everyone gets ADS-B equipped (eventually even your piper cub) we will have "radar" like coverage everywhere.

My company is going to be one if the first in the world with ADS-B on a satellite, giving radar like coverage over the whole ocean.

The whole thing is beyond my complete understanding but that's what I've garnered from the briefs I've had about the future!
 
I'm not worried to the point it is keeping me up nights either... I mean, I fly aircraft with no radar / VOR / xpdr / ADS-B most of the time anyway, and somehow seem to survive.

On the other hand, one reason that you don't see phony VORs or ILS systems spoofing signals - those things are really, really expensive, and radiate a fair bit of power. I mean, you can see those antenna installations at the airport, and you couldn't run it on batteries, and you physically need to have it there... ADS-B, pretty cheap stuff, anyone can hack together one and output whatever they like. Certainly more potential for nefarious folks.

It doesn't matter much now, because there is still radar. And beside, ACARS goes in the clear over VHF (ARINC), easier to spoof that, possibly more dangerous.
ACARS is not as great of a threat as CPDLC and AGCS systems
 
ACARS is not as great of a threat as CPDLC and AGCS systems

The issue is, none of these systems really do anything to even attempt to verify the sender is actually who they are and where they are. A digital signature tied to each controlling authority and each tail number would really be the only way to accomplish that right now. This was never an issue before, because hackers didn't control the radar sites or build their own.
 
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