A-10 to be retired.

The answer to the suggestion that the USMC should take on the A-10 since their specialty is CAS is that they probably would like the mission, but there is absolutely no way to operate them off a carrier.
 
Firebird2XC said:
As for the MQ-9, I don't know much about it, but you really don't need too large a payload to do CAS. Loiter time would seem to be a much more useful aspect. Come down, rain fire or drop relatively light antipersonnel munitions and return to loiter altitude. Done.
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While loiter is important, payload is essential. Ask any of the attack guys on here about situations where all the iron they had wasn't enough to deliver the win and they had to either hand off to another flight or leave to refuel/rearm. There aren't always other flights, and if your stations are empty but your fuel tanks are still full, you just became a spectator to the fight.

Firebird2XC said:
The thing that would really make a drone good at CAS would be that it could designed from the ground up to do that. None of the existing fixed-wing airframes- the A-10 included- were really designed with CAS in mind. A Predator with a Hellfire can do that now. Imagine what they could do with a little innovation.
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I'd be all for the development of a CAS-specific UAV. If someone could develop a true virtual reality human interface, the Reaper already has the weapons capabilities, they'd just need a good number of them to avoid aforementioned spectatorship.
 
Can't really do CAS, unless you have local air superiority. This would include superiority against robust IAD's. I'd say that there are a lot of really important missions that have to be successful prior to being able to do CAS, and support troops on the ground. Is it the big show in town in OEF? Sure. I'd say not so much in a future conflict where there is a lot of opposition (to aviation assets) initially.
 
///AMG said:
Can't really do CAS, unless you have local air superiority. This would include superiority against robust IAD's. I'd say that there are a lot of really important missions that have to be successful prior to being able to do CAS, and support troops on the ground. Is it the big show in town in OEF? Sure. I'd say not so much in a future conflict where there is a lot of opposition (to aviation assets) initially.
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Infantry is cheaper than aircraft. We can accept the additional losses.
 
Autothrust Blue said:
This aircraft looks sort of appropriately mean, but it doesn't have the Big Gun.

a29_super_tucano.jpg
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The big gun isn't really a necessity for CAS. The A-10's 'big gun' was a product of Vietnam-era thinking for tank-busting. With modern precision guided munitions designed for that, such a large gun is hardly still necessary.
 
The Fez said:
While loiter is important, payload is essential. Ask any of the attack guys on here about situations where all the iron they had wasn't enough to deliver the win and they had to either hand off to another flight or leave to refuel/rearm. There aren't always other flights, and if your stations are empty but your fuel tanks are still full, you just became a spectator to the fight.

I'd be all for the development of a CAS-specific UAV. If someone could develop a true virtual reality human interface, the Reaper already has the weapons capabilities, they'd just need a good number of them to avoid aforementioned spectatorship.
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I agree on the payload thing- should you find yourself 'winchester', there's not much point to being in the fight. I was more focusing on the fact that existing CAS assets seem to be limited more by loiter time, and that UAV gains in loiter could be an asset, appropriately armed.
 
Firebird2XC said:
The big gun isn't really a necessity for CAS. The A-10's 'big gun' was a product of Vietnam-era thinking for tank-busting. With modern precision guided munitions designed for that, such a large gun is hardly still necessary.
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In Desert Storm, one of the biggest tank-killing aircraft......was the F-111.
 
Firebird2XC said:
... and I'm correct in assuming they weren't using a gun pod?
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Correct. Gen. Horner's famout "tank plinking" campaign, using F-111s loaded out with GBU-12 500lb LGBs. The F-111s in DS didn't have their 20mm guns installed.
 
MikeD said:
Correct. Gen. Horner's famout "tank plinking" campaign, using F-111s loaded out with GBU-12 500lb LGBs. The F-111s in DS didn't have their 20mm guns installed.
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Ah- thank you. That validates my point. While the A-10's monster cannon is certain a 'shock and awe ' inducing thing and will be missed in that right, it's hardly reason to think that a true CAS aircraft is deficient without one.
 
Firebird2XC said:
The thing that would really make a drone good at CAS would be that it could designed from the ground up to do that. None of the existing fixed-wing airframes- the A-10 included- were really designed with CAS in mind. Maybe the F-15E was intended- but that's a redesign from an interdiction jet. The mission almost always seemed to be an afterthought. True CAS is about putting something in firing position that can delivery heavy ordinance on demand. A Predator with a Hellfire can do that now. Imagine what they could do with a little innovation.
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The problem with that line of thought is the belief that there is one single set of capabilities that defines the "perfect" CAS aircraft.

When you look at the fixed wing assets that are used for CAS -- from a U-28, to an AC-130, to the Hog, F-15E, even up to the B-1 and B-52 -- they all bring a different set of extremely useful capabilities to the fight. There are big areas of overlap between those capabilities, but there are also notable areas of exclusive capability to each of those airframes. JTACs pick different capabilities from different airframes to get the information or effect they want depending on the situation to be handled. Some of them have great sensors and comm capabilities...some of them carry very precise weapons....some have a lot of gas and thus a lot of loiter time....some of them carry a whole truckload of bombs...the list goes on.

A lot of beliefs about CAS come from a time when munitions weren't GPS-precise and the only way to provide highly accurate fires was through slow-flying aircraft using forward-firing ordnance. That is certainly not the case today. GPS/Intertial munitions mean that any aircraft that can hold a bomb and get mensurated coordinates from the JTAC can deliver danger close fires. Laser designators on anything from a King Air to a Pred and on up to a B-1 or BUFF mean that anything that can hold a bomb with a laser kit on it can also deliver Danger Close kinetic effects. The reality is, the current technology means that a very wide range of aircraft with a very wide range of extremely useful tools can be used to provide accurate fires. JTACs can reach in to that toolbox sitting in the stack above them and use a hammer for nails and use a wrench for bolts, rather than having to use a mallet for everything. The diverse set of capabilities also means that it is just not possible to build one air vehicle -- regardless of how it is controlled (manned or unmanned) -- that is the "ultimate CAS machine" and can incorporate all that useful tools.

As an aside, the F-15E was never really designed with CAS in mind (again, as CAS was thought of pre-9/11). It was pretty specifically a replacement for the F-4 and F-111 as an interdiction bomber that could also provide its own air-to-air protection. When I went through the F-15E initial qual course, I remember asking my instructor on a surface attack sortie if we were going to strafe. He replied, "the F-15E will never strafe. That's not our mission." So...we see how well that prediction has borne out. On my first assignment in the F-15E, the only time we ever spoke about CAS was after 9/11 and when it was looking like we were going to Afghanistan. Before that we never even learned how to strafe, much less practiced it -- in fact, it was generally considered "too dangerous" for us to spend time on, given all of the other missions we needed to be good at. There was a mad thrash in my unit after 9/11 to have the former A-10 guys teach us academically how the Army worked, about CAS theory, and the mechanics of it all. It was a crash course.

When I went back to my 2nd F-15E tour in 2006, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, the community had fundamentally changed such that strafe and CAS were now basic, bread-and-butter items that were part of basic competency.
 
Hacker15e said:
A lot of beliefs about CAS come from a time when munitions weren't GPS-precise and the only way to provide highly accurate fires was through slow-flying aircraft using forward-firing ordnance. That is certainly not the case today. GPS/Intertial munitions mean that any aircraft that can hold a bomb and get mensurated coordinates from the JTAC can deliver danger close fires. Laser designators on anything from a King Air to a Pred and on up to a B-1 or BUFF mean that anything that can hold a bomb with a laser kit on it can also deliver Danger Close kinetic effects. The reality is, the current technology means that a very wide range of aircraft with a very wide range of extremely useful tools can be used to provide accurate fires. JTACs can reach in to that toolbox sitting in the stack above them and use a hammer for nails and use a wrench for bolts, rather than having to use a mallet for everything. The diverse set of capabilities also means that it is just not possible to build one air vehicle -- regardless of how it is controlled (manned or unmanned) -- that is the "ultimate CAS machine" and can incorporate all that useful tools.
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Exactly. CAS does come in all kinds. An A-1 or A-10 certainly couldn't have provided the hammer that B-52s did during the siege of Khe Sanh. Multiple B-52s, essentially flying CAS, but actually hitting preplanned areas/coordinates, brought a firepower support for the outside perimeter of the USMC base, in a volume that no tactical jets could provide. Now, could the B-52s have hit a moving target at th time, had the NVA been on the move? No. And neither can GPS guided munitions today. LGBs can, as well as tactical airframes.

As an aside, the F-15E was never really designed with CAS in mind (again, as CAS was thought of pre-9/11). It was pretty specifically a replacement for the F-4 and F-111 as an interdiction bomber that could also provide its own air-to-air protection. When I went through the F-15E initial qual course, I remember asking my instructor on a surface attack sortie if we were going to strafe. He replied, "the F-15E will never strafe. That's not our mission." So...we see how well that prediction has borne out. On my first assignment in the F-15E, the only time we ever spoke about CAS was after 9/11 and when it was looking like we were going to Afghanistan. Before that we never even learned how to strafe, much less practiced it -- in fact, it was generally considered "too dangerous" for us to spend time on, given all of the other missions we needed to be good at. There was a mad thrash in my unit after 9/11 to have the former A-10 guys teach us academically how the Army worked, about CAS theory, and the mechanics of it all. It was a crash course. .
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As a FAC overhead Marines engaged with AQ west of Al Taquaddam in 2004, I had a 2 ship of -15Es pushed to me, and they seemed somewhat news to CAS. When I told them I was going to mark a target with strafe, and I needed their 20mm north/south along it, they were very hesitant to do it, and ended up not; using GBUs instead.
 
Hacker15e said:
There was a mad thrash in my unit after 9/11 to have the former A-10 guys teach us academically how the Army worked, about CAS theory, and the mechanics of it all. It was a crash course.

When I went back to my 2nd F-15E tour in 2006, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, the community had fundamentally changed such that strafe and CAS were now basic, bread-and-butter items that were part of basic competency.
Click to expand...

This is why the Marine Corps has always emphasized CAS as mission #1 from day one. With the pilots spending 6 months learning to be grunts before even attending flight school. I'm sure the Navy and AF would see this as a waste of time and resources, but in the eyes of the Marines it is absolutely critical to operating the air war as one with the ground war. The corporate mentality that we are all riflemen, who sometimes fly or fix airplanes, is vital to the effectiveness of Marine Aviation.

This axiom proved true again last year when the CO of VMA-211 lead a counter attack against the insurgents who breached the wire at Camp Bastion.
 
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