Landing Incident @ SFO

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What makes you think that I'm not capable of both being brutally honest about poor piloting and embracing every opportunity and process to make flying safer?

Because studies show that pilots with your attitude are dangerous. The FOI test deals a great deal in the various hazardous attitudes, with a great deal of focus on yours.

Since you brought up 121 operations. One reason I'm not in 121 aviation is because of my attitudes towards safety. A couple of months ago, I felt one of our pilots needed work on visual approaches. I had the freedom to schedule a non-revenue training flight that included more than a dozen approaches. I can't do that in 121 jet operations. I don't think 121 operations are willing to expend the resources to operate safely.


Damn, you'd be funny if you weren't so ignorant! The most amazing safety record in transportation history over the past 15 years, and you want to hold up Part 91 or Part 135 as the superior safety culture? Keep talking, and keep digging.
 
Because studies show that pilots with your attitude are dangerous. The FOI test deals a great deal in the various hazardous attitudes, with a great deal of focus on yours.

Can you be more specific about which "hazardous attitude" you believe is represented by his statements?
 
Strange stuff indeed these airplane wrecks.

First thing - some of you don't remember it but in the 70's and 80's it wasn't particularly shocking when an airliner crashed. Bad yes, but "OMG! That is shocking!", no. Today it is almost a shock when a major carrier crashes a plane, at least here in the US. I guess it hit me in watching my daughters reaction to the coverage and how utterly surprised she was that a big airplane could crash - but when you consider the safety record over her 15 year lifespan it isn't really. Just off the top of my head I can recall the PSA mid-air in the 70's, a Pan Am 727 in New Orleans, the Delta 1011 at DFW, American 191 in Chicago, the Air Florida Washington DC crash, and others that had occurred by the time I was her age.

The human errors thing and culture - hard thing to prove in a way but different cultures can be weird - and I'm all for finding out the causes and creating "systems" to fix things. I guess my question is, how much safer can things possibly get? As long as humans are at the controls you are going to have an error once in a while and a plane will crash it seems - and that's about what we have - "once in a great while". While the human is the weakest part of the airplane a lot of times, the flip side is that the human can do amazing things - Sully, Al Haynes, etc - that's the flip side to the human error thing. It seems though that at some point you can't get a whole lot safer and I'm wondering how close things are at this point?


It's an interesting question, because the human nature side of us wants to avoid any tragedy if at all possible. But at some point, we must eventually reach the point of diminishing returns, at least economically. Are there even more electronic nannies and warnings we can throw in front of the pilot to prevent this specific thing from happening? Sure, and they seem pretty easy to implement (if they already aren't... I've never seen the action on the 777 flight deck, so I don't know what nannies are already in place). But soon, you are creating safeguards for really isolated incidence possibilities. Where does it end? How much will it cost? How much MORE complex does it make the already complex systems? And if you introduce another safeguard, how does it impact the safeguards and procedures that are already there? Does introducing it break other things in the chain? There are so many variables to consider.

For instance, in this particular scenario (and I profusely apologize for my complete lack of knowledge on this, and I'd be thrilled to learn): They dropped significantly below Vref. That leads me to believe one of two things:
  1. Besides the visual indication on the tape, there are no other obvious indications, audibly or visibly, that they've dropped below Vref, or,
  2. There are indications, but pilots may occasionally dip below that target speed so regularly on approach (do they?) that the warnings are just noise
Both of those are human factors issues, and pretty easily addressed. For me to take that thought pattern any further, I guess I need to ask the fellas here that fly jeeeeeeeeeeeeeets: do you get any visual or audible indication that you've dropped a certain percentage past Vref? How often are you glancing down during visual approaches to do an instrument scan? What is included in that scan? All of these questions are coming from a GA perspective, so please understand that. Most GA pilots have an eternity to check all of this stuff, and I know things happen much faster in your offices.
 
The NTSB has stated that the pilots knew they were slow, and had put in power to correct speed 8 seconds before impact after they realized the auto throttles were not doing what they expected them to do, but obviously didn't put enough power in.
 
But to get that slow, it had to have happened before the 8 second mark. That's what I am getting at... why/how did they not notice that they were getting that slow (or, at the very least, that their airspeed was trending down and they would drop below Vref), and are there systems to alert the crew to that situation?

Further clarification for my uneducated mind: when are you supposed to be at Vref in a large aircraft like that? FAF? Over the numbers? DH?
 
It's an interesting question, because the human nature side of us wants to avoid any tragedy if at all possible. But at some point, we must eventually reach the point of diminishing returns, at least economically. Are there even more electronic nannies and warnings we can throw in front of the pilot to prevent this specific thing from happening? Sure, and they seem pretty easy to implement (if they already aren't... I've never seen the action on the 777 flight deck, so I don't know what nannies are already in place). But soon, you are creating safeguards for really isolated incidence possibilities. Where does it end? How much will it cost? How much MORE complex does it make the already complex systems? And if you introduce another safeguard, how does it impact the safeguards and procedures that are already there? Does introducing it break other things in the chain? There are so many variables to consider.

For instance, in this particular scenario (and I profusely apologize for my complete lack of knowledge on this, and I'd be thrilled to learn): They dropped significantly below Vref. That leads me to believe one of two things:
  1. Besides the visual indication on the tape, there are no other obvious indications, audibly or visibly, that they've dropped below Vref, or,
  2. There are indications, but pilots may occasionally dip below that target speed so regularly on approach (do they?) that the warnings are just noise
Both of those are human factors issues, and pretty easily addressed. For me to take that thought pattern any further, I guess I need to ask the fellas here that fly jeeeeeeeeeeeeeets: do you get any visual or audible indication that you've dropped a certain percentage past Vref? How often are you glancing down during visual approaches to do an instrument scan? What is included in that scan? All of these questions are coming from a GA perspective, so please understand that. Most GA pilots have an eternity to check all of this stuff, and I know things happen much faster in your offices.

Some airplanes already have safeguards for this situation, so it's not a prohibitively expensive thing to do. The airplane I fly, the 717 (which is also the same cockpit as the MD-11), has automatic low speed protection. Even if you have the autothrottles and the autopilot disconnected, if you get to "the footer," which is a few knots above stall speed, the autothrottles turn themselves back on and increase thrust to keep you out of a stall. The only way to stall the airplane is to make a very sudden pitch up to rapidly increase the AOA faster than the low speed protection can kick in, which obviously wouldn't have applied in this case.

Frankly, I think such a system should be mandatory on every transport category aircraft. But I said the same thing following the Colgan accident, and the "purists" around here just droned on and on about "basic airmanship." Basic airmanship is all well and good, but I think the dead people would much rather have had a little bit more automation and not be dead.
 
Further clarification for my uneducated mind: when are you supposed to be at Vref in a large aircraft like that? FAF? Over the numbers? DH?


Well, it's not actually Vref, but a calculated approach speed. The 717 uses the term Vapp, which is 5 knots above Vref in most conditions, but could be as much as Vref+20.

Most operators require you to be stable at calculated approach speed by 1,000 feet. Some allow it to go as low as 500 feet in visual conditions.
 
From what I recall, it was the needless speculation.


I wouldn't necessarily call speculation needless.

When it is informed, and reasonable, people learn from speculation. Thought questions with a known outcome, but unknown circumstances teach people to think objectively about what is a possible cause, probable cause, or not a possible cause. Reasoning in an abstract sense is useful as a learning tool.

No one here is going to write the NTSB report, so any comment here is irrelevant that purpose. That doesn't mean that commentary is without value though.
 
Every time one of these accident threads gets started, people speculate, and people whine about the speculation.

But I have learned vital information in every.single.one.of.these.threads. Every one. It might all be speculation, but as long as it is informed speculation (which, compared to just about every other place discussing 214 such as MSM or Youtube, this place is practically full of geniuses), there is much to be learned by all of us, whether we are flying J3's or A380s.
 
Not sure if this has been brought up, this is a massive thread now. But, a question to you 777 or Boeing product drivers -- if you load a visual into the FMS and use it for VNAV info, will it take you to the threshold or the 1000' point?
 
Perhaps a dependence on technology contributed to this accident rather than a lack of more warning bells and alarms.

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Invulnerability and macho.

Interesting, I don't see that at all based on what I'm reading. What specifically makes you think that?

I think there is a big cultural divide here between guys from a military flying culture and the civilian flying culture. Not saying one is better or worse, but from my perspective I understand what Pilot Fighter is saying and don't see it at all as coming from a position of either invulnerability or machismo. I suspect that your feelings on what he's posting is because you do not come from that background and don't understand the reason he has the opinion he does. I don't agree with everything he's saying, but I certainly don't think what he's saying is rooted in some hazardous attitudes as an aviator.

Not to say that he might have those attitudes as an aviator, I don't know....I just don't understand how you'd derive that based on what he's posted in this thread.

I think you two could be actually having an interesting conversation about approaching accident investigation (and root cause analysis) from what are clearly two very different perspectives, but instead you two are talking past each other...and at least one of you is letting it get personal rather than simply professional. Actually having an exchange of ideas requires that we come out from our respective positions of being "right" (based on our own personal experience) and at least consider that there might be merit in what the other guy says. Don't we all agree in the concept of academic nonattribution when discussing this kind of thing?

I am certainly not saying that the military perspective on flying airplanes is black-and-white correct and blanket applies to everything operating with wings. I have modified some of my perspectives on things in aviation that I was raised with in the military based on experience, interactions, and opinions of guys raised in the civilian sector (and I believe that I'm a much better aviator for it). I'm also, however, the first one to point out when there are entrenched attitudes and perceptions in other posters here that aren't representative of other sectors of aviation, including military operations.

In this case, my view as an outsider says that you both have valid positions that are worthy of consideration and discussion.
 
Damn, you'd be funny if you weren't so ignorant! The most amazing safety record in transportation history over the past 15 years, and you want to hold up Part 91 or Part 135 as the superior safety culture? Keep talking, and keep digging.

Did I ever suggest that 91 or 135 operations were safer than 121 in the aggregate, which would be a stupid proposition? No, I've found comfort in a non-121 operation that makes no compromises when it comes to safety. None, absolutely no budget constraints. It is a situation that you and other safety-minded pilots would thrive in.
 
Annual Aviation Statistics For 2011 Released:
No Fatalities On U.S. Airlines or Commuters, General Aviation Accidents Increased

April 27, 2012

The National Transportation Safety Board today released preliminary aviation accident statistics showing a slight overall increase in U.S. civil aviation accidents for 2011 from the previous year. Marked increases were seen in accidents involving on-demand Part 135 operations. However, for the second year in a row, there were no fatal accidents involving scheduled Part 121 air carriers or scheduled Part 135 commuter operations.

U.S. civil aviation accidents rose from 1,500 in 2010 to 1,550 in 2011. Fatalities also increased, from 473 in 2010 to 485 in 2011. All of the fatalities were in general aviation and on-demand Part 135 operations (charter, air taxi, air tour, and air medical operations). Twenty-eight accidents were recorded for scheduled Part 121 air carriers and four accidents were recorded for scheduled Part 135 commuter operations.

Total accidents involving on-demand Part 135 operations climbed from 31 in 2010 to 50 in 2011, while fatal accidents rose from 6 to 16 and fatalities rose from 17 to 41. The accident rate per 100,000 flight hours for on-demand Part 135 operations experienced the most dramatic rate increase among major U.S. civil aviation segments, rising from 1.00 in 2010 to 1.50 in 2011.

General aviation accidents, which continue to account for the greatest number of civil aviation accidents, reversed their downward trend over the previous two years increasing from 1,439 in 2010 to 1,466 in 2011. However, there were 263 fatal general aviation accidents in 2011, down from 268 in 2010. General aviation fatalities declined from 454 in 2010 to 444 in 2011. While the number of general aviation flight hours increased in 2011, the accident rate per flight hours decreased from 6.63 in 2010 to 6.51 in 2011.

The 2011 statistical tables showing accidents, fatalities, and accident rates for major segments of U.S. civil aviation are found at: http://www.ntsb.gov/data/aviation_stats.html
 
C'mon, man...I'm interested in having an actual discussion because I think there is a worthwhile point in this in learning about/from your two very differing perspectives.

I'm disappointed that you think that a drive-by comment like that is sufficient.
You are surprised that one of the resident bomb throwers did a drive by? :confused:

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