Landing Incident @ SFO

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Seggy said:
But let's look at the system that caused the mistake to prevent it from happening again. This cycle of accidents (Colgan 3407, Air France 447, and Asiana 214) ALL appear to have been caused by speed control issues. That points more to a systemic problem worldwide rather than an individual pilot mistake.
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I agree wholeheartedly.
 
So from your guys' POV, what is the systemic factor that connects them all?

My perspective, which we've discussed before and diverges from some of you 121 guys, is that this is rooted in a combination of currency/recency/proficiency (as in, long haul international guys not getting many opportunities to get their hands on the yoke and throttles and land very often) and a de-emphasis of hands-on airmanship paired with an emphasis on automation.

The first part, there isn't a whole lot that can be changed systemically to change, and the second part is obviously rooted in some safety and economic factors that drive a lot of 121 policies.

What's the perspective from where you guys sit?
 
Seggy said:
But let's look at the system that caused the mistake to prevent it from happening again. This cycle of accidents (Colgan 3407, Air France 447, and Asiana 214) ALL appear to have been caused by speed control issues. That points more to a systemic problem worldwide rather than an individual pilot mistake.
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Put one of these in every airline cockpit? :)

aoaselftest.jpg
 
ATN_Pilot said:
I can't even imagine, nor can you, what level of courage it would take to communicate face to face, or even over the phone, with the child of someone whose death that you live with the nightmare of having caused. I could never judge someone for not having that level of courage, because I can't even begin to imagine what it's like to live with that hell every moment of every day.



I've never met a lawyer who tried to talk someone into lying. But keeping your mouth shut isn't a lie.




My biggest problem with your attitude is your continual use of the word "negligent." There was no negligent behavior in this crash. There were mistakes. Mistakes that any of us could have made. I flew in and out of that airport many times during my tenure on the CRJ, and I lost track of the amount of pilots I flew with who made the comment "this runway configuration is an accident waiting to happen." We all knew it was dangerous. So when you start throwing complicating factors at it, like fatigue, last minute aircraft swaps and getting in a rush, etc., the danger finally catches up with you.

We study crashes not to affix blame, but to learn from them and find ways to avoid them in the future. Changes were made following the LEX accident. Every airline added a procedure to cross-check heading, runway markings, and FMS programmed runway to ensure that you're on the right pavement. My carrier wasn't doing that as a matter of procedure prior to the accident. Neither were many others. The FAA also instituted new procedures for ATC. And so on. That's why we study accidents. Not so you can get your jollies attacking fellow aviators and calling them negligent.
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I'm sorry about your friend, and I recognise your desire to defend him, but don't attack other members because they don't share your friendship. I disagree with your opinion, but there's nothing jolly about it.
 
Autothrust Blue said:
After all the hullaballoo, they still haven't done a very good job on the signage out there, just sayin'.


I'm fond of:

"During descent FO confused aircraft call signs the crew responded to a radar vector given to another aircraft. FE picked up something was wrong and said nothing. FO was also not happy but said nothing. AC took up new heading. Despite visual conditions crew did not look out and see that the current heading would not take aircraft to the airfield. Radar picked up 70 degree heading error and corrected. Captain hit FO with the back of his hand for making the error. The incident caused by similar sounding call signs, lack of situational awareness, crew not looking out, crew not speaking up, incorrect radio procedures and implicitly trusting ATC."
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Especially frustrating because I've never once seen anyone actually use that crossing runway...
 
NickH said:
I'm sorry about your friend, and I recognise your desire to defend him, but don't attack other members because they don't share your friendship. I disagree with your opinion, but there's nothing jolly about it.
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Actually, we're not friends. I haven't seen or spoken to him in years. My rigorous defense for him is the same as it would be for any fellow aviator who is being smeared.
 
I mentioned in another thread just yesterday how otherwise 'good' police officers will lead to defend the actions of officers committing negligent or criminal actions. It appears to be somewhat universal.
 
Hacker15e said:
So from your guys' POV, what is the systemic factor that connects them all?

My perspective, which we've discussed before and diverges from some of you 121 guys, is that this is rooted in a combination of currency/recency/proficiency (as in, long haul international guys not getting many opportunities to get their hands on the yoke and throttles and land very often) and a de-emphasis of hands-on airmanship paired with an emphasis on automation.

The first part, there isn't a whole lot that can be changed systemically to change, and the second part is obviously rooted in some safety and economic factors that drive a lot of 121 policies.

What's the perspective from where you guys sit?
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Assuming that the issue involved the use of level change or another mode that put the A/T out of the equation and eliminated low-speed protection (and have not confirmed this, but it seems that the 777's low speed protection does not work in all modes according to some sources), then I would say attentional tunneling coupled with an expectation of autothrottle protection. That scenario would be more similar to AA in Jackson Hole than just lack of pilot skill.
 
Negligent should not be the word used absent an intentional act to not follow a policy or procedure. Even then, it would not apply unless it is a willful disregard of a significant safety hazard. That would apply to bus drivers, police officers, doctors, pilots, etc. Our legal system places blame on the front line operator, and by doing so, leaves in place significant problems that are systemic and encourages a culture of covering up errors.
 
The guys in 5191 made a mistake, granted a very terminal one, but a mistake nonetheless. Unfortunately, there's not much of a system fix for that particular accident other than "ensure you're taxiing to the correct place on the airport, without any incursions, and when you get there, prior to rolling, do your standard last chance checks to ensure you're at the correct place." In 5191, no one other than the flight crew had a responsibility to ensure that the jet was taxiied to the correct place. ATC could potentially have helped, but as they hadn't opened yet and the controller was likely taking care of opening duties, that simply wasn't available; and it reverts back to, the crew must ensure they taxi to the correct place. Even so, with all of this, the crew did nothing criminal, nothing negligent; they made a mistake. In no way did they want to have what happened to them happen; there was no "hey, watch this"; they did what they did believing they were making the correct decisions the whole way to takeoff, but didn't catch some of the clues that existed that they weren't. In no way can 5191 be compared to a, say, 3701; completely different scenarios in a number of ways, in the strict human factors sense. The errors made by the crew of 5191 were very basic errors of airmanship, but they were mistakes made......whether by complacency, by rote, by fatigue.....they were still mistakes; ones that the co-pilot will have to live with, and does.

Live and learn. As Ive said many a time, we aren't finding new ways to crash planes.
 
Is it true in American flight training, that at no point do you ever have to actually spin an airplane?
 
pilot4500 said:
That is correct. Spin training is only required if one decides to pursue a Flight Instructor License.
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Which is BS, I personally demonstrated them to all my students so they knew what to expect. If, god forbid, it ever happened to them I didn't want them bringing a knife to a gun fight. End thread drift.
 
SteveCostello said:
Not sure what this has to do with the topic... perhaps another thread is in order?
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I personally think its an excellent tool for developing even better slow flight handling techniques.

If anything, obviously,handling of an airplane at the bottom edge of the performance envelope might have helped a few accidents, maybe not, but it sure as hell couldn't hurt. It was one day of my commercial flight training.

I realize that like most things in this nancified world we live in, spin training was taken out probably because aircraft manufacturers started making training airplanes placarded as being not safe to spin.

I've only done a very limited amount of commercial air work, but I'd like to think if I was doing it for a living, I'd appreciate every tool I can fit in my toolbox.
 
I was responding mostly to Hacker who asked what the systemic problem is.

I think it boils down to me, that, more and more pilots are trained for systems, rather than flying, spin training is a perfect example, in my opinion THE perfect example reference Colgan/Asiana/Air France as listed above... Adam Air recently too?
 
What Im afraid will happen as a result in accident is more rules and regulations to try to fix "airmenship" or the lack of it. As Chief Pilot for a 135 company, the FAA mandated us spending countless hours rewriting our training manual as a result of the Air France 447 crash emphasizing pitching down at stall and to treat first indication as a fully developed stall. While I agree with the need of better training, more regs and procedures is just going to make us more of a robot. Might as well have a computer fly.
 
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