CNN Video: Safety Rule Could Create Pilot Shortage

That's just it, I have been doing it for years now and flown with all sorts of people. Almost no correlation to experience and how good of a pilot they were. This is of course with a minimum baseline, I would suspect someone with 250 hours like you said would be excellent at flying the plane but not know as much when it comes to weather, situational awareness (what does ATC want you to do) etc. In fact I would bet they would be really safe, as they would go 50 miles around a TS if ATC would let them!

I'm not saying the law is bad, just that it is unnecessary IMO. I think it went too far. Remember the reason it came out? The Colgan crash? The CA had 3500 hours and FO 2000 hours IIRC and had spent years in the 121 environment. The Comair crash prior? Also years and years of experience up until that point, IIRC they were a senior crew.

Hours and experience doesn't make a pilot safe - the pilot does.
That's just it, I have been doing it for years now and flown with all sorts of people. Almost no correlation to experience and how good of a pilot they were. This is of course with a minimum baseline, I would suspect someone with 250 hours like you said would be excellent at flying the plane but not know as much when it comes to weather, situational awareness (what does ATC want you to do) etc. In fact I would bet they would be really safe, as they would go 50 miles around a TS if ATC would let them!

I'm not saying the law is bad, just that it is unnecessary IMO. I think it went too far. Remember the reason it came out? The Colgan crash? The CA had 3500 hours and FO 2000 hours IIRC and had spent years in the 121 environment. The Comair crash prior? Also years and years of experience up until that point, IIRC they were a senior crew.

Hours and experience doesn't make a pilot safe - the pilot does.

Sure these crews had hours....but what did they do before their right seat in an airliner? And even Pinnacle 3701..I believe the FO and maybe even the captain were Gulfstream pay for job types, so I can't imagine they had much of a building block type flying background before right seat part 121. I'm doing house chores and using my mobile, so I am just going off the top of my head. And heck, the structured university programs are getting five hundred hours off the 1500 hours for an ATP. That is plenty. They have time to use that structured flying skill set and refine and build on those skills for awhile before flying part 121 swept wing jets or big turbo props.

And I again think that there is more developed than hard flying skills; its the soft skills. What I mean is that time and opportunity are required to develop a person. We aren't binary, we aren't machines, we need time to be molded. Further 250 /wet comm means that this is a job that can be bought, probably with someone elsecs money, not earned. Lots of red flags there.

Finally, *if* this law forces airlines to stop smacking around their pilot force and provide better pay and QOL I certainly think safety is improved. A beaten work force is not productive, creative, well rested (fatigue is cumulative, right?), etc. This is one thing I think the National Guard tries really hard to get right. Leadership repeatedly tells us if our home life is messed up, we are messed up, and the mission suffers. The airlines kick you in the jimmies and then say "you better fly safe- with vigilance, professionalism, accountability, customer service, etc. !"
 
If its any consolation to the guys that come out of some of these programs, I worked at a fast track pilot mill until recently where I'm now training at a regional. Since I trained the CFI's, I was they're last stop before they're first paid flying job and I made it a point to fight this self-deserving mentality that was running around everywhere. While I was a stubborn stick in the mud to some people I did win some guys over I think... Mostly by teaching a little "hiring history" like Doug mentioned in earlier posts. Most were appalled when I told them that regional/commuter pay sucked then as it did now but you needed 3-5K hrs to touch a jet... and most companies didn't pay during training...

Still I definitely heard someone tell me outright in class, "well I don't care much for this FOI stuff, I'll be in a jet soon enough anyway so it doesn't matter." or another guy... "why is the VOR approach or a DME arc important anyways? the airlines never do them..." que eyeroll

But those guys (in the video) were probably the 2% which is usually the most vocal and just want to get on TV anyways...
 
Sure these crews had hours....but what did they do before their right seat in an airliner? And even Pinnacle 3701..I believe the FO and maybe even the captain were Gulfstream pay for job types, so I can't imagine they had much of a building block type flying background before right seat part 121.

The captain of flight 3701 was not a "pay for job type." He was hired as a street captain at Gulfstream (without paying anything) after flight instructing and working at Trans States. Then he went to Pinnacle after spending a good amount of time as a captain at Gulfstream. He was not low time, and did not take any shortcuts in his career.
 
To add: Not everyone at Gulfstream was PFJ. Gulfstream was an airline that did, in fact, hire regular people, namely as street Captains, as Todd points out.
 
If its any consolation to the guys that come out of some of these programs, I worked at a fast track pilot mill until recently where I'm now training at a regional. Since I trained the CFI's, I was they're last stop before they're first paid flying job and I made it a point to fight this self-deserving mentality that was running around everywhere. While I was a stubborn stick in the mud to some people I did win some guys over I think... Mostly by teaching a little "hiring history" like Doug mentioned in earlier posts. Most were appalled when I told them that regional/commuter pay sucked then as it did now but you needed 3-5K hrs to touch a jet... and most companies didn't pay during training...

Still I definitely heard someone tell me outright in class, "well I don't care much for this FOI stuff, I'll be in a jet soon enough anyway so it doesn't matter." or another guy... "why is the VOR approach or a DME arc important anyways? the airlines never do them..." que eyeroll
Clearly these guys have never been to Mexico.
 
The captain of flight 3701 was not a "pay for job type." He was hired as a street captain at Gulfstream (without paying anything) after flight instructing and working at Trans States. Then he went to Pinnacle after spending a good amount of time as a captain at Gulfstream. He was not low time, and did not take any shortcuts in his career.
Thanks for the reply. Also I do realize not all Gulfstreamers paid... What was the FOs story then?

I am surprised at the resistance for ATP mins being a base line airline pilot requirement. Seems like a natural and logical starting point from what my experience has shown.

The Colgan accident shed light on some bad practices in the industry; low pay, pilot pushing, and pay for a job schemes all drew understandable scrutiny. To me, the unfortunate ramifactions are the check ride failures and pretty much anything in your history turns a pilot into a leper. Most likely the rationale is the CNN affect. I have no busts nor did my 121 training have hiccups, but from what I have seen, if a pilot does---good luck! You are on your own!
 
Thanks for the reply. Also I do realize not all Gulfstreamers paid... What was the FOs story then?

The FO was a relatively low time pilot, with about 800 hours total at the time of the accident. He did attend GIA Academy, so I assume that he paid for his training, although I don't know for sure. Regardless, it isn't relevant. There were many contributing factors to the cause of the 3701 accident, but the FO having paid for training at a previous airline certainly wasn't one of them.

I am surprised at the resistance for ATP mins being a base line airline pilot requirement.

I'm not resistant to the new mins. In fact, I wish they would have just made it ATP mins period, without the 500 hour reduction for college programs. But we should be honest with ourselves here and admit that none of the recent accidents were caused by low time pilots. The Comair crew was incredibly experienced. The captain of 3701 was as well. The Colgan crew had well above the new minimums. As much as we should support these higher standards, we shouldn't be dishonest and claim that the minimums would have changed anything in these accidents.
 
The FO was a relatively low time pilot, with about 800 hours total at the time of the accident. He did attend GIA Academy, so I assume that he paid for his training, although I don't know for sure. Regardless, it isn't relevant. There were many contributing factors to the cause of the 3701 accident, but the FO having paid for training at a previous airline certainly wasn't one of them.



I'm not resistant to the new mins. In fact, I wish they would have just made it ATP mins period, without the 500 hour reduction for college programs. But we should be honest with ourselves here and admit that none of the recent accidents were caused by low time pilots. The Comair crew was incredibly experienced. The captain of 3701 was as well. The Colgan crew had well above the new minimums. As much as we should support these higher standards, we shouldn't be dishonest and claim that the minimums would have changed anything in these accidents.
I disagree with your assertion that paying for a job isn't an issue. Paying for a job equals paying to skip steps in experience building.
 
Again, please point to an NTSB report that lists low time pilots as the probable cause or even a contributing factor to the accident.

We lose credibility when we ignore the facts. Arguing that requiring an ATP is a reasonable minimum level of experience can be done without making baseless claims about low time pilots causing accidents. The facts aren't there to support that claim.
 
Again, please point to an NTSB report that lists low time pilots as the probable cause or even a contributing factor to the accident.

We lose credibility when we ignore the facts. Arguing that requiring an ATP is a reasonable minimum level of experience can be done without making baseless claims about low time pilots causing accidents. The facts aren't there to support that claim.

The NTSB reports read like a PTS; "failed to maintain airspeed, failed to maintain...., loss of...." Well no crap they failed to maintain airspeed!! It's like listening to a really rigid, stuffy professor talk. What's written between the lines? And therein lies real piloting. Being about to think outside of rigidity, your alma mater's dogma--see the big picture of what your flight is doing. I'd like to look up the NTSB stuff now for more intelligent conversation, but I'm gonna hang out with my woman for the night, because I leave tomorrow.

Also, like the Colgan crash, what went unmentioned (to my knowledge) in the list of causes was fatigue, but son-of-a-gun if we aren't getting new rests rules as a result of what? The Colgan crash? There's a lot that goes unsaid in those reports. I remember Rod Machado saying something to that affect once..

I stand by my statement that a lot of schemes are meant to sling shot pilots into 121 seats before their time. The ads for this make NO bones about the lightning speed at which someone's piltoing career is going move using X company's plan. Usually the ad says something about how awful and useless CFIing is. Red Flag number one!! That stuff needs to end.
 
I disagree with your assertion that paying for a job isn't an issue. Paying for a job equals paying to skip steps in experience building.
Mesa Airlines puts (or did) its ab initio guys in 1900s and RJs with 250 hours TT. They had a ton of guys go thru that program, in fact when I worked there I taught about 20 privates alone over the course of the year, and there were 7-10 instructors at any given time. How is that any different than someone going to Gulfstream, but paying for it?
 
The NTSB reports read like a PTS; "failed to maintain airspeed, failed to maintain...., loss of...." Well no crap they failed to maintain airspeed!! It's like listening to a really rigid, stuffy professor talk. What's written between the lines? And therein lies real piloting. Being about to think outside of rigidity, your alma mater's dogma--see the big picture of what your flight is doing. I'd like to look up the NTSB stuff now for more intelligent conversation, but I'm gonna hang out with my woman for the night, because I leave tomorrow.

Also, like the Colgan crash, what went unmentioned (to my knowledge) in the list of causes was fatigue, but son-of-a-gun if we aren't getting new rests rules as a result of what? The Colgan crash? There's a lot that goes unsaid in those reports. I remember Rod Machado saying something to that affect once..

You really should read the report. You don't have your facts straight. In fact, fatigue was mentioned in the report. It was #24 and #25 on the NTSB's list of 46 findings. NTSB reports are not as bland and ambiguous as you state. To the contrary, they contain immense amounts of information, findings, and recommendations.

In the case of the Colgan accident, despite a 266 page report, which included 46 explicit findings that covered everything from the captain's faulty control movements to the lack of a low speed warning band on the airspeed tape to the likely involvement of fatigue, nothing was mentioned regarding the flight crew not having enough flight time. And the reason is simple: the facts don't support that conclusion. The facts do support many other recommendations related to pilot training, and those recommendations were included in the report. But those recommendations were specific to the training programs at airlines, not minimum flight time requirements prior to getting an airline job.
 
Mesa Airlines puts (or did) its ab initio guys in 1900s and RJs with 250 hours TT. They had a ton of guys go thru that program, in fact when I worked there I taught about 20 privates alone over the course of the year, and there were 7-10 instructors at any given time. How is that any different than someone going to Gulfstream, but paying for it?

I am honestly disappointed in this post, because normally I would give some creedance to what you write, but it seems to me you have not paid attention to any of my previous posts; I have said that airline transport operations should require airline transport pilot experience; the 1500 hours, the XC time, the instrument time, etc.

So having an ab initio program circumvents this experience building, apparently places paying pax in the hands of 250 hour fresh commercials, thus ALSO skipping steps in experience building. I could come up with an exhaustive list of things that do not equal ATP experience, but I don't see why I need to.

Further, I fail to see how, "They had a ton of guys go thru that program, in fact when I worked there I taught about 20 privates alone over the course of the year, and there were 7-10 instructors at any given time." is supporting evidence of anything.

Rod Machado wrote about a fundamental lack of airmanship skills up the airline level, and also a lack of understanding of flying an airfoil, understanding angle of attack. Reference the Air France flight. I am not a fan of quick fixes, simple solutions, or just throwing money at a problem. Quite frankly that is how I see this zero to hero programs. Having dealt with products of these programs I would say the results are a mixed bag at best.

I think we can potentially raise the bar, and make a lot higher percentage of airline pilots built on more solid foundations. I want to know that my loved ones are flying on a flight operated by seasoned pilots, not someone who wanted that airline job and wanted it now. A crew that has had a chance to use their skills, judgement, and heck even make some mistakes-but having done so before the folks in the back are counting on them.

Do experienced pilots make mistakes? Heck yeah! What are some objective ways to reduce pilot errors and or reduce the error severity? More experience under one's belt is a great start.
 
You really should read the report. You don't have your facts straight. In fact, fatigue was mentioned in the report. It was #24 and #25 on the NTSB's list of 46 findings. NTSB reports are not as bland and ambiguous as you state. To the contrary, they contain immense amounts of information, findings, and recommendations.

In the case of the Colgan accident, despite a 266 page report, which included 46 explicit findings that covered everything from the captain's faulty control movements to the lack of a low speed warning band on the airspeed tape to the likely involvement of fatigue, nothing was mentioned regarding the flight crew not having enough flight time. And the reason is simple: the facts don't support that conclusion. The facts do support many other recommendations related to pilot training, and those recommendations were included in the report. But those recommendations were specific to the training programs at airlines, not minimum flight time requirements prior to getting an airline job.

Ok, so I remembered what the hubub about fatigue was, and now have access to a real computer. Reading some article or articles in the past, it was cited that fatigue was smattered all throughout the original NTSB report, but for some reason failed to be mentioned in the list of recommendations. Later "4.1 New Recommendations" was added to address this issue. The authors of the articles I read pondered at some length why something that was written about to some length in the report failed to make an appearance in the recommendations. I am not sure what caused a "New Recommendations" to necessary....possibly the outcry of the families of the deceased?

When it comes down to the probably cause, it's just the facts ma'am;
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this

accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led

to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident

were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the lowspeed

cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s

failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed

selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.
 
You really should read the report. You don't have your facts straight. In fact, fatigue was mentioned in the report. It was #24 and #25 on the NTSB's list of 46 findings. NTSB reports are not as bland and ambiguous as you state. To the contrary, they contain immense amounts of information, findings, and recommendations.

In the case of the Colgan accident, despite a 266 page report, which included 46 explicit findings that covered everything from the captain's faulty control movements to the lack of a low speed warning band on the airspeed tape to the likely involvement of fatigue, nothing was mentioned regarding the flight crew not having enough flight time. And the reason is simple: the facts don't support that conclusion. The facts do support many other recommendations related to pilot training, and those recommendations were included in the report. But those recommendations were specific to the training programs at airlines, not minimum flight time requirements prior to getting an airline job.

On page 174 under Public Hearing;

The issues presented at the hearing were the effect of icing on airplane performance, cold weather operations, sterile cockpit rules, flight crew experience, fatigue management, and stall recovery training.

Page 3;

The captain reported on his employment application (to Colgan) that, in addition to the BE-1900D, he had flown the Piper PA-32 and PA-28 and the Cessna C-172. He also reported 618 total flight hours, including 38 hours of actual instrument time, and 71 hours of simulator instrument time.
Wow...That is after going through flight school, and after having flown paying pax at Gulfstream? How much experience did he have on his own making decisions before flying paying pax at Gulfstream? I started CFI-ing at 600 hours TT.




During that conversation, the first officer indicated that she had accumulated more actual flight time in icing conditions on her first
day of initial operating experience (IOE) with Colgan than she had before her employment with the company. <-----(Me--Yikes...apparently she came to Colgan with only six hours actual instrument. Really not much. She did however, have almost ATP time-1,470 TT. )
She also stated that, when other company first officers were “complaining” about not yet having upgraded to captain, she was thinking that she “wouldn’t mind going through a winter in the northeast before [upgrading] to captain.” The first officer explained that, before IOE, she had “never seen icing conditions … never deiced … never experienced any of that.”

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I think what this accident did was raise public awareness of the realities going on in the Airline business. Despite other accidents and incidents this happened to be the catpaulting event. Captain Sullenberg and FO Skiles landing in the Hudson also highlighted the industry and gave a platform for pilots to speak. I choose to speak in favor of higher experience for all airline pilots. If accidents are the tip of the proverbial iceberg, what near accidents are we not seeing reported due to inexperience? And hey, I am OK with structured training programs getting a reduction in hours due to advanced syllabi and training facilities. But pilots still need a chance to get their well of experience filled before taking that next step. What would have prevented the Colgan, Lexington, Jefferson city accidents? Well, break any link in the chain, right? What if we had the opportunity to beef up one of those links? The pilots. The crew rest. The crew's pay-and thus ability to take care of one's self. What if we could improve pilot QOL and therefore alertness at work? I think the new ATP law gives us that chance.
 
On page 174 under Public Hearing;

The issues presented at the hearing were the effect of icing on airplane performance, cold weather operations, sterile cockpit rules, flight crew experience, fatigue management, and stall recovery training.


Yes, flight crew experience. If you read the findings of fact and the recommendations, you'll find what sort of flight crew experience the NTSB thinks was needed. And it wasn't 1,500 hours as a CFI, either.

During that conversation, the first officer indicated that she had accumulated more actual flight time in icing conditions on her first
day of initial operating experience (IOE) with Colgan than she had before her employment with the company. <-----(Me--Yikes...apparently she came to Colgan with only six hours actual instrument. Really not much.

Where do you get that? She says actual flight time in icing conditions. Not actual instrument time. Big difference. There aren't too many new airline pilots who have previous experience in icing conditions. Few non-airliners are certified for flight into known icing conditions.

I choose to speak in favor of higher experience for all airline pilots.

And I think that's a good thing. What I don't think is a good thing is conflating issues, because it destroys credibility, and when you harm your credibility, you make it harder to get things improved for the better. People won't listen to you when you lack credibility. Claiming that PFT is a cause of recent accidents strains credulity to the breaking point. Stick to things that are actually supported by the facts.
 
Just about everything cabin class piston twin and bigger is/can be certified FIKI. Even a 210 can be.
 
And how many newhire regional pilots do you know who had previous experience in cabin class pistons? And I'm not just talking recently, I'm talking back in the '90s when you had to have 2,000 hours just to be able to PFT at ASA. In reality, few pilots have that experience. Even back then, guys were coming straight from flight instructing for the most part, and had no experience in known icing, little experience in actual instrument conditions, and usually no more than 100-200 hours in multi-engine equipment. There aren't enough piston 135 operators for everyone to work at before coming to the airlines. Expecting that sort of experience before someone can come to the airlines is unrealistic, especially with the coming pilot shortage.
 
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