Vets Returning home having a tough time finding work?

[MikeD]

Oh, so once complete with I-phase in the -67, from then on the focus is all operational and combat employment? I can see where the skills would atrophy then, esp with little experience to fall back on.

The CIS....it does have it's share of ways to bite you if you don't understand it!

 

[ProudPilot]

Thanks for the shoulder Proud. It is a ball busting effort for all the crooked-up fingers typing all the cover letters, calling, tweaking each app for the job being applied for, etc for someone to go haven't you got a job yet?
Boot to the head!!

--AA

No problem. Just remember, you do have a step up on us civies. There are always other countries too. While I am a loyal citizen, it doesn't pay the bills or put food on the table. Sometimes you have to go overseas for that next job. Besides, you get WAY more vacation in Europe and high tier jobs in Asia.

 

[Ian_J]

Oh, so once complete with I-phase in the -67, from then on the focus is all operational and combat employment? I can see where the skills would atrophy then, esp with little experience to fall back on.

Yes - from the instrument phase I believe they move on to their advanced aircraft these days (not 100% sure what FSXXI has them do though). So they have to learn a new aircraft, combat skills, and NVGs. They touch a little on instruments again but not a lot.

The CIS....it does have it's share of ways to bite you if you don't understand it!

Just the other day I watched a guy follow his roll command bar away from an approach course he was trying to intercept. He had heading on instead of nav.

 

[deadstick]

...but doesn't the Army believe that 96 hrs/yr is all an aviator needs to maintain currency AND proficiency? Mins = Max

 

[Ian_J]

Only 90 for 47s.

 

[deadstick]

Aren't FAC2s at around 60? Insane.

 

[Blackhawk]

As a senior W3 I guess I'm getting a little crusty. After 4 deployments flying doesn't have the same appeal it used to... and my back hurts.

That's what Army candy is for (800 mg Motrin). One before and one after the mission. Followed by some "mouthwash" sent by my brother.

 

[JDean3204]

Army Aviator,
There is a ton of job opportunities on the west coast and specifically in the northwest. I know that it may involve a pay cut, however there are good opportunities for vets out here. I know a gentleman who was a prior CWO who is now a medivac pilot and also a FW flight instructor. He loves both of the jobs and doesn't seem to be doing too bad for himself either. just my .02

 

[MikeD]

Just the other day I watched a guy follow his roll command bar away from an approach course he was trying to intercept. He had heading on instead of nav.

I don't bother with the roll/pitch command bars or the toothbrush. Prefer the raw data just fine. The CIS is nice, but Im used to more of a flight director type system with steering bars, which the CIS doesn't necessarily do, so I don't bother with it.

 

[Blackhawk]

I don't bother with the roll/pitch command bars or the toothbrush. Prefer the raw data just fine. The CIS is nice, but Im used to more of a flight director type system with steering bars, which the CIS doesn't necessarily do, so I don't bother with it.

I loved them. The ATR had the same double cue flight director. I never saw a single cue flight director until the CRJ and sniveled the entire course about it.
Now if you don't know how to use it, such as forgetting to arm Nav mode it will bite you.
I taught both the 60 course and IERW in the 90s and tried to integrate an instrument approach prior to each student change out and at the end of the lesson recovering to Cairns. Especially if I had and OH or AH student in the Q course.

 

[MikeD]

I loved them. The ATR had the same double cue flight director. I never saw a single cue flight director until the CRJ and sniveled the entire course about it.
Now if you don't know how to use it, such as forgetting to arm Nav mode it will bite you.
I taught both the 60 course and IERW in the 90s and tried to integrate an instrument approach prior to each student change out and at the end of the lesson recovering to Cairns. Especially if I had and OH or AH student in the Q course.

Im used to an actual director system, where as the steering needle..say when you roll into a bank and center it up, it has you maintaining that bank or will adjust itself to "fly" you onto the desired course.

And the CPI....kind of sensitive and I just end up chasing it, so I just set the collective and fly my speed down the approach.

 

[Blackhawk]

Im used to an actual director system, where as the steering needle..say when you roll into a bank and center it up, it has you maintaining that bank or will adjust itself to "fly" you onto the desired course.

And the CPI....kind of sensitive and I just end up chasing it, so I just set the collective and fly my speed down the approach.

Yeah, never really liked the CPI and ignored it as well.

 

[Blackhawk]

Probably the biggest problem I saw with Army flight school was the lack of combat maneuver training. Pilots did not understand maneuvering, G loading, lift vectors, etc. Anything beyond a 30 degree bank was "hot dogging"... of course when we went to war crews started having meeting engagements with the ground.
Throw in the stupid AH tactic of hovering for 15 minutes during an engagement. First time I was assigned to an attack BN and saw this I could not believe my eyes and asked if anyone had read about Lam Son 719. Got blank stares. Was told I was a lift guy and did not understand. Ten years later we had Karbala.

 

[Low_Level_Hell]

Probably the biggest problem I saw with Army flight school was the lack of combat maneuver training. Pilots did not understand maneuvering, G loading, lift vectors, etc. Anything beyond a 30 degree bank was "hot dogging"... of course when we went to war crews started having meeting engagements with the ground.
Throw in the stupid AH tactic of hovering for 15 minutes during an engagement. First time I was assigned to an attack BN and saw this I could not believe my eyes and asked if anyone had read about Lam Son 719. Got blank stares. Was told I was a lift guy and did not understand. Ten years later we had Karbala.

All of the guys I talked to involved in this operation acknowledged the mistakes and how better tactics were needed and did eventually come out after this operation. The mission handed to those guys had a some serious issues, especially were their planned attack by fire positions were placed by higher, they tried to adjust the best they could but still had to carry out the mission. There is the perception in the Army that the AH-64s came to a hover right over downtown Karbala while being surrounded by miles of open desert. Most aircraft involved stayed well above ETL the entire time and the entire objective area was inhabited like you would expect it to be around an urban area, no way around it. The air defense threat still kept them low. What was not counted on was that every one and their grandma would be waiting for them with an AK47 ready to shoot into the night sky on cue. It was a very well planned operation by the Iraqis. They were lucky to only loose one aircraft that night.

Another issue with the Karbala attack was how we currently operate. If this was a war in the traditional sense, the entire area would have been shelled or bombed before the helicopters arrived on scene or at least been in an area were their was very little enemy threat, also concern for collateral damage also limited their ability to defend themselves, we were still trying to be liberators at the time.

At least in the circles I work with now it is a very deliberate decision to pull into a hover at a battle position but there are times its still needed. Having gone against air defense radar in simulations and exercises, spending even a small amount of time unmasked will get you shot down. There are movement techniques that will minimize exposure getting to and from the objective but when it comes to engaging the objective, the area you can operate is usually constrained by the being able to acquire and shoot the target and not being acquired/shotdown by the target or enemy air defense. Sometimes that area is so small that a team of helicopters have no choice but to come to a hover. At that point it takes discipline on not staying at that location too long and when the attack should be broken off, which for attack guys I think is the toughest part.

Though I don't think US attack helicopters have been used often in a defensive manner in actual combat against a conventional forces, a lot of the risks of hovering in a battle position are minimized in a defensive setting. Most of all the area you are flying over is theoretically clear of enemy forces. Also the most favorable terrain can be selected for a strike against the enemy that would allow for the best concealment.

 

[Blackhawk]

Your first point brings up another issue I had while assigned to the AH Bn. I was the S-2 for a big mission. Yet during the mission planning sequence the S-3 did not want to hear any input based upon the INTSUMs I was getting. It came time for the mission brief and I went first. Then the S-3 started briefing the mission and roles down the operations overlay. He had placed BPs right over the predicted OPFOR flank security element. Regimental CO walks up to the overlay and says "Otis (S-3), why are the BPs right over the flank security element?" Without missing a beat the S-3 turned to me and told me to move the flank security element as it was messing up the plan. The RCO gave the S-3 a quick class on how at worked.
Speaking of RADAR, how many helicopters were brought down by RADAR guided weapons? Not many. Just about any Iraqi RADAR that turned on was probably immediately targeted by numerous HARMs.
As for running fire, not sure how any Army AH was able to do it, much less effectively as running fire was not part of gunnery prior to this fiasco in the Army except in the 160th. When Ft Rucked rewrote the gunnery manual after this 160th little bird pilots were used to tell the Army how to do it.
Again, I would say read about Lam Son 719. It mirrored in many respects what happened in Karbala.

 

[Low_Level_Hell]

Your first point brings up another issue I had while assigned to the AH Bn. I was the S-2 for a big mission. Yet during the mission planning sequence the S-3 did not want to hear any input based upon the INTSUMs I was getting. It came time for the mission brief and I went first. Then the S-3 started briefing the mission and roles down the operations overlay. He had placed BPs right over the predicted OPFOR flank security element. Regimental CO walks up to the overlay and says "Otis (S-3), why are the BPs right over the flank security element?" Without missing a beat the S-3 turned to me and told me to move the flank security element as it was messing up the plan. The RCO gave the S-3 a quick class on how at worked.
Speaking of RADAR, how many helicopters were brought down by RADAR guided weapons? Not many. Just about any Iraqi RADAR that turned on was probably immediately targeted by numerous HARMs.
As for running fire, not sure how any Army AH was able to do it, much less effectively as running fire was not part of gunnery prior to this fiasco in the Army except in the 160th. When Ft Rucked rewrote the gunnery manual after this 160th little bird pilots were used to tell the Army how to do it.
Again, I would say read about Lam Son 719. It mirrored in many respects what happened in Karbala.

I'm sure in retrospect the Karbala mission would have been flown at a much higher altitude. I know ZSU-23-4s were still a significant concern in the push towards Baghdad. When I got there at the end of 2003 we were finding abandoned ADA all over the place.

I can't remember if I practiced running fire at Fort Rucker in AQC in 2001 but every gunnery table I have done since incorporated running and diving fire. To me the way Littlebirds and Kiowas engage at point blank ranges carries a high level of risk as well. They would be swatted out of the sky going against armor with those techniques.

 

[MikeD]

Doctrinally speaking, are Army aviation units (namely Apache) considered manuever units on their own? As in, do they normally get sent forward on interdiction missions past the FEBA/FLOT to hit targets far downrange independantly? Or are all their ops in direct support of some ground commander or ground unit in some way, and they don't go too far ahead of that? Does their Batallion or higher commander run his birds independantly in that way? Or again is it all tied to support of some ground element in some way/shape/form?

 

[Low_Level_Hell]

If you're asking if an Apache Battalion would develop their own objectives and execute their own missions the answer is no. Attack aviation will work for the ground owning unit, usually controlled at the Division or Corp level and can be passed down subordinate ground units as they operate in their areas. Interdiction I think is more an AF term but in both Desert Storm and OIF Apache's were sent past the FEBA/FLOT with the full attention of the ground forces and fire elements, and I'm 99.99% sure their was significant AF involvement and support as well.

 

[MikeD]

Yes, exactly what I was asking regarding do they execute on their own targets that they plan, etc, since though I know the overall doctrine, Im not fully certain how the Army executes in relation to it.

Interdiction, as Im meaning it, is the "deep strike" target work well beyond the FLOT, well beyond where it's considered any kind of CAS. And definitely, the Desert Storm and OIF ops were coordinated; I was just wondering if those kinds of ops were common or were the exception.

In the case of the two ops mentioned above, would a ground commander at some level have to have "released" them or otherwise approved their use in that way (ie- in ops not in direct support of ground forces)? Or can aviation units independantly (as in some high level aviation commander....brigade/division) approve these ops themselves?

 

[Low_Level_Hell]

Yes, exactly what I was asking regarding do they execute on their own targets that they plan, etc, since though I know the overall doctrine, Im not fully certain how the Army executes in relation to it.

Interdiction, as Im meaning it, is the "deep strike" target work well beyond the FLOT, well beyond where it's considered any kind of CAS. And definitely, the Desert Storm and OIF ops were coordinated; I was just wondering if those kinds of ops were common or were the exception.

In the case of the two ops mentioned above, would a ground commander at some level have to have "released" them or otherwise approved their use in that way (ie- in ops not in direct support of ground forces)? Or can aviation units independantly (as in some high level aviation commander....brigade/division) approve these ops themselves?

The highest ranking Aviator in an operational environment is going to be an O-6 Brigade Commander. Their will be a General and his staff that will task out the aviation units. For example, a Division may give each of their ground combat Brigades 3 Air Weapons Teams a day, in turn the Brigades may hand off control to their Battalions and so on. Division usually keeps tabs on their aviation assets regardless who they work for though. Having worked at the bottom of this command structure as an Air Mission Commander my experience has varied from very specific missions to just flying around for a few hours fishing for stuff to do from the ground owning units.