New Wreckage found in AF447 crash

the last failure I had in flight was actually a rudder cable centering linkage... Be careful what you wish for.

I've had plenty. Can't remember, don't want to. But my overarching notion (from a lifetime of bad luck and doing stupid things) is that what generally fail are the avionics and the powerplants (in that order). My personal opinion is that, avionics being first to fail (however fancy or not), that the most useful and "real-world" of training is that which addresses information...where you get it, how it might break, how to understand the failure, and what to do about it. And this seems a, how shall I say..."underserved market" in the world of "get em in the sim and on the line". We practice v1 cuts like it's going out of style, and sure, that's a feasible occurance. But systems failures are an afterthought, if they're taught at all. And my admittedly totally unscientific sampling of...well, me, indicates that they're way more common than anything else...glass OR steam.
 
Interesting sidelight for those old enough to remember it. Obviously there are huge dissimilarities in the systems of the aircraft, but in both cases, a large aircraft stalled and failed to recover, and in both cases, the stall warning systems were inop/unreliable.

http://ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20001208X07150&key=1

I knew the PIC in this one, his name was Garth Avery. Good guy, I was in a P-3 Navy Reserve augment unit with him.

I remember having a conversation with him about how he wanted out at ABX, he was afraid that the old equipment they flew there at the time would kill someone...

As the brief synopsis alludes to here, the technique to recover their DC-8 sim from a stall was different from how the actual airplane worked, and that was the "800 lb. gorilla" that killed them - they kept trying to recover from the stall with procedures which they "knew" were the right ones, but that guaranteed they wouldn't recover.

Sad and unnecessary deaths...


Kevin
 
Boris, totally agree.

In my relatively short flying career, I have seen:

Failures: AHRS, ASI, XPDR, tach, GPS, CDI, flaps, blown tire, battery, brake hydraulics, alternator, rudder, cockpit door, AP, AP servo, and probably a few more I can't remember.

Blown tires are probably more common than engine outs on takeoff, an no one seems to spend enough time teaching that...
 
IMHO, it's criminal that we rely on sims as much as we do. If a plane is capable of recovering from a stall, the PIC should have stalled it, seen that it is recoverable, and seen what really happens. Regardless, I'm sorry for the loss of your friend/acquaintance. Didn't mean to pick at old scabs for anyone.
 
IMHO, it's criminal that we rely on sims as much as we do. If a plane is capable of recovering from a stall, the PIC should have stalled it, seen that it is recoverable, and seen what really happens. Regardless, I'm sorry for the loss of your friend/acquaintance. Didn't mean to pick at old scabs for anyone.

I don't know how practical that would be in heavy jets, but I do sincerely believe that stall/spin training at the primary level is totally inadequate. And I will speculate that it ain't taught in the sims at all.

If the FAA doesn't want spins demonstrated to primary students, most CFIs are not going to be very proficient at unusual attitude recovery (since legally I cant really teach it)
 
I don't know how practical that would be in heavy jets, but I do sincerely believe that stall/spin training at the primary level is totally inadequate.

I'll do you one better and say that it's totally inadequate at both levels. Spinning a 152 shouldn't be any more dangerous than practicing engine-outs...conceivably less so, since the engine might not go back to full power (water in the tanks, whatever), but the wing will start flying again. This is a known thing...people have been spinning 150/152s since God was a child. You can recover them with power, or without. After half a turn, or after 10. The problem (imho) is that there's a cushion built in for incompetence, and (in my further, perhaps less humble opinion) there oughtn't be. None of this is about the AF crew, btw. I don't know the systems, or the airframe, or the training, or pretty much anything at all enough to even begin to speculate about their level of competence. I do know that sim rides, even the best sim rides, are pretty much about how to operate the systems of the airplane in a competent manner. And that primary training is mostly about showing that you can fly an airplane without getting in your own idiot way.

So, without any sort of specualtion about the poor dead guys flying that Airbus (in fact with a resoundingly solid opinion that they ought not be judged, especially by us), I do think that the way we are being taught is fundamentally flawed. Normal ops should be things you have down cold before anyone throws you in to something unpleasant. As it stands, the allmighty dollar (or, er, euro) dictates that one learn how to give a canned response to a canned answer. And, then, when things go wrong (in the abstract, again don't have an opinion about AF), the pilots get thrown under the bus for "inappropriate response" when the real cause ought to be "inadequate training".
 
Definitely not judging the AF pilots, we don't have enough info to say anything intelligent anyway.

But the facts are facts, we have had a few accidents recently where airline crews have managed to stall an otherwise flyable aircraft.

Why? Training is obviously the problem. If it is a part installed on an airplane, it is going to break. I pretty much assume as much on every flight.

I think I may invest in some parachutes so that my own students get some real world training on stalls and spins with an INOP ASI...
 
Definitely not judging the AF pilots, we don't have enough info to say anything intelligent anyway.

But the facts are facts, we have had a few accidents recently where airline crews have managed to stall an otherwise flyable aircraft.

Why? Training is obviously the problem. If it is a part installed on an airplane, it is going to break. I pretty much assume as much on every flight.

I think I may invest in some parachutes so that my own students get some real world training on stalls and spins with an INOP ASI...


I used to be a pretty big badass myself (when I flew 402s), but these days I'm getting soft. It has nothing to do with my flying ability or lack of training; it has to do with the fact that I just don't get much hands-on experience anymore. Take away all the automation, and I still wouldn't get much hands-on experience. I just don't fly very many legs (I flew 4 legs in May). There is simply no way around it in certain segments of the industry, even if in your previous life you could fly an ILS to 1800 RVR with a tilty whisky compass and a glass of water.
 
So, what's your solution?

@Boris

Longer, more costly training. Including flying the airplane (not the sim) at least to the shaker, preferably in to the stall. The darned things cost hundreds of millions of dollars, but pilots are somehow expected to recover them with no idea of how they actually behave outside the normal realm of flight with nothing more than a sim session or two and a pat on the back. Because flying the airplane for people who are expected to fly the airplane is "too expensive". Ludicrous. When I flew turboprops with boxes in the back, I stalled the airplane, or at least went to the shaker (if it had one). Now that I fly Jeeeeettttsssss with real live human beings in the back, I'm expected to just go to the "first indication" of a stall in a giant box on hydraulic arms in an air-conditioned room in Dallas. This seems backwards, to me. If it's really safe and recoverable from a stall, then this should be no problem. If it isn't, then our certification standards need to be, er, "ammended".
 
Definitely not judging the AF pilots, we don't have enough info to say anything intelligent anyway.

But the facts are facts, we have had a few accidents recently where airline crews have managed to stall an otherwise flyable aircraft.

Why? Training is obviously the problem. If it is a part installed on an airplane, it is going to break. I pretty much assume as much on every flight.

I think I may invest in some parachutes so that my own students get some real world training on stalls and spins with an INOP ASI...

It's not really as simple as inop asi. The fact that the primary AND standby pitot-static system became so overwhelmed with ice is in comprehensible in a modern swept wing jet. It just shouldn't happen. We can talk about better training, automation vs. no automation till we're blue in the face. I'm pretty sure if you took a Pan-Am 707 from back in the day, put it in the same scenario, I highly doubt the outcome would be any different.

Night time, horrible weather above and below, multiple systems telling you your fast, now your slow, now your fast again, stalled, not stalled and 3:30 on the clock. I don't care how many moon landings you have. That's a crap sandwich.
 
It's not really as simple as inop asi. The fact that the primary AND standby pitot-static system became so overwhelmed with ice is in comprehensible in a modern swept wing jet. It just shouldn't happen.

My point is, if it is installed on an airplane, it is going to break at some point. Probably in bad weather at night (that Murphy, he can be an ass, can't he?)

Pitot tubes? If one ices over, they all will probably ice at the same time. Easy to say it shouldn't happen, but it did at least 10 other times we know of in the same year on that airframe.

And in theory, unreliable airspeed is something we all learned in kindergarten as a memory item (hold appropriate pitch and set appropriate power, watch altitude which is now primary for power).
 
My point is, if it is installed on an airplane, it is going to break at some point. Probably in bad weather at night (that Murphy, he can be an ass, can't he?)

Pitot tubes? If one ices over, they all will probably ice at the same time. Easy to say it shouldn't happen, but it did at least 10 other times we know of in the same year on that airframe.

And in theory, unreliable airspeed is something we all learned in kindergarten as a memory item (hold appropriate pitch and set appropriate power, watch altitude which is now primary for power).

I get the whole "any thing can break at any time". This really is some thing that shouldn't break. So much so, I've never seen a total pitot static failure in a sim. That includes two ERJ sessions and four Lear 45 sessions. Loss of primary, sure but not a total failure. It's a lot like the Hudson landing, should we all now practice dual engine flame outs because "it could break". My problem is the fact that it didn't break, it was a design flaw in a critical system. They were set up for failure. Didn't an airline recently ground an entire fleet for about a day so the proper software could be updated in the air data system. (it's late I can't remember the airline or the exact issue, so I might be a bit off on that) I'd say 10 instances of icing in the pitot system would warrant a similar response.

I'm pretty sure they held pitch and set the power all the way into the ocean. Isn't there a saying ”it's great in theory"?
 
Probably in bad weather at night (that Murphy, he can be an ass, can't he?)
Almost everyone can handle Murphy, it's when he brings his whole family to the dinner party that the ... hits the fan...

Most people can handle single emergencies pretty good, perhaps even a secondary emergency. But usually that is where it stops.
After that we usually loose the context and we are not able to figure out what is really going on and then we cannot solve the problem.
 
I get the whole "any thing can break at any time". This really is some thing that shouldn't break. So much so, I've never seen a total pitot static failure in a sim. That includes two ERJ sessions and four Lear 45 sessions. Loss of primary, sure but not a total failure. It's a lot like the Hudson landing, should we all now practice dual engine flame outs because "it could break". My problem is the fact that it didn't break, it was a design flaw in a critical system. They were set up for failure. Didn't an airline recently ground an entire fleet for about a day so the proper software could be updated in the air data system. (it's late I can't remember the airline or the exact issue, so I might be a bit off on that) I'd say 10 instances of icing in the pitot system would warrant a similar response.

I'm pretty sure they held pitch and set the power all the way into the ocean. Isn't there a saying ”it's great in theory"?

If they hit severe icing, then there was nothing that would allow the probes to continue to work. In fact, no aircraft will be able to overcome a severe icing encounter by the design limits of how aircraft are certified.

It happens. I think instead of throwing our arms up in the air and screaming about how this could NEVER happen, we should probably get to the point of accepting that some of us aren't going to survive this industry, and that what we do is inherently dangerous. We make it very, very safe, but there are going to be days where there's no real good way out of a bad situation, and while we should learn everything we can from accidents like this one, there's the possibility that these poor guys were simply screwed.
 
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