Bandit_Driver
Gold Member
The E-170 had a ton of updates
WSJ Article: Airline Mishaps Raise Concern
- Thread starter CRJDriver
- Start date
The E-170 had a ton of updates
spasekace
WHOligan
Falcon 20 has the same setup, (with it's own set of "French" oddities) plus we can actually hear each other talking with only 1 engine running- that's your big clue
Screaming_Emu
Well-Known Member
Pilot professionalism and discipline are not issues that are simply limited to regional airlines. Anyone who thinks pilots are immune to such issues simply because they fly a bigger airplane for more money is kidding themselves.
That being said, I don't think that professionalism and discipline are what causes a lot of these problems. While there are certainly many people out there flying airplanes who shouldn't be, most pilots out there are competent, well trained, and responsible.
What causes someone to forget to start an engine, land on a taxiway, etc is more likely task saturation than lack of discipline. Forgetting to start an engine is a lot easier than one thinks.
While it probably varies from airline to airline and airplane to airplane, my busiest time as an f/o is from pushback to takeoff. I'm expected to start an engine, run the after start checklist, talk on the radio, brief the takeoff, make a PA, talk to the flight attendant, do the before takeoff checklist, all while monitoring the captain to make sure we are staying on the right taxiways and not running into stuff. Throw in a mx issue, ATC delay, and starting another engine and I often feel like a one legged sprinter. Couple that with a short taxi and a captain who taxis a bit more spirited than most and it is possible to miss something.
I'm very convinced that someone starting an engine is going to lead to either a runway incursion or somebody hitting something. It really is impossible to give your full attention to monitoring the taxi when doing as much as we are expected to do during the taxi out. And as the article pointed out, we're certainly not being given less to do up front. I know one of my pet peeves in Atlanta was having to call every leg for catering, fuel, cleaning, etc when all that stuff is supposed to be going on automatically. We already have enough to do. Then there's in Dulles where catering just hands the flight attendant a bag of stuff and they have to stock their own galley. All part of corporate America's attempt to do things for as cheap as possible by putting more tasks on every single person.
That being said, I don't think that professionalism and discipline are what causes a lot of these problems. While there are certainly many people out there flying airplanes who shouldn't be, most pilots out there are competent, well trained, and responsible.
What causes someone to forget to start an engine, land on a taxiway, etc is more likely task saturation than lack of discipline. Forgetting to start an engine is a lot easier than one thinks.
While it probably varies from airline to airline and airplane to airplane, my busiest time as an f/o is from pushback to takeoff. I'm expected to start an engine, run the after start checklist, talk on the radio, brief the takeoff, make a PA, talk to the flight attendant, do the before takeoff checklist, all while monitoring the captain to make sure we are staying on the right taxiways and not running into stuff. Throw in a mx issue, ATC delay, and starting another engine and I often feel like a one legged sprinter. Couple that with a short taxi and a captain who taxis a bit more spirited than most and it is possible to miss something.
I'm very convinced that someone starting an engine is going to lead to either a runway incursion or somebody hitting something. It really is impossible to give your full attention to monitoring the taxi when doing as much as we are expected to do during the taxi out. And as the article pointed out, we're certainly not being given less to do up front. I know one of my pet peeves in Atlanta was having to call every leg for catering, fuel, cleaning, etc when all that stuff is supposed to be going on automatically. We already have enough to do. Then there's in Dulles where catering just hands the flight attendant a bag of stuff and they have to stock their own galley. All part of corporate America's attempt to do things for as cheap as possible by putting more tasks on every single person.
400A
New Member
dasleben
That's just, like, your opinion, man
Well put. Agree 100%. Beyond that, well, sometimes stuff just happens. We're all human and make mistakes. Frankly with the design of Embraer's takeoff configuration check and the task saturation, I'm surprised this doesn't happen more often.
C150J
Well-Known Member
Not to take this off topic, but how do caterers accomplish this at your other stations? This is pretty normal for our operations (not that it's easy - I think you're absolutely right). Do they stock the galley for the FA?
Thanks!
J.
Polar742
All the responsibility none of the authority
The big Boeings have the same check....no "Did you start all the engines?" check.
And, there were about as many major software loads on the Ejet in 2.5 years as there were in about 6 on the E145s. I'd like to thank Honeywell for the crappy coding.
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
Were you flying the 145 during the FADEC issues?
Polar742
All the responsibility none of the authority
What FADEC issues?
We had a latched "No Dispatch" Message on the E145 when you'd start the motors for a bit. Is that the one that you are referring to?
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
The rumor from the old timers at XJT was that there was a period of time, very early in the EMB-145's life, where you had to "wake up" the FADEC units through a series of combinations of the start/stop selector. Additionally, there were so many faults being created by the FADEC computers that there were a large number of in flight shut downs, as in the FADEC computer shut the engine off.
I saw that one happen myself, though the engine switched FADEC computer and relit as advertised.
Polar742
All the responsibility none of the authority
I did do the Start/Stop Shuffle, which happened AFTER I was on the airplane, so '99-'00 time frame. (Stop-Run-Stop-Run-Start, IIRC)
I don't recall the large numbers of inflight faults being generated. Like I said, some goof at honeywell put a decimal point in the wrong place for the power switch over from ship's power to the PMA, which resulted in the "No Dispatch" fault. A total PITA.
C150J
Well-Known Member
Couple of peripheral comments, not necessarily related to the article:
I strongly believe that most of these issues are due to external pressures/distractions (fatigue, excessive flight segments, duties that should be in the hands of dispatch/operations, etc.). However, I also think that we have let our professional standards/discipline slip to the point where incompetence/inexperience has caused some of these events (at BOTH the regionals and majors). Instead of acknowledging that some folks don't belong on the flight deck or need training, companies institute new checklist items that aren't necessary for 99% of those on property. Just a personal gripe.
Hopefully, new regulations (1500TT/some experience) and hiring practices (aptitude testing) will help address these concerns. Again, I'm certainly not saying that we have a large number of boneheads among our ranks - god knows I'm capable of BEING a bonehead! Just expressing my frustration when a company litigiously responds to an isolated incident with unnecessary checklist items/callouts.
I strongly believe that most of these issues are due to external pressures/distractions (fatigue, excessive flight segments, duties that should be in the hands of dispatch/operations, etc.). However, I also think that we have let our professional standards/discipline slip to the point where incompetence/inexperience has caused some of these events (at BOTH the regionals and majors). Instead of acknowledging that some folks don't belong on the flight deck or need training, companies institute new checklist items that aren't necessary for 99% of those on property. Just a personal gripe.
Hopefully, new regulations (1500TT/some experience) and hiring practices (aptitude testing) will help address these concerns. Again, I'm certainly not saying that we have a large number of boneheads among our ranks - god knows I'm capable of BEING a bonehead! Just expressing my frustration when a company litigiously responds to an isolated incident with unnecessary checklist items/callouts.
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
What you're describing has also been called the learning process.
And I'd hate to cut that out because "some people are too stupid."
C150J
Well-Known Member
J - I think I understand what you're saying. I believe that you're encouraging a more macrocosmic operating philosophy, emphasizing learning and real engagement instead of robotic checklists and rote procedure. Is that what you're getting at?
Along these lines, I certainly encourage standardization. Just not blind compliance with no "back knowledge" of systems, SA, etc.
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
I'm more saying that we shouldn't avoid creating new checklist items and callouts because "people should know better."
We don't, we prove it time and time again. We combat the mistakes we've made in the past with checklists and callouts.
As an example; I think XJT checks flaps set 9 like three or four times prior to takeoff, care to guess why? Further, both pilots have to acknowledge, verbally, that flaps are indicating zero after takeoff. Wanna guess how many times people have STILL blasted through 250 knots with flaps set to 9?
Imagine how many more it was BEFORE that checklist item existed.
Further, to take your idea to the furthest extent possible, we shouldn't need checklists, we should just fly the airplane. It worked, for the most part, in a Cessna 172; why not a jet?
Screaming_Emu
Well-Known Member
I've always thought that airline training should be revamped in a way. I think recurrent could be done much differently than it is now. Instead of going over the same info every year, I think it should be treated as a sort of continuing education.
You would get the basic indoc and systems classes when you're a new hire. But every year you go back in with your newhire class and get a little bit more in depth with the subject.
A lot of newhire class is based on the "what" of everything without spending the time to talk about the "why". This could be done a little bit more every year so that it actually would be true that the longer you've been there, the more you know.
C150J
Well-Known Member
Completely agree, to the extent that checklists need to be concise and brief; cell phones, seatbelts, and other items need not be on a 121 checklist. Also, items that have been proven ineffective should be removed.
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
Would you say that a climb check at 180 is unnecessary to remember to switch the altimeter to 29.92?
If it existed would you disregard it because it only has one item on it, and the airplane reminds you to do it anyway?
Screaming_Emu
Well-Known Member
In that case I say that a climb check isn't a bad idea. While pretty obvious, the workload at that part of the climb isn't very high, so its not a bad idea to have a checklist there to double check.
C150J
Well-Known Member
Not at all. I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about.
We added "TAKEOFF CONFIG OK" to our takeoff checklist because folks were occasionally forgetting flaps, leading to aborted takeoffs. We already had a "CAS, CHECKED" item, which, in our "expandeds," explains that "TAKEOFF CONFIG" should be observed on CAS.
This change has resulted in more takeoff issues than before, as people are now ignoring the "CAS, CHECKED" item. They're just looking for one line. If people executed the original checklist as it was intended (and a communication went out emphasizing the CAS check), we probably would see fewer problems.
I might have been completely unclear - I'm definitely not saying that you can fly a part 25 aircraft like a 172. I'm just saying that, along with good checklists, we need to spend more time explaining WHY items are on a checklist instead of just adding to them.