NTSB boots controller's union from Hudson investigation.

SteveC

"Laconic"
Staff member
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NTSB RELIEVES AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS GROUP OF PARTY STATUS IN HUDSON RIVER MIDAIR COLLISION INVESTIGATION


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The National Transportation Safety Board today removed the National Air Traffic Controllers Association as a party to its investigation into the August 8 midair collision of two aircraft over the Hudson River that killed all 9 persons
aboard.

Under the Safety Board's procedures, organizations and agencies are invited to participate in NTSB investigations if they can provide technical expertise. At the outset of the investigation, the organizations sign an agreement to abide by NTSB party rules. Among the rules parties agree to is that they will not reveal investigative information being learned through that process, nor publicly comment on it. Parties agree that only the NTSB will release factual information on the progress of the investigation and discuss the progress of the investigation with the public, including the news media.

On Friday, August 14, NATCA convened a press conference to discuss information released earlier that day by the NTSB. The organization was subsequently reminded of its responsibilities as a party to the investigation. This morning, NATCA issued a press release again discussing the information released, and conducted another press conference this afternoon.

Patrick Forrey, NATCA President, was informed today that his organization has been removed as a party to the investigation.

In light of conflicting interpretations of factual information released by the NTSB on Friday, the Board takes this opportunity to address the issue of the Teterboro controller's interaction with the accident airplane in the minutes before the collision:

According to preliminary data provided to the Safety Board by the Federal Aviation Administration, the controller cleared the accident airplane for departure at 11:48:30. The first radar target for the airplane was detected at 11:49:55, at about 300 feet. The controller initiated a non-business-related telephone conversation at 11:50:31. Prior to the Teterboro controller instructing the pilot to contact Newark Tower at 1152:20, there were several aircraft in the Hudson River Class B Exclusion Area in the vicinity of the airplane, some of which were potential traffic conflicts. These were detected by radar and displayed on the controller's scope in Teterboro tower. The Teterboro controller did not alert the airplane pilot to this traffic prior to instructing him to change his radio frequency and contact Newark. The accident helicopter was not visible on the Teterboro controller's radar scope at 1152:20; it did appear on radar 7 seconds later - at approximately 400 feet.

At 1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data processing system detected a conflict between the accident airplane and the accident helicopter, which set off aural alarms and caused a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. The controller terminated his non-business-related telephone call at 11:53:13. The collision occurred at 11:53:14.

As the Safety Board stated in its media release on Friday, the role that air traffic control might have played in this accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation progresses. The Board is waiting for more detailed air traffic control-related data from the Federal Aviation Administration. Any opinions rendered at this time are speculative and premature.

"Although we appreciate the technical expertise our parties provide during the course of an investigation," NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said, "it is counterproductive when an organization breaches the party agreement and publicly interprets or comments on factual information generated by that investigation. Our rules are set up precisely to avoid the prospect of each party offering their slant on the information. I regret that we have had to remove NATCA from the investigation."
 
I'm sure NATCA sees the writing on the wall and is hell-bent on damage control:

"The NTSB finds that the proximate cause of the accident was the controller's non-business-related phone call".
 
I don't know much about the whole deal. But if it's VMC even if they were operating under IFR, they are responsible for see and avoid. It says so right there in the regs. Even still it was a VFR corridor. It's put there to allow traffic to transition through the airspace without having to talk to the controllers.
 
You know it's funny, but I've seen that on other accident reports as well - remarks to the effect of "the representative from Lycoming was removed from the investigation". When our plane went down, there were reps from Lycoming and Cessna there. Guess they have to make sure they don't get out of line.
 
I don't know much about the whole deal. But if it's VMC even if they were operating under IFR, they are responsible for see and avoid. It says so right there in the regs. Even still it was a VFR corridor. It's put there to allow traffic to transition through the airspace without having to talk to the controllers.
Been a while since I was in the corridor, but once your outside the D you switch over. I believe once you are south of the hudson at those altitudes you are outside the D. Maybe I haven't been paying close enough attention (I've just been reading the aero-news.net stuff) but the helo was on a company and the other pilot (saratoga) was on the tower still right?

Note: the first time I went through the B corridor, I tried the little trick of getting Newark Tower to help you out but they didn't have time. Once I was comfortable with the 123.05 freq I never tried it again (+30 times through the thing).
 
Been a while since I was in the corridor, but once your outside the D you switch over. I believe once you are south of the hudson at those altitudes you are outside the D. Maybe I haven't been paying close enough attention (I've just been reading the aero-news.net stuff) but the helo was on a company and the other pilot (saratoga) was on the tower still right?

I don't know. I'm really just bored and talking out of my bum.:)

But reguardless, the pilots are still responsible for their own see and avoid.
 
Does the tower have traffic advisory capabilities? They may have had a scope, but I thought not all of them are supposed to be used for traffic advisories.
 
Does the tower have traffic advisory capabilities? They may have had a scope, but I thought not all of them are supposed to be used for traffic advisories.
TEB, i believe, gets a downlink from NYC (center), and the multiple times I've been in there they aren't giving you advisories going out, just in. If ur gonna duck VFR under the corridor, it's been my experience to get out of 4nm and goto 123.05 (if I'm remember the freq right).
 
TEB, i believe, gets a downlink from NYC (center), and the multiple times I've been in there they aren't giving you advisories going out, just in. If ur gonna duck VFR under the corridor, it's been my experience to get out of 4nm and goto 123.05 (if I'm remember the freq right).

According to the reports that I've read, including the NTSB info I posted above, the pilot was receiving flight following services from TEB, and was-being/had-been handed off to Newark.
 
According to the reports that I've read, including the NTSB info I posted above, the pilot was receiving flight following services from TEB, and was-being/had-been handed off to Newark.
I only tried once, but I couldn't get following in there. What altitude were they at?
 
But reguardless, the pilots are still responsible for their own see and avoid.

Regardless of controller actions/inactions, that's the bottom line. Pilots are the final responsibility for see and avoid in VMC. It sucks, but it is the current reg. And until that gets changed, thats the ultimate way it is. The controller actions/inactions can be secondary contributing factors in this case, but the ultimate responsibility rests with the pilots in this case. What will need to be determined is which pilot, if not both, would this apply to.

I understand the limitations of see and avoid, but until the regs get modified or changed on that, they'll remain a "catch all" for midair's in VMC.
 
Here is a factual information release by the NTSB:

http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2009/090814.html
"aircraft collided at 1,100 feet in the vicinity of Stevens Point"

Looks like, if I'm right about stevens point, he was trying to climb up through the corridor to 3,500 feet, and VFR. I can't believe EWR was going to take the traffic, but anyhow, they seemed to have moved him into the corridor and was to have him acend into the B. I don't know. I can't make heads or tails of what the intention of the controller was. Gotta shut up and wait.
 
I read it as he was planning on transiting through the corridor and had asked for flight following. I believe that the 3500 feet was the pilot's request for an en-route altitude, presumably after leaving the Hudson corridor area (my presumption only). TEB was coordinating with Newark, and it is pretty apparent that EWR had accepted the hand-off (and was planning on providing services) but the plane never actually checked in with them. EWR actually called TEB back to try to contact the plane and give a vector away from conflicting traffic. I doubt if EWR was going to bring him up into the Class Bravo until (if?) he was clear of the airline traffic. A lot of supposition on my part, but it seems pretty clear to me that the controllers were planning on giving him radar services of some sort.

As far as see-and-avoid, it certainly isn't my intention to shift blame away from the VFR pilots in this case, just pointing out some of the ATC interactions that may have aleviated the situation if things had played out differently.

The original point of this thread had to do with NATCA going public to try to offset some speculation that was taking place in the media, strictly against the NTSB investigation guidelines. I understand their reason for trying to shift the public opinion away from castigating the controller(s), but they sure shot themselves in the foot in my opinion.
 
Either way, between careless and reckless, see and avoid, or blaming atc, the faa needs a scapegoat. Wait a few weeks and we will know...
 
FWIW, many times ATC will give you advisories in the corridor, but often it's a general "Numerous targets 1,000' and below" type of statement. To me, that means eyeballs outside/head on swivel. From my experiences operating there, I can't see how you can expect ATC to be responsible for calling out everything, or even anything. Just take what they say for what it's worth: an advisory--period. It's a very risky place to fly.

To show a newbie's perspective: I took one of my recently-minted private guys there so he could learn the ropes. It was very smart of him to seek out the specific training there even though he had his certificate. I showed him both how to fly the corridor while using ATC, turned around and showed him how to do it on the CTAF. Even after that lesson (and it was a relatively light traffic day), he told me how overwhelming it was for him and that he still plans to fly it at least once more as a lesson before doing it alone. (Yes, as a CFI I thought "mission accomplished" with this guy as he was making very rational decisions as a new pilot.)

-A.S.
 
Doug Stewart (real name stewart stewart) has a company he owns that sells a corridor seminar on tape. I didn't use it but not bad for the novice.
 
NATCA got what deserved after being told multiple times to keep their pie holes closed.

Agreed. They know better or should have known better. Not only was it unprofessional for them to run their own program outside of the NTSB's, but they've undoubtedly harmed their own people by being tossed as a party to the investigation.
 
TEB has never been responsible nor should they be for the Hudson river, even with radar in the tower. Their Delta goes right up to the edge of the river. Over the river and for class B ops, LGA handles things to the north and EWR to the south.

I can only imagine that Altman was going to look for a Bravo from EWR and climb above 1100'. He never got the chance.

It's a tough situation that he was in, BUT, one option he had was once he departed TEB was to ask TEB to switch to 123.05 before leaving their Delta. Here, TEB should advise of any traffic in their Delta that he might want to look for (but not the Hudson river) and send him on his way.

He could then call 123.05, get a picture of what's going on, enter the river, and then once situated give EWR a call.

In fact, I wonder if he might have been allowed to call EWR while still in TEB's Delta and get the climb before even entering the river?

For a slightly different example: I often ask Caldwell (CDW) when departing and still in their Delta (often still opposite the airport on a downwind departure) for a frequency change to New York approach for advisories.

Here, CDW will advise of any traffic and send me over to New York. Never been an issue with this, as with my 210 I don't even bother calling CDW to ask until I am passing through 1700' or so, well above their pattern altitude, and advise them of this.

Just some thoughts on this from someone who lives / flies in this area, and whose home overlooks the Hudson river.
 
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