Pilots in crashes had failed multiple tests

SmitteyB said:
Colgan 3407 had nothing to do with experience, in my opinion. There were no questionable PIC decisions. Did anyone else notice that during the ENTIRE approach sequence that cockpit was infact STERILE? They configured that airplane according to profile. Personally I just think they were tired, and the shaker and pusher startled them. When Renslow realized what was going on, the airplane was already out of control.
RIP Colgan 3407
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:clap:

3000+hours is not inexperienced. This crew may have broken the rules of airmanship 101, but so did a 17,000 hour 747 captain who took off out of Tenerife without clearance. None of us are infallible.
 
granlistillo said:
Not too sure on that...

I've known 3 pilots in the military I tought were accidents ready to happen. 2 of the 3 had class A mishaps. Both continued flying. The system didnt weed them out. I had a squadronmate who landed in the wrong touchdown zone (opposite the approach) and run off the end of the runway and destroyed the airplane. Although as white as me, he unabashedly played the race card to keep his wings cause one of his parents could sing most likely sing the words to cielito lindo.
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Cielito lindo?:bandit:
 
Tristan said:
:clap:

3000+hours is not inexperienced. This crew may have broken the rules of airmanship 101, but so did a 17,000 hour 747 captain who took off out of Tenerife without clearance. None of us are infallible.
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As was the Air Florida pilot in Washington DC.
 
Tristan said:
:clap:

3000+hours is not inexperienced. This crew may have broken the rules of airmanship 101, but so did a 17,000 hour 747 captain who took off out of Tenerife without clearance. None of us are infallible.
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3000 hours is not exactly "high time". As for the PA crew, that was a lot more complex due to the differences in phraseology used. Outside the U.S. it's a different set of rules and clarity is often severely lacking.

Also, go look up that accident again and see just WHO was taking off! From Wiki:

Following the tower's instructions, the KLM aircraft was cleared to backtaxi the full length of runway 30 and make a 180° turn to put the aircraft in takeoff position — a difficult maneuver to perform with a 747 on a runway only 45 m (150 ft) wide. While KLM 4805 was backtaxiing on runway 30, the controller asked the flight crew to report when it was ready to copy the ATC clearance. Because the flight crew was performing the checklist, copying this clearance was postponed until the aircraft was in takeoff position on Runway 30. During taxiing, the weather deteriorated and low-lying clouds now limited the visual range to about 300 m (1,000 ft).

Shortly afterwards Pan Am 1736 was instructed to also backtaxi the same runway, leaving it by taking the third exit on their left and then using the parallel taxiway. Initially the crew was unclear as to whether the controller had told them to take the first or third exit. The crew asked for clarification and the controller responded emphatically by replying: "The third one, sir; one, two, three; third, third one". The crew began the taxi and proceeded to identify the unmarked taxiways using an airport diagram as they slowly reached them. Based on the chronology of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the distances between the taxiways (and the location of the aircraft at the time of the collision), the crew successfully identified the first two taxiways (C-1 and C-2), but their discussion in the cockpit never indicated that they had sighted the third taxiway (C-3), which they had been instructed to use. There were no markings or signs to identify the runway exits. The Pan Am crew appeared to remain unsure of their position on the runway until the collision, which occurred near the intersection with the fourth taxiway (C-4).

The angle of the third taxiway would have required the plane to perform a turn of approximately 145°, which would lead back toward the still-crowded main apron. At the end of C-3 another 145° turn would have to be made to continue taxiing towards the start of the runway. Taxiway C-4 would have required two 35° turns. A study carried out by the Air Line Pilots Association after the accident concluded that making the second 145° turn at the end of taxiway C-3 would have been "a practical impossibility", although the Dutch report stated that such a maneuver "could reasonably be performed". The official report from the Spanish authorities did not explain why the controller had instructed the Pan Am aircraft to use the third taxiway, rather than the easier fourth taxiway.[4]
 
MFT1Air said:
As was the Air Florida pilot in Washington DC.
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Yes, if that Captain had listened to his military trained F/O, that accident would not have happened. Instead, he relied on his training to just check the EPR and did not cross check the N1's and the rest is history.
 
seagull said:
Yes, if that Captain had listened to his military trained F/O, that accident would not have happened. Instead, he relied on his training to just check the EPR and did not cross check the N1's and the rest is history.
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It's not that simple.... the "military trained" FO didn't speak up properly.... and didn't take control when he realized the problem as they were barreling down the runway and into the bridge.
 
cencal83406 said:
It's not that simple.... the "military trained" FO didn't speak up properly.... and didn't take control when he realized the problem as they were barreling down the runway and into the bridge.
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Remember what year this accident happened, and what was going on with CRM training at that time. It was not so simple as what you are stating either.

Anyway, I never said that more experienced crews do not have accidents, only fewer of them, and Air Florida was more akin to a current regional than a major. Crews make errors all the time, however, in Colgan, it is safe to say that there were problems with that crew that should have been seen before it happened.
 
seagull said:
Remember what year this accident happened, and what was going on with CRM training at that time. It was not so simple as what you are stating either.

Anyway, I never said that more experienced crews do not have accidents, only fewer of them, and Air Florida was more akin to a current regional than a major. Crews make errors all the time, however, in Colgan, it is safe to say that there were problems with that crew that should have been seen before it happened.
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We do have a high speed "clacker".... why not a low speed "clacker" of some sort....

I do agree that there seems to be (final report not out yet) some sort of crew issue with lack of attention to detail (big detail as it were).... but a contributing factor to this may be their fatigue. Tertiary factors would then include experience and decision making (because if these had been better they would have recognized the fatigue and tried to pay more attention for example).
 
cencal83406 said:
We do have a high speed "clacker".... why not a low speed "clacker" of some sort....

I do agree that there seems to be (final report not out yet) some sort of crew issue with lack of attention to detail (big detail as it were).... but a contributing factor to this may be their fatigue. Tertiary factors would then include experience and decision making (because if these had been better they would have recognized the fatigue and tried to pay more attention for example).
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Agree with the first part, but as for fatigue, it's pretty darn hard to recognize in yourself. However, this crew contributed to their own fatigue, for various reasons.
 
I have a question for you pilots. If I read and remember correctly, the Q doesn't have a warning for low airspeed. Do most/all commercial aircraft have it?
 
Qgar said:
I have a question for you pilots. If I read and remember correctly, the Q doesn't have a warning for low airspeed. Do most/all commercial aircraft have it?
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Well, the "low speed" warnings in CRJs (and probably the Q) are: Low Speed Cue (red/white "snake" from bottom of tape), green 1.27 Vso line, the stick shaker/pusher (and thence continuous ignition). Other than that, the sound of the wind going by, the angle of attack on the PFD or out the window)...

To answer your question, if you were to keep your eyes closed and you couldn't hear the wind, there would be no indication that the speed is low until the shaker.... if we go too fast (never done that ;)) you get the "clacker" when you get in the upper snake.

It's VERY similar to this:

http://www.entertonement.com/clips/dhlgpnkchx--Overspeed-WarningAviation-
 
seagull said:
Remember what year this accident happened, and what was going on with CRM training at that time. It was not so simple as what you are stating either.

.
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Absolutely correct. CRM then isn't what is is now.....in fact, nearly non-existant. Read the accident of UA 173 in Portland, Or 1978 to get a good feel for how things were. That accident itself was a catalyst to begin CRM in airliner cockpits
 
MikeD said:
Absolutely correct. CRM then isn't what is is now.....in fact, nearly non-existant. Read the accident of UA 173 in Portland, Or 1978 to get a good feel for how things were. That accident itself was a catalyst to begin CRM in airliner cockpits
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Wasn't that yet another run out of fuel troubleshooting an issue scenario?
 
cencal83406 said:
Wasn't that yet another run out of fuel troubleshooting an issue scenario?
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Yes it was. FE was watching the gauges run down and was attempting to inform the Capt, who kept overriding him while concentrating on the main landing gear down-or-not issue. It wasn't until the engines started spooling down that the Capt then tried to go direct to the airport...which they were only about 10 miles from. IIRC, the FE was the only fatality.
 
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