An airplane is like an egg. There’s no such thing as a ‘fairly good’ one…..
4 November 2002
Near San Isidro Air Force Base (MDSI)
San Isidro, Dominican Republic
Canadair CL-13B Sabre Mk6, N30CJ
1 Fatal (pilot)
The accident profiled today continues the MikeDs Accident Synopsis series with accidents that this author has a personal familiarity with. In my early days in aviation, post-college, I worked the line at an FBO located at Scottsdale Airport, Arizona (KSDL), Corporate Jets Aviation. At the time, this FBO was one of two located on field that primarily serviced their namesake: corporate aircraft utilizing Scottsdale Airport, one of the busiest general aviation airports for corporate traffic in the country. In addition to its primary role as an FBO, Corporate Jets provided the standard services that many FBOs of its type do such as charters, fleet management, maintenance, and sales. One small part of the operation that wasn’t as well known was the military contract to the US Air Force the company had. In addition to the corporate fleet, Corporate Jets had, at that time, completed a contract to the USAF for target-towing services to Europe-based USAF units. Servicing this contract were two Canadair Sabre Mk6 aircraft which were Canadian versions of the popular North American F-86 Sabre. These aircraft were painted in a smart light blue and white livery and were based at Soesterberg Royal Netherlands AFB (ICAO: EHSB) located near the town of the same name. Their mission was to support the USAF Europe’s (USAFE) 32nd Tactical Fighter Group and their one squadron of F-15A/B Eagles with target towing services utilizing aerial target darts towed by the company’s Sabres. The two Sabres, N30CJ and N50CJ, served in this role for a number of years until the USAFE presence at Soesterberg AB ended following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent drawdown of Europe-based forces in the early 1990s. I crossed paths with both of these aircraft at Scottsdale, where they had been returned to for storage following the end of the contract; N50CJ sitting dismantled inside an overseas shipping container in the storage lot, while N30CJ sat proudly on the flightline, having been re-assembled at some point following arrival at KSDL. I helped keep N30CJ clean and serviceable, and as good looking as it could be, while both aircraft awaited word on their respective futures. With no further work for these aircraft, they were eventually put up for sale, and N30CJ was purchased by a retired American Airlines pilot named James Rossi.
Mr Rossi was a well known figure in the US aerobatic and warbird circles, in addition to his time as an airline pilot. He had been a member of the US Aerobatic team, and held an ATP Certificate with Type Ratings in eight different transport category aircraft, as well as FAA Letters of Authorization in seven different jet warbirds, including the F-86. He was also a member of the Experimental Aircraft Association, was an Aerobatic Competency Evaluator with the International Council of Airshows, and a member of the Screen Actors Guild, in addition to membership in other professional aviation organizations. Following the purchase of N30CJ, Mr Rossi repainted the aircraft in a Korean War-era natural metal finish representing the USAFs 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, retaining the N-number, naming the aircraft ‘CrapShooter’; and began utilizing the aircraft in airshows around the country in a Korean War air combat simulation. In concert with another pilot flying MiG-17F ‘Mr MiG’ that Mr Rossi also owned, the two put on a low-level dogfighting simulation representing aerial combat from the Korean War era, with the MiG-17 simulating the MiG-15, the F-86s most common foe during the Korean War.
On the morning of 4 November 2002, Mr Rossi was preparing to depart from San Isidro AFB, Dominican Republic, following spending the weekend performing for the 2002 Caribbean Airshow in N30CJ. The plan was to depart San Isidro leading a two-ship formation with the MiG-17 on a DVFR flightplan to Ocala, Florida, with an intermediate fuel stop in Nassau, Bahamas. Weather was clear that morning, with startup and taxi out to Runway 3 at MDSI being uneventful. Receiving clearance for takeoff, N30CJ and its MiG wingman took to the runway for a standard formation takeoff. By witness accounts, including those on the ground as well as the MiG wingman, takeoff roll and liftoff were normal, however on the initial climbout and passing 250 kts through 2,500 ft, a large “ball of flame” was seen by the MiG pilot to come from the tailpipe of 30CJ, followed immediately by Mr Rossi declaring an emergency and citing complete loss of engine power, as he made a left turn to attempt to return to the base. However 30CJ was too far from the base to be able to reach it in a dead-stick glide at the low altitude the flight was at. Additionally, another factor was the dense urban population center surrounding the San Isidro base, making a dead-stick forced landing or ejection from the aircraft a dicey proposition. Realizing that gliding back to the AFB wasn’t an option, Mr Rossi aimed 30CJ at a marshy grass area, with homes on three sides of it, approximately 4 NM northwest of the base in the San Luis neighborhood of San Isidro. It was the only patch of open area around, and while not optimal, was the best open space there was in the area. As 30CJ lost altitude, and while being trailed by the MiG wingman, Rossi was able to glide to the marsh area and commenced a gear-up forced landing with what was described as a level and smooth touchdown. However, unknown to Rossi at the time, beneath the grass and unable to be seen from the air was a heavily rutted ground containing the remains of abandoned vehicles. Upon touchdown, the Sabre bounced a number of times along the ruts, and had both wings and external fuel tanks sheared off following impact with the previously-unseen abandoned vehicles. As the Sabre disintegrated, Rossi was thrown from the wreckage as the now-released fuel ignited and 30CJ burst into flames. Rossi suffered fatal injuries. The MiG-17F wingman returned to a safe landing at San Isidro AFB.
Probable Cause:
*Engine- Catastrophic Failure- Total
*Engine- Seizure
Secondary Factors:
*Ground Area – Congested/Urban
*Flameout Landing- Executed
*Ejection/Bailout - Not Attempted
Tertiary Factors:
*Ground Area – Obstacles, Hidden/Unseen
MikeD says:
This particular accident brings up two areas of discussion related to this accident, both a combination of procedural and philosophical:
1. Engine failure post takeoff in single-engine aircraft, beyond useable runway to land
2. Forced landing versus ejection from stricken aircraft
Engine Failure Post Takeoff:One of the most difficult emergency situations a pilot can find himself in is the engine failure or severe loss of power post-takeoff in a single-engine aircraft, beyond useable runway to land. There are many techniques available, and all depend on a large number of variables and factors that will differ from situation to situation. Everything from altitude of the failure occurs at, distance from the airport/runway, urban or rural area surrounding, type of landing areas available surrounding, ability to egress the aircraft airborne or not….such as parachute or ejection; all of these and more can and do play factors in deciding what actions to take. Worse, time is not on the side of the pilot in these situations, so any decisions made……right or wrong….generally have to be stuck with and made the best of. Apart from egressing the aircraft, which will be discussed later, the two available options surround (assuming no restart ability) attempting to return to the airport, or landing somewhere ahead or to the side of the flightpath. Each option will depend on the aforementioned factors, and one will not always be better than the other in every situation. Like anything, it all depends.
In the case of N30CJ, the main factor working against the pilot was distance from the airfield on upwind when the engine failure occurred. Moving at a little over 4 miles/minute and in a shallow climb, 30CJ was over 2 miles from the field and at 2,500 AGL when the fireball from the tailpipe was seen by the wingman. After initiating a left turn back towards the base, the pilot very soon realized that gliding back to the airfield boundary, much less the to the runway, was going to be impossible. As the pilot’s landing area options rapidly diminished due to the growing urban area he was encountering on the ground, the pilot was forced to settle for a less-than-optimal landing area consisting of the grass-covered marsh. Unfortunately, the high grass of the marsh concealed the rough ground and derelict vehicle obstacles located in that area, and to which running out of altitude and options forced him to head the aircraft into. The decision to land gear up was prudent for the type of off-field landing intended, and had the rough ground and especially the obstructions not been present, it could very well have been survivable. But in retrospect, were there better options available to the pilot in terms of where to towards, either for a forced landing, or for ejection from the aircraft?
Forced Landing versus Ejection from a Stricken Aircraft: Following the loss of thrust event, the workload level for the pilot of N30CJ increased exponentially, which likely served to cause rapid task saturation and strain to the situational awareness (SA) of the pilot. His initial decision to turn back toward the airbase in a left turn, unknowingly took him to an area northwest of the base that was significantly more urban and congested with homes and buildings, than the areas to the northeast or even the southeast of the base were. It is likely that the pilot was not fully familiar with the area, since he wasn’t from that area, and may have not known this. By the time the left turn was made and as altitude was lost in the descent, the pilot was committed to that course of action in terms of direction he was going to end up in relation to the airbase, the other directions now being out of reach as options. As the urban area built up, the options became more and more limited, and the result is described in the narrative above. The pilot unknowingly placed himself into a square corner, options-wise. But why did the pilot elect to make a forced landing versus bailing out of the aircraft when he had the time and chance?
Reportedly, N30CJ was equipped with a functional ejection seat, now I can’t personally remember if this was true when it was owned by Corporate Jets and whether one had been installed aftermarket or not. I do remember N30CJ having no ejection seat warning triangles on the fuselage during it’s time at Corporate Jets, which is part of why I can’t remember if it, in fact, did or not. However, assuming a bailout capability did exist, the pilot of N30CJ would’ve found himself in a position, following the left turn, where the urban buildup would’ve precluded a safe bailout not in terms of pilot survivability necessarily, but of where the abandoned aircraft would’ve ended up; likely in a house or building and causing injuries or death to persons on the ground. That’s never something any pilot wants to have to live with. As altitude became lower and lower, the chances for pilot survivability also lowered for an ejection or bailout situation, thus narrowing the options in the square corner the pilot was rapidly finding himself in. Of course this is all pure speculation, but these are reasonable considerations the pilot could’ve well been thinking which could’ve caused him to make the choice to stay with the aircraft and risk a forced landing, versus abandon the aircraft in flight.
MikeDs Final Thoughts: This accident is one of those ones where the list of options was low to begin with and rapidly deteriorated from there. The pilot of N30CJ played his cards to the best of his ability, seeing to the fairly lousy set of cards this situation dealt him from the get go. Once key choices were made, namely the left turn to return to the field, the list of options rapidly faded; a fate that likely wasn’t known to the pilot at the time. Had the pilot of N30CJ proceeded straight ahead to the rural and sparsely populated northeast, his options could possibly have been more in his favor with regards to bailing out of the aircraft, or making a forced landing. But none of this was likely known to the pilot as he worked to manage a situation where he was instantly placed behind the proverbial eight-ball; making decisions quick, and accepting the consequences of what those decisions did for him, positive or negative. Even with the rapidly tightening square corner the pilot found himself in, he was still able to avoid civilian buildings, homes, and population, and place his aircraft in what should’ve been a clear landing area and what appeared from the air to be so; regardless of it likely being the only available open area in his flight path. The smooth gear-up forced landing was negated by factors and obstructions out of the pilots control unfortunately. Despite the best noble efforts of the pilot in keeping the aircraft away from population centers, it’s a tragic twist of irony that many factors beyond the control of ‘CrapShooter’ all came together in that marshy field, making the pilots final roll of the dice, come up as the dreaded snake eyes.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
Pictures, left to right:
-N30CJ when with Corporate Jets, 1992, near the end of its USAFE contract. [copyright E. Tanner]
-N30CJ as CrapShooter, shown just prior to takeoff on it's final flight at San Isidro [copyright JC Porcella]
-Wreckage remains of tail section and canopy of N30CJ at San Isidro AFB [copyright JC Porcella]
4 November 2002
Near San Isidro Air Force Base (MDSI)
San Isidro, Dominican Republic
Canadair CL-13B Sabre Mk6, N30CJ
1 Fatal (pilot)
The accident profiled today continues the MikeDs Accident Synopsis series with accidents that this author has a personal familiarity with. In my early days in aviation, post-college, I worked the line at an FBO located at Scottsdale Airport, Arizona (KSDL), Corporate Jets Aviation. At the time, this FBO was one of two located on field that primarily serviced their namesake: corporate aircraft utilizing Scottsdale Airport, one of the busiest general aviation airports for corporate traffic in the country. In addition to its primary role as an FBO, Corporate Jets provided the standard services that many FBOs of its type do such as charters, fleet management, maintenance, and sales. One small part of the operation that wasn’t as well known was the military contract to the US Air Force the company had. In addition to the corporate fleet, Corporate Jets had, at that time, completed a contract to the USAF for target-towing services to Europe-based USAF units. Servicing this contract were two Canadair Sabre Mk6 aircraft which were Canadian versions of the popular North American F-86 Sabre. These aircraft were painted in a smart light blue and white livery and were based at Soesterberg Royal Netherlands AFB (ICAO: EHSB) located near the town of the same name. Their mission was to support the USAF Europe’s (USAFE) 32nd Tactical Fighter Group and their one squadron of F-15A/B Eagles with target towing services utilizing aerial target darts towed by the company’s Sabres. The two Sabres, N30CJ and N50CJ, served in this role for a number of years until the USAFE presence at Soesterberg AB ended following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent drawdown of Europe-based forces in the early 1990s. I crossed paths with both of these aircraft at Scottsdale, where they had been returned to for storage following the end of the contract; N50CJ sitting dismantled inside an overseas shipping container in the storage lot, while N30CJ sat proudly on the flightline, having been re-assembled at some point following arrival at KSDL. I helped keep N30CJ clean and serviceable, and as good looking as it could be, while both aircraft awaited word on their respective futures. With no further work for these aircraft, they were eventually put up for sale, and N30CJ was purchased by a retired American Airlines pilot named James Rossi.
Mr Rossi was a well known figure in the US aerobatic and warbird circles, in addition to his time as an airline pilot. He had been a member of the US Aerobatic team, and held an ATP Certificate with Type Ratings in eight different transport category aircraft, as well as FAA Letters of Authorization in seven different jet warbirds, including the F-86. He was also a member of the Experimental Aircraft Association, was an Aerobatic Competency Evaluator with the International Council of Airshows, and a member of the Screen Actors Guild, in addition to membership in other professional aviation organizations. Following the purchase of N30CJ, Mr Rossi repainted the aircraft in a Korean War-era natural metal finish representing the USAFs 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, retaining the N-number, naming the aircraft ‘CrapShooter’; and began utilizing the aircraft in airshows around the country in a Korean War air combat simulation. In concert with another pilot flying MiG-17F ‘Mr MiG’ that Mr Rossi also owned, the two put on a low-level dogfighting simulation representing aerial combat from the Korean War era, with the MiG-17 simulating the MiG-15, the F-86s most common foe during the Korean War.
On the morning of 4 November 2002, Mr Rossi was preparing to depart from San Isidro AFB, Dominican Republic, following spending the weekend performing for the 2002 Caribbean Airshow in N30CJ. The plan was to depart San Isidro leading a two-ship formation with the MiG-17 on a DVFR flightplan to Ocala, Florida, with an intermediate fuel stop in Nassau, Bahamas. Weather was clear that morning, with startup and taxi out to Runway 3 at MDSI being uneventful. Receiving clearance for takeoff, N30CJ and its MiG wingman took to the runway for a standard formation takeoff. By witness accounts, including those on the ground as well as the MiG wingman, takeoff roll and liftoff were normal, however on the initial climbout and passing 250 kts through 2,500 ft, a large “ball of flame” was seen by the MiG pilot to come from the tailpipe of 30CJ, followed immediately by Mr Rossi declaring an emergency and citing complete loss of engine power, as he made a left turn to attempt to return to the base. However 30CJ was too far from the base to be able to reach it in a dead-stick glide at the low altitude the flight was at. Additionally, another factor was the dense urban population center surrounding the San Isidro base, making a dead-stick forced landing or ejection from the aircraft a dicey proposition. Realizing that gliding back to the AFB wasn’t an option, Mr Rossi aimed 30CJ at a marshy grass area, with homes on three sides of it, approximately 4 NM northwest of the base in the San Luis neighborhood of San Isidro. It was the only patch of open area around, and while not optimal, was the best open space there was in the area. As 30CJ lost altitude, and while being trailed by the MiG wingman, Rossi was able to glide to the marsh area and commenced a gear-up forced landing with what was described as a level and smooth touchdown. However, unknown to Rossi at the time, beneath the grass and unable to be seen from the air was a heavily rutted ground containing the remains of abandoned vehicles. Upon touchdown, the Sabre bounced a number of times along the ruts, and had both wings and external fuel tanks sheared off following impact with the previously-unseen abandoned vehicles. As the Sabre disintegrated, Rossi was thrown from the wreckage as the now-released fuel ignited and 30CJ burst into flames. Rossi suffered fatal injuries. The MiG-17F wingman returned to a safe landing at San Isidro AFB.
Probable Cause:
*Engine- Catastrophic Failure- Total
*Engine- Seizure
Secondary Factors:
*Ground Area – Congested/Urban
*Flameout Landing- Executed
*Ejection/Bailout - Not Attempted
Tertiary Factors:
*Ground Area – Obstacles, Hidden/Unseen
MikeD says:
This particular accident brings up two areas of discussion related to this accident, both a combination of procedural and philosophical:
1. Engine failure post takeoff in single-engine aircraft, beyond useable runway to land
2. Forced landing versus ejection from stricken aircraft
Engine Failure Post Takeoff:One of the most difficult emergency situations a pilot can find himself in is the engine failure or severe loss of power post-takeoff in a single-engine aircraft, beyond useable runway to land. There are many techniques available, and all depend on a large number of variables and factors that will differ from situation to situation. Everything from altitude of the failure occurs at, distance from the airport/runway, urban or rural area surrounding, type of landing areas available surrounding, ability to egress the aircraft airborne or not….such as parachute or ejection; all of these and more can and do play factors in deciding what actions to take. Worse, time is not on the side of the pilot in these situations, so any decisions made……right or wrong….generally have to be stuck with and made the best of. Apart from egressing the aircraft, which will be discussed later, the two available options surround (assuming no restart ability) attempting to return to the airport, or landing somewhere ahead or to the side of the flightpath. Each option will depend on the aforementioned factors, and one will not always be better than the other in every situation. Like anything, it all depends.
In the case of N30CJ, the main factor working against the pilot was distance from the airfield on upwind when the engine failure occurred. Moving at a little over 4 miles/minute and in a shallow climb, 30CJ was over 2 miles from the field and at 2,500 AGL when the fireball from the tailpipe was seen by the wingman. After initiating a left turn back towards the base, the pilot very soon realized that gliding back to the airfield boundary, much less the to the runway, was going to be impossible. As the pilot’s landing area options rapidly diminished due to the growing urban area he was encountering on the ground, the pilot was forced to settle for a less-than-optimal landing area consisting of the grass-covered marsh. Unfortunately, the high grass of the marsh concealed the rough ground and derelict vehicle obstacles located in that area, and to which running out of altitude and options forced him to head the aircraft into. The decision to land gear up was prudent for the type of off-field landing intended, and had the rough ground and especially the obstructions not been present, it could very well have been survivable. But in retrospect, were there better options available to the pilot in terms of where to towards, either for a forced landing, or for ejection from the aircraft?
Forced Landing versus Ejection from a Stricken Aircraft: Following the loss of thrust event, the workload level for the pilot of N30CJ increased exponentially, which likely served to cause rapid task saturation and strain to the situational awareness (SA) of the pilot. His initial decision to turn back toward the airbase in a left turn, unknowingly took him to an area northwest of the base that was significantly more urban and congested with homes and buildings, than the areas to the northeast or even the southeast of the base were. It is likely that the pilot was not fully familiar with the area, since he wasn’t from that area, and may have not known this. By the time the left turn was made and as altitude was lost in the descent, the pilot was committed to that course of action in terms of direction he was going to end up in relation to the airbase, the other directions now being out of reach as options. As the urban area built up, the options became more and more limited, and the result is described in the narrative above. The pilot unknowingly placed himself into a square corner, options-wise. But why did the pilot elect to make a forced landing versus bailing out of the aircraft when he had the time and chance?
Reportedly, N30CJ was equipped with a functional ejection seat, now I can’t personally remember if this was true when it was owned by Corporate Jets and whether one had been installed aftermarket or not. I do remember N30CJ having no ejection seat warning triangles on the fuselage during it’s time at Corporate Jets, which is part of why I can’t remember if it, in fact, did or not. However, assuming a bailout capability did exist, the pilot of N30CJ would’ve found himself in a position, following the left turn, where the urban buildup would’ve precluded a safe bailout not in terms of pilot survivability necessarily, but of where the abandoned aircraft would’ve ended up; likely in a house or building and causing injuries or death to persons on the ground. That’s never something any pilot wants to have to live with. As altitude became lower and lower, the chances for pilot survivability also lowered for an ejection or bailout situation, thus narrowing the options in the square corner the pilot was rapidly finding himself in. Of course this is all pure speculation, but these are reasonable considerations the pilot could’ve well been thinking which could’ve caused him to make the choice to stay with the aircraft and risk a forced landing, versus abandon the aircraft in flight.
MikeDs Final Thoughts: This accident is one of those ones where the list of options was low to begin with and rapidly deteriorated from there. The pilot of N30CJ played his cards to the best of his ability, seeing to the fairly lousy set of cards this situation dealt him from the get go. Once key choices were made, namely the left turn to return to the field, the list of options rapidly faded; a fate that likely wasn’t known to the pilot at the time. Had the pilot of N30CJ proceeded straight ahead to the rural and sparsely populated northeast, his options could possibly have been more in his favor with regards to bailing out of the aircraft, or making a forced landing. But none of this was likely known to the pilot as he worked to manage a situation where he was instantly placed behind the proverbial eight-ball; making decisions quick, and accepting the consequences of what those decisions did for him, positive or negative. Even with the rapidly tightening square corner the pilot found himself in, he was still able to avoid civilian buildings, homes, and population, and place his aircraft in what should’ve been a clear landing area and what appeared from the air to be so; regardless of it likely being the only available open area in his flight path. The smooth gear-up forced landing was negated by factors and obstructions out of the pilots control unfortunately. Despite the best noble efforts of the pilot in keeping the aircraft away from population centers, it’s a tragic twist of irony that many factors beyond the control of ‘CrapShooter’ all came together in that marshy field, making the pilots final roll of the dice, come up as the dreaded snake eyes.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
Pictures, left to right:
-N30CJ when with Corporate Jets, 1992, near the end of its USAFE contract. [copyright E. Tanner]
-N30CJ as CrapShooter, shown just prior to takeoff on it's final flight at San Isidro [copyright JC Porcella]
-Wreckage remains of tail section and canopy of N30CJ at San Isidro AFB [copyright JC Porcella]
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