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Report FT 118 indicates that stall certification flights were performed on one airplane, N38PA, which was built at Piper's Vero Beach, Florida, facility. (A second airplane, N381PT, was used during the last week of the certification flight test program for lighting and vibration tests; however, no stall tests were performed using this airplane.) During the program, stalls were tested on 13 flights, and no unsatisfactory stall characteristics were reported.
After certification was granted, Piper moved production of the PA-38-112 to the company's Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, facility, where more than 2,400 PA-38-112 airplanes were built between 1978 and 1982, when production ceased. The Safety Board has learned of reports of significant differences in the stall characteristics between the certification-tested airplane and the production airplanes.
According to testimony from a Piper engineer,(5) shortly after delivery of production airplanes began, owners and operators of the airplane complained that the lateral directional characteristics at the stall were abrupt and unpredictable, and that the airplane exhibited a rapid roll as the stall occurred. In 1979, in an attempt to improve the airplane's stall characteristics, Piper modified the wing design of the PA-38-112 by adding two additional stall strips.(6) An airworthiness directive (AD 83-14-08) mandated that all existing airplanes be retrofitted with the additional stall strips.
However, the additional stall strips may not have solved the problems with the stall characteristics. According to an August 1982, Aviation Safety article, "Test pilots and flight instructors have found that both the two-strip and four-strip Tomahawks have a tendency to drop a wing (as much as 90 degrees) in an intended straight-ahead stall if prompt and positive recovery controls are not used."
In an April 1995 letter to the Safety Board, a former test pilot, employed by Piper at the Lock Haven facility from 1978 to 1984, stated that the production PA-38-112 aircraft that he flew were "totally unpredictable, one never knew in which direction they would roll-off, or to what degree, as the result of a stall." These sentiments were echoed by a second former test pilot, employed by Piper at the Lock Haven facility for a least six years beginning in 1979, in a January 1997 interview with a Safety Board investigator. He stated that "the airplanes were very unpredictable in a stall. Each airplane did not perform stalls the same from one flight to the other."
In January 1997, Safety Board staff interviewed a third former test pilot, employed by Piper from 1973 to 1978, who held the company title of chief pilot and served as the FAA Delegation Option Authority (DOA) and Designated Engineering Representative (DER). He stated that the production PA-38-112 airplanes built at the Lock Haven facility were "nothing like the article certified [by the FAA] as far as stall characteristics are concerned." He reported that Piper test pilots who performed post-production flight tests were "shocked at the stall characteristics observed." He claimed that the additional stall strips did not eliminate the stall/spin defects that he observed in the airplane.
The Safety Board attempted to determine if the FAA had ever evaluated the stall characteristics of production PA-38-112 airplanes, in either the two-strip or four-strip wing configuration. In a letter dated March 3, 1997, the FAA informed the Safety Board, "We requested that Piper search the DOA files for any indication that the FAA was involved in any such testing, and the search did not reveal any such tests. Piper conducted stall/spin tests at their Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, facility prior to the issuance of AD 83-14-08; however, only Piper DOA flight test pilots participated, the FAA was not involved in these tests."
The Safety Board is concerned that production PA-38-112s may have stall characteristics different from those documented on the single pre-production airplane used during the original certification program. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should expand the upcoming certification flight test program to include a minimum of two test airplanes, and should document any changes necessary to bring these test airplanes into conformance with the type certificate.