Today's history reading...

Polar742

All the responsibility none of the authority
Just to show that there is little that is new in the world. Something the FAA put out

Just a little taste said:
I. Introduction

On March 29, 1995, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on ``Commuter
Operations and General Certification and Operations Requirements'' (Notice No. 95-5; 60 FR 16230.) In Notice 95-5, the FAA proposed that commuter operations conducted in airplanes with 10-30 passenger seats be conducted under the domestic or flag rules of part 121 of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Currently, scheduled passenger-carrying operations in airplanes with passenger-seating configurations of over 30 seats or more than 7,500 pounds payload capacity are conducted under part 121. Scheduled passenger-carrying operations in airplanes with passenger-seating configurations of 30 seats or less and
7,500 pounds or less payload capacity are conducted under part 135.

Part 121, which provides the safety requirements for all major air carriers (as well as for any certificate holder conducting scheduled or nonscheduled operations with airplanes configured with more than 30 passenger seats), is generally considered to have more restrictive requirements than part 135. The regulatory changes were introduced in order to address the continually changing needs of the industry and to fulfill the agency's statutory requirement. This is the final rule, based on Notice 95-5.

II. History

Historically, the maximum certificated takeoff weight (MCTW) of an airplane determined both an airplane's categorization and operating requirements. Beginning in 1953, airplanes with an MCTW of 12,500 pounds or less were defined as ``small airplanes'' and were permitted to carry fewer than 10 passengers in on-demand air taxi service. The rules under which those operations were conducted were eventually codified as part 135. Airplanes with an MCTW of more than 12,500 pounds were defined as ``large airplanes,'' and most large airplanes carried 20 or more passengers in scheduled air transportation. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) used the large/small dividing line to separate major airline companies, who were required to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the CAB in order to operate in interstate commerce as a common carrier, from on-demand air taxi operators, who were exempted from obtaining a CPCN.

During this time, the CAB issued only a small number of CPCN's to major, publicly-recognized companies, such as Eastern, American, Delta, Pan Am, TWA, etc. In contrast, on-demand air taxi operators numbered in the thousands. These operators were typically fixed-base, usually at small airports, and owned fewer than five airplanes. They provided on-demand air transportation as well as other services, such as training new pilots and selling and renting small airplanes. Typically, the air taxi portion of such an operator's business was a small part of that business and rarely involved any scheduled operations.

Beginning in the late 1960's, airplane manufacturers began to design and build small airplanes, that is, less than 12,500 pounds
maximum certified takeoff weight, that were capable of carrying more than 10 passengers, often close to 20. Some air taxi operators began to offer services that resembled the services of the major airlines, given the economic opportunity to
operate under the less restrictive requirements of part 135. Though these scheduled commuter operators began to overtake some air taxi operations, they still remained a small percent of the thousands of air taxi operators.

In 1978, as a result of the Airline Deregulation Act, the airline industry was deregulated economically and air carriers were given more freedom to enter and exit markets without prior government economic approval. One of the most significant effects of this deregulation was that it allowed major carriers to eliminate service to smaller communities, where such service proved to be uneconomical for the large aircraft the carriers operated. Major carriers were replaced in those communities by the commuter carriers. Under this ``hub and spoke'' system, the major part 121 air carriers provided service to the large metropolitan airports, while the growing class of scheduled part 135 air carriers provided service between smaller communities as well as
feeder service from the smaller communities to the larger cities to connect with the major carriers' operations. With these changes, the traditional two categories of operations became three categories of operations--scheduled commuter operations, traditional air taxis, and traditional major air carriers.

Also in 1978, in response to the Airline Deregulation Act, the FAA reissued part 135 standards to upgrade commuter and air taxi safety requirements and make them more like part 121. At that time part 135 certificate holders were required to meet more stringent requirements in several areas, including weather reporting, flightcrew training, maintenance, and qualifications for management personnel.

Since 1978, the FAA has issued a number of separate rule changes to further align part 135 safety requirements with those in part 121. Despite this realignment, differences between the regulations still exist. The economic incentive to operate under part 135 still exists because the requirements in part 135 are still less restrictive than the part 121 requirements in many instances.
For the remainder of this document the following terms are used in the following ways. ``Commuter,'' ``commuter airline,'' and ``commuter operator'' mean those operators conducting scheduled passenger-carrying operations under part 135 in airplanes with a passenger-seating capacity of 30 or fewer seats.

This current use of the word ``commuter'' does not include scheduled passenger-carrying operations conducted under part 121 in airplanes with a seating capacity of 31 to 60 seats. The term ``commuter category airplane'' used in this document
refers to airplanes type certificated in that category under part 23 in contrast to airplanes type certificated under part 25 which are
transport category airplanes. The term ``nontransport category airplanes'' is used for commuter category airplanes and SFAR 41 and predecessor normal category airplanes to be operated under part 121, as well as for some older airplanes certificated before the predecessors of part 25 (parts 04 and 4b of the Civil Air Regulations) came into existence. The Department of Transportation (DOT) uses the term ``commuter'' more broadly to include all scheduled passenger-carrying operations conducted in airplanes with a passenger-seating capacity of 20 to 60 seats. (Note: The High Density Rule, 14 CFR part 93 uses ``scheduled commuters'' differently. Its meaning under that part is not relevant to its use in this document.) The term ``regional,'' which is
used by industry to refer to short-haul, passenger-carrying, scheduled operations conducted under part 121 or part 135, is not generally used by the FAA.

III. The Problem and Related FAA Action

Recent part 135 commuter accidents have focused public, government, and industry attention on the safety of commuter operations. While the safety level of part 135 commuter operations has continued to improve, accident data, public perception, and recent government inquiries show a need for additional measures.

III.A. Accident Rate for Commuter Operations

The airline industry that uses airplanes with a passenger-seating capacity of 60 or fewer seats to conduct scheduled operations under parts 121 and 135 is an essential part of the air transportation network in the U.S. These airlines now fly more than all airlines did in 1958. In 1993, over 50 million passengers, 12 percent of the total passenger flights in the country, were flown by these airlines. Half of these passengers were flown in part 135 operations, i.e., in aircraft with 30 or fewer seats.

Over the past two decades the safety record of part 135 commuters has greatly improved. The accident rate per 100,000 departures in 1993 was one-fourth the accident rate in 1980. However, the accident rate for commuter airlines operating under part 135 continues to be higher than the rate for domestic part 121 airlines. In the past 2 years, several commuter airline accidents occurred that attracted media and public attention and caused government and industry officials to
scrutinize the safety system for commuter operations under part 135.

These accidents included the December 1, 1993, crash of a Jetstream 3100, operated by Express II (as Northwest Airlink), at Hibbing, MN; the January 7, 1994, crash of a Jetstream 4100, operated by Atlantic Coast Airlines (as United Express), at Columbus, OH; and the December 13, 1994, crash of a Jetstream 3200, operated by Flagship Airlines (as American Eagle), at Raleigh-Durham, NC. All of these accidents involved fatalities.

III.B. Public Perception

With the increase in the number of flights to many communities conducted in airplanes with a seating capacity of 30 seats or less,
some members of the public are questioning whether they are receiving an appropriate level of safety in small propeller-driven airplanes compared to the level of safety they receive in larger aircraft. This public concern is partly a result of the integration of commuter carriers with major airlines under an arrangement known as code-sharing. The term ``code-sharing'' refers to the computerized airline reservation system that lists a commuter flight in the reservation system under the same code used by a major carrier. A passenger who books with a major carrier may have a leg of the flight automatically booked with a smaller commuter affiliate of the major carrier.

With the media attention to recent commuter accidents, the passenger may also believe that the flight involves more risk because
the smaller airplane and its operation may not have to meet the same safety standards. Most passengers probably do not realize that some differences in standards are necessary because of differences in the airplane and operation and that some of the accidents that are categorized by the media as ``commuter'' accidents occurred in flights that were being conducted under part 121; that is, in airplanes with over 30 passenger seats.

The differences in regulations were initially based on differences in the types of operations and differences in the size of airplanes;
these differences in many instances still apply. But other differences, such as certain performance and equipment requirements, operational control requirements, and passenger information requirements are not size- or operationally-based. Some differences
between the two sets of regulations must be maintained while others can be eliminated to improve the safety of commuter operations.
 
Back in the time machine again.....

Another little paper from the FAA: source http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1980/A80_64_75.pdf

another teaser said:
On January 31, 1980, the National Transportation Safety Board completed a 4 - day public hearing on commuter airline safety. The hearing followed an extensive 4-month special investigation of the commuter industry and the elements which affect commuter airline safety. The special investigation included an on-site survey of 45 commuter airlines throughout the United States, a study of the role and effectiveness of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board, the influence of the airport environment, financial posture and management structure on individual airlines and on commuter airline safety, and an evaluation of the operational,
maintenance, and training programs of the commuter airline industry.

The Safety Board used its 1972 "Air Taxi Safety Study" and its commuter aircraft accident investigation experience as a basis to determine the safety issues which were involved and to evaluate the progress the commuter airline industry and the FAA are making toward correcting the deficiencies.

<snip>

The Safety Board believes that the revision of 14 CFR 135 has upgraded saftey standards for commuter airlines. However, the Board believes that Part 135 should be amended to strengthen the requirements for the training of pilots, especially for training in emergency procedures, weight and balance, and center of gravity. These safety deficiencies, coupled with a lack of knowledge by some flight operations personnel dispatch procedures, have contributed to several accidents in recent years. Finally,
Board believes that 14 CFR 135 should be amended to increase the frequency determining the aircraft empty- weight and center of m- avitv for aircraft used cam muter operations.

In addition to the upgrading of pilot training programs, the Safety Board believe that 14 CFR 135 should be revised to establish a minimum number of multiengine flight hours for a pilot-in-command of a multiengine aircraft used in commuter operations. The Universal Airways accident at Gulfport, Mississippi, on March 1, 1979, and the Comair accident at Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 8, 1979, reinforced the Board's belief that
pilot's inexperience in reciprocating multiengine aircraft can affect performance in emergency situations.
 
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