The Fez
Analog Millennial
I just want to share an experience I had today during a checkride that I think a great many young instructors can easily duplicate and create an almost certain path to heartache for themselves and their students.
Here's some background: I am a rotary-wing CFI/CFII as a civilian and also a USAF Reserve CSAR H-60 pilot. To say the two worlds are about as far apart as they can be (both regulation/policy-wise, as well as aircraft performance and aggressiveness in maneuvering) within the same category, is an understatement. However, I found out today just how powerful the Laws of Learning can be across that difference, particularly the laws of primacy and exercise.
Here's the story: Air Force H-60 pilots undergo two different types of checkrides, an Instrument/Qualification and Mission check. This will focus on the Instrument/Qualification or "Inst/Qual" check, which assesses the pilot's general aircraft/systems knowledge as well as instrument proficiency. Aside from the instrument portion, the checkride deals with handling in-flight emergency procedures. As a student pilot in the H-60, right up until today, the flow of an Inst/Qual check, and the emergency procedure flights we're required to complete every 90 days which duplicate the emergency procedures examined in the checkride, has always been the same. 4 different emergency procedures pertaining to specific aircraft systems followed by an instructor/evaluator demonstrated autorotation and one or two student/examinee autorotations. ALWAYS.
On today's flight, we had completed the instrument portion of the examination and had begun working through the emergency procedures. All was going well until we began autorotations. My evaluator demonstrated a straight-ahead autorotation after requesting opposite direction traffic due to wind limitations. Immediately after I took the controls and began to climb out to set up for my autorotation, we were forced back to prevailing traffic direction due to an emergency aircraft inbound. As I circled, waiting for the emergency aircraft to land, my evaluator induced another malfunction that I hadn't anticipated. I called for and ran the appropriate checklist, but in my mind we were doing my autorotation next, after all, we ALWAYS finish with autorotations. After another pattern direction change, I began setting up my auto. My flight engineer even tried to throw me a bone with, "So...what are we doing now?" but my brain was locked on my autorotation. I shacked my entry parameters and initiated my auto, followed by an immediate, "Go around" from my evaluator. I thought back to the entry and wondered if I had descended or slowed from our minimum parameters for the maneuver and then verbalized them. "What about this?" my evaluator said as he points at the illuminated caution light from the induced emergency.
Two things screamed out from the depths of my brain. First, I was utterly confused, as we have an operating limitation for performing an auto with the specific emergency induced, and thought it was a test (I even verbalized the limit as I set up the maneuver). Second, I knew of no regulation prohibiting me from performing an auto with that malfunction. I was wrong on both counts.
Lessons Learned: My evaluator had simply not yet given me a malfunction on that system, something I should've caught at my experience level. I was also unaware of a restriction on instructors/evaluators inducing multiple simulated emergencies. Like most pilots getting a checkride, I was laser-focused on getting it over with. After a not-so-pleasant debrief, I began thinking about why I was so intent on the auto with another malfunction present. Surprisingly, my FOI knowledge rose up from the depths to give me this:
The Law of Primacy tells us that the first way a student is shown something is usually the way that it sticks. Additionally, the Law of Exercise is how we not only improve performance, but reinforce proper procedures so that students do things the right way out of habit. But these laws are a double-edged sword. If we, as instructors, allow students to practice the same things, the same way, every time we fly, the student can become handicapped when it comes to dealing with an unexpected change. When I instruct, I change the flow of maneuvers as much as is feasible. But I wasn’t “taking it across the street” to my other flying job. I was doing these Emergency Procedure flights the same way every time because that’s just the way they’re done in that particular flying world.
I came perilously close to a hooked checkride today because I was not applying my knowledge from my instructing job to my other highly-demanding flying activity. As an instructor, I tell my students to take charge of their training, know what tasks they need to accomplish, and make plans to accomplish those tasks. As a student and line pilot in the Air Force, I am expected to do the same. However, in both civil and military aviation, it can be too easy to cede the requirements of the checkride to the evaluator so the examinee can expend spare brain bytes on flying well.
For me, no more. From now on, I will make every effort to plan on changes being made and adapting the tasks I need to perform to the situation at hand, just like I do on every other flight. Don’t take a second of flight time for granted just because it is a checkride with a set list of things to accomplish. Run the show as you see fit and do not allow the “Well, that’s how I’ve always done it” excuse to ruin your day.
Thanks for reading.
Here's some background: I am a rotary-wing CFI/CFII as a civilian and also a USAF Reserve CSAR H-60 pilot. To say the two worlds are about as far apart as they can be (both regulation/policy-wise, as well as aircraft performance and aggressiveness in maneuvering) within the same category, is an understatement. However, I found out today just how powerful the Laws of Learning can be across that difference, particularly the laws of primacy and exercise.
Here's the story: Air Force H-60 pilots undergo two different types of checkrides, an Instrument/Qualification and Mission check. This will focus on the Instrument/Qualification or "Inst/Qual" check, which assesses the pilot's general aircraft/systems knowledge as well as instrument proficiency. Aside from the instrument portion, the checkride deals with handling in-flight emergency procedures. As a student pilot in the H-60, right up until today, the flow of an Inst/Qual check, and the emergency procedure flights we're required to complete every 90 days which duplicate the emergency procedures examined in the checkride, has always been the same. 4 different emergency procedures pertaining to specific aircraft systems followed by an instructor/evaluator demonstrated autorotation and one or two student/examinee autorotations. ALWAYS.
On today's flight, we had completed the instrument portion of the examination and had begun working through the emergency procedures. All was going well until we began autorotations. My evaluator demonstrated a straight-ahead autorotation after requesting opposite direction traffic due to wind limitations. Immediately after I took the controls and began to climb out to set up for my autorotation, we were forced back to prevailing traffic direction due to an emergency aircraft inbound. As I circled, waiting for the emergency aircraft to land, my evaluator induced another malfunction that I hadn't anticipated. I called for and ran the appropriate checklist, but in my mind we were doing my autorotation next, after all, we ALWAYS finish with autorotations. After another pattern direction change, I began setting up my auto. My flight engineer even tried to throw me a bone with, "So...what are we doing now?" but my brain was locked on my autorotation. I shacked my entry parameters and initiated my auto, followed by an immediate, "Go around" from my evaluator. I thought back to the entry and wondered if I had descended or slowed from our minimum parameters for the maneuver and then verbalized them. "What about this?" my evaluator said as he points at the illuminated caution light from the induced emergency.
Two things screamed out from the depths of my brain. First, I was utterly confused, as we have an operating limitation for performing an auto with the specific emergency induced, and thought it was a test (I even verbalized the limit as I set up the maneuver). Second, I knew of no regulation prohibiting me from performing an auto with that malfunction. I was wrong on both counts.
Lessons Learned: My evaluator had simply not yet given me a malfunction on that system, something I should've caught at my experience level. I was also unaware of a restriction on instructors/evaluators inducing multiple simulated emergencies. Like most pilots getting a checkride, I was laser-focused on getting it over with. After a not-so-pleasant debrief, I began thinking about why I was so intent on the auto with another malfunction present. Surprisingly, my FOI knowledge rose up from the depths to give me this:
The Law of Primacy tells us that the first way a student is shown something is usually the way that it sticks. Additionally, the Law of Exercise is how we not only improve performance, but reinforce proper procedures so that students do things the right way out of habit. But these laws are a double-edged sword. If we, as instructors, allow students to practice the same things, the same way, every time we fly, the student can become handicapped when it comes to dealing with an unexpected change. When I instruct, I change the flow of maneuvers as much as is feasible. But I wasn’t “taking it across the street” to my other flying job. I was doing these Emergency Procedure flights the same way every time because that’s just the way they’re done in that particular flying world.
I came perilously close to a hooked checkride today because I was not applying my knowledge from my instructing job to my other highly-demanding flying activity. As an instructor, I tell my students to take charge of their training, know what tasks they need to accomplish, and make plans to accomplish those tasks. As a student and line pilot in the Air Force, I am expected to do the same. However, in both civil and military aviation, it can be too easy to cede the requirements of the checkride to the evaluator so the examinee can expend spare brain bytes on flying well.
For me, no more. From now on, I will make every effort to plan on changes being made and adapting the tasks I need to perform to the situation at hand, just like I do on every other flight. Don’t take a second of flight time for granted just because it is a checkride with a set list of things to accomplish. Run the show as you see fit and do not allow the “Well, that’s how I’ve always done it” excuse to ruin your day.
Thanks for reading.