Iraqi Air Force - Interesting Info


Vocals, Lyrics, Triangle, Washboard, Kittens
Open-source from Congressional Research Service...

As of October 31, 2008, the Iraqi Air Force had 2,006 personnel on its
payrolls, up from 1,300 in March 2008, out of 3,690 authorized personnel. According to MNSTC-I, the plan is for the Air Force to grow to 6,000 personnel by December 2009.

As of December 2008, the small Iraqi fleet included 77 aircraft, 31
fixed-wing and 46 rotarywing: 16 UH-1HP “Huey-II” helicopters and 17 Ukrainian Mi-17 helicopters for battlefield mobility; 3 C-130E “Hercules” aircraft; 6 King Air 350’s for both ISR and as light transport aircraft; 8 CH-2000 aircraft; and 10 Cessna C-172’s, 5 Cessna 208 “Caravans” plus 4 ISR
Caravans, 10 Bell Jet Rangers and 10 OH-58A/C’s for training. The Iraqi Air Force plans to have a fleet of 123 aircraft by December 2009.

By any measure, the Iraqi Air Force is still a fledgling institution
in the early stages of recruiting, training, and development. The effort to develop the Iraqi Air Force in earnest began at the start of 2007, and coalition advisors note that it takes three to five years to train pilots, air traffic controllers, and maintenance personnel—longer than it takes to train
ground forces.

The initial—and exclusive—focus of Iraqi Air Force training was counter-insurgency, including first of all battlefield mobility. In September 2007, the Jones Commission assessed that the Air Force was “well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force.”

Iraqi Air Force training had expanded to include “kinetic air to ground attack capability,” and ISR capabilities.498 In early 2009, DOD reported that the Iraqi Air Force had made initial progress in COIN capabilities including ISR and airlift; capabilities still “lagging” included ground attack, airspace control, and command and control.

In August 2008, the Iraqi Air Force was flying about 230 sorties per
week, up from about 150 sorties per week one year earlier. The number had fallen slightly from a peak of over 300 sorties per week, in April and May of 2008, due to a combination of weather, sustainment challenges, and the grounding of Cessna 172s used for training.500 By March 2009, the number had climbed again to over 350 operational and training sorties per week, and the Iraq Air Operations Center was providing scheduling, and command and control, for those missions.

In 2008, regular Air Force training was augmented by real-world
experience supporting Iraqi Army operations. During the Basra operations in March 2008, the Iraqi Air Force flew 353 missions, transporting personnel and cargo, dropping leaflets providing information to the local population, and helping provide ISR. An open question for the future is what sort of air force—with what capabilities, personnel, and equipment—the Iraqi Ministry of Defense will determine it needs, to meet its full spectrum of
security requirements.

In February 2008, then-Commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition
Team, Air Force Major General Robert Allardice, noted that like all of
Iraq’s MoD forces, the Iraqi Air Force is eventually expected to turn its attention to external threats. The final stage of development would include the use of jet aircraft to defend Iraq’s airspace. He estimated that Iraqis could have a self-sustaining Air Force with that capability “in about the 2011 or 2012 timeframe,” depending on the investments they make.

Other senior U.S. officials have raised questions about the capabilities that a future, externally focused Iraqi Air Force might really need. One official suggested that air defense capabilities may be more important than fighter aircraft.

One challenge, he added, is that Iraqi Air Force senior leaders are former fighter pilots eager to have a fleet of fighter aircraft. A number of senior U.S. officials point out that most senior Ministry of Defense officials have an
Army background—the Minister of Defense himself is a former tanker.
That background, officials argue, together with the exigencies of the ongoing COIN fight, leaves them with relatively little time and attention for guiding the long-term development of their air and maritime services.

Sorry about the strange paragraph breaks. I couldn't get it as raw text.
I would LOVE to be a contract instructor there, I bet those guys are pulling in some serious cash for sitting right seat in a 172
Where else could you suit up with body armor for a training "sortie" in a 172?
When I think of a "Sortie," I most certainly do not think of a 172.

Keep trying Iraq..

Hey, they gotta teach in something. It's a military mission and both pilots travel armed.

By the way - if ANY of you have an active security clearance, there are a TON of jobs available in both Iraq and Afghanistan right now for civilians.
I know a couple of guys who did the C-172 thing in Kirkuk. They use C-172's and C-208's for their basic flight training. We just got the first couple of Iraqi's in AF UPT recently, too.

They're coming along... but it will be a while!

Oh, my buddy's were flying with both a hand gun and a semi-automatic rifle when they flew over there. The rifle was for threats outside of the airplane, and the hand gun was to take out the student if he went " 'Qaeda ".
I was the OIC of the prep school for RSNF pilots (Royal Saudi Navy) at Whiting not to long ago. If the Iraqi's are anything like the Saudi's...and I'm sure they are, it has to be painful. BTW, a retiring Marine pilot took a job in Saudi with BAE, flying PC-9's as an IP. Pay is $200K a year. I heard the tax free was moved up to $115K or so but don't quote me on that.