Intercepting the SR-71, the Swedish way

MikeD

Administrator
Staff member
Interesting article. Aerial interceptions of what are termed "High-Fast Flyers" is a definite challenge for fighter and fighter-interceptor aircraft. Japan found out this challenge back when the USSRs MiG-25 was new and would make overflights of that island nation, with Japanese F-4 Phantoms unable to make pursuit.




Viggen Vs Blackbird: how Swedish JA-37 fighter pilots were able to achieve radar lock on the legendary SR-71 Mach 3 spy plane

Dario Leone
Jan 9 2018

“In total I have five hot intercepts against the SR-71 to my credit. All can be described as successful,” Per-Olof Eldh, Swedish Air Force JA-37 Viggen pilot

At the height of the Cold War, when East-West tensions were at their greatest, Swedish JA-37 Jaktviggen (or fighter Viggen) fighter pilots were scrambled on 400-500 live Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) missions per year to intercept any unidentified aircraft approaching Swedish airspace. QRA targets came from both Warsaw and NATO nations, and were usually flying close to Swedish airspace over the Baltic Sea or the Gulf of Bothnia. No doubt the most challenging QRA targets were the U.S. Air Force’s Lockheed SR-71A Blackbird [strategic reconnaissance aircraft], that often passed very close to Swedish airspace on their regular ‘Baltic Express’ missions.

The SR-71’s awesome performance capabilities provided a unique opportunity for Swedish GCI [Ground Control Intercept] controllers and JA-37 fighter pilots to evaluate various intercept solutions against a high-speed, high-altitude threat, as Rolf Jonsson, a retired Swedish Air Force (Svenska Flygvapnet) GCI controller recalls: “The most spectacular alerts in the Swedish Air Force during the 1980s occurred about once a week, when the Blackbird was operating in the Baltic. These were also probably the most frustrating events of the entire Cold War, with our fighters trying to reach the same altitude and position as this high-speed, high altitude target, efforts which, if successful, would allow the fortunate pilot to catch a brief glimpse of the fantastic SR-71 at quite close quarters. When the SR-71 first began operating in Europe our air force was equipped with the Saab J-35F Draken, and although intercept attempts were made, the aircraft’s performance wasn’t up to the task. However, one point was clear – the method that offered the greatest opportunity of success was a frontal attack, with both aircraft exactly on a 180° divergent heading – always assuming of course that the SR-71 didn’t turn. Other very important factors to try to determine when planning an intercept were the high altitude air temperature and the SR-71 altitude.

When the Saab JA-37 Viggen entered service, suddenly the mix was right; the aircraft’s performance and avionics capabilities combined with the eagerness of its pilots and a high degree of teamwork with the air command and control centers, including the radar tracker, the intercept controller and the pilots. For everything to work, the pilot needed to reach the speed and altitude that corresponded with information derived from the data tracker system in the Air Operator Centre (AOC). This data determined exactly where and when the pilot needed to initiate a pull-up from cruising altitude to acquire a radar contact. If the pilot failed to lock his radar on first time that was it, the opportunity was gone – at least for another week. On some occasions our pilots had problems locking-on because the SR-71 crew activated their defensive countermeasures systems, but pilots soon learned how to avoid triggering such systems. Also, an electronic counter-countermeasures [ECCM] system was built into the JA-37.

Another high performance aircraft operating from bases around the Baltic was the MiG-25 Foxbat; this has a speed advantage on the JA-37 Viggen, but the latter had a superior weapon system and, from 1981, was already using an information dissemination system similar to the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System the U.S. deployed later on tactical aircraft including the F-15 Eagle.Viggen Vs Blackbird: how Swedish JA-37 fighter pilots were able to achieve radar lock on the legendary SR-71 Mach 3 spy plane

The most difficult phase on the intercept for pilots was during the steep climb, since they had to monitor their engine instruments to ensure they remained within the Volvo Flygmotor RM8B turbofan’s EGT limits, and also scan their radar screens. During this phase the pilot tilted his radar scan angle down, on its maximum of -15°. The radar then had just a few seconds to locate and then lock on to the target before the two aircraft passed one another with a combined speed closing speed of Mach 5; it was an extremely impressive spectacle to watch on radar from the ground. The intercept window was incredibly tight, and all the SR-71 pilot needed to do during the fighter’s final climb phase was maneuver just slightly and the intercept solution changed and failed. One of the main problems facing our Viggen pilots was that one of the rules in their Orders for Safe Flights stipulated that flight above 16,000m was prohibited without the use of a full pressure suit and these weren’t available, so our pilots needed to be careful or they would be grounded by their divisional commanders.

The SR-71 “Baltic Express” flights were usually known about an hour before the aircraft entered the area. The Blackbird always entered the Baltic Sea over a reporting point named “Codan”, located about 80km south of Copenhaghen and on a heading of about 090°. This usually triggered a scramble by a pair of JA-37s that were kept on alert at either F10 Ängelholm, F17 Ronneby or F13 Norrkšping, although sometimes even temporary bases like Visby were used. The best base for an SR-71 intercept, however, was F17 Ronneby, because this was best positioned for the acceleration and climb phase, about 30-50km southeast of Gotland and Öland. The SR-71 Baltic Flight path remained the same throughout the time it operated in Europe and consisted of a singe counter-clockwise loop that took about 30 minutes to complete. It remained in international airspace and first flew off the Polish coast, then just before the Bay of Gdánsk, well inside the Kaliningrad enclave, the aircraft turned left, onto a heading of about 015°. With the Blackbird now flying at 21-24.000m only the Su-15 Flagons based at Vainode, in Latvia, had a chance of making an intercept, and it’s doubtful that any of them were actually successful. Certainly the MiG-21 Fishbeds and MiG-23 Floggers based at Pamu, Haapsalu and Tapa in Estonia had no chance; their trails on our radar screens in Sweden were so harmless it was painful to witness.

The SR-71 then proceeded to a point about 60km west of the Estonian island of Saaremaa, where it began a long, programmed left turn, taking it onto a southerly heading of about 190°, rolling out southeast of Stockholm. It then passed between the islands of Gotland and Öland, and this always impressed us because the corridor of international airspace between the two islands is only 3km wide; the Blackbird only violated our airspace once (this was the only time that it became necessary for the Swedish foreign department to protest about an airspace violation) when an SR-71 was forced to interrupt its high speed left turn, reduce speed and descent from its position in the north of its route due to an inflight emergency. [On that occasion, the SR-71 was forced to fly directly over Gotland – at this point AJ-37 strike Viggen pilots took hand-held photos of the Blackbird and it is clear to see from these that the aircraft was flying on one engine]. It was in this area that our JA-37 pilots carried out their practice intercepts. Once 56-74km southeast of Gotland and Öland, the “Baltic Express” turned onto a heading of about 265° and exited the area over the same point that it had entered.

Almost every time the SR-71 was about to leave the Baltic, a lone MiG-25 Foxbat belonging to the 787th IAP at Finow-Eberwalde in the German Democratic Republic was scrambled. […] Arriving at its exit point, the “Baltic Express” was flying at about 22km and the lone MiG would reach about 19km in a left turn before rolling out and always completing its stern attack 3km behind its target. We were always impressed by this precision; it was always at 22km and 3km behind the SR-71. [this would seem to suggest that these were the parameters necessary for its weapons system to effect a successful intercept if the order to fire was ever given.] This is interesting, since US Air Force intelligence specialists and SR-71 crewmembers believed that the only possibility of an interceptor successful engaging a Blackbird would be head on, a position given further credence by the fact that the DEF systems designed to tackle an airborne threat operating within the X-band (DEF A2) was forward-facing. When the SR-71 detachment at RAF Mildenlhall, UK was deactivated, the 787th IAP re-equipped with new MiG-29 Fulcrum, but even after the withdrawal, we believe that at least three Foxbats remained behind at Finow-Eberswalde, just in case the “Baltic Express” returned.”

The key to JA-37’s successes was the integration of a highly sophisticated datalink, which, until relatively recently, remained highly classified. The Swedish Air Force gained significant expertise in the datalink field with a system installed in the J-35F back in the 1956. However, the system installed in the JA-37 was far more capable than that of the Draken. It entered service in 1982 and it had the capability to upload and download data to four active aircraft of the same link; it was also capable of downlinking data from an airborne JA-37 to others still on the ground. Datalink information was displayed on the Horizontal Situation Display (HSD) and a tactical display, the latter using link symbology that could be overlaid with an electronic map on a multifunction display (MFD). As an integral part of the STRIL-60 command-and-control system that was built around it, the JA-37 could take off, attack, land refuel and rearm, then re-engage, with little or no voice communication, while enduring heavy jamming.

The first successful intercept of an SR-71 over the Baltic was carried out by Per-Olof Eldh, who recalls the incident: “In the 1980, I joined the 2nd Squadron “Blue Marlins” of Fighter Wing 13, equipped with the JA-37 fighter Viggen and based at Bravalla, just outside the town of Norrkšping, on the Baltic coast. Our mission was to conduct operational task and evaluation focused on air defense and air superiority. We were already equipped with a datalink from the air defense network; the next step was to establish it between fighters and we achieved this in 1981. Integrating this with the PS-46 air-to-air pulse-Doppler radar and the Skyflash missile provided the JA-37 with a significant enhanced capability. Looking at the map display on the MFD, the pilot could see other friendlies, the enemy, SAM sites, etc, and this information was constantly updated via the datalink by fighter controllers and other JA-37s, giving the pilot unprecedented levels of situational awareness. In fact, the system was so good that we could employ the same tactics – line abreast, box formations or scissors maneuvers – day or night in VFR or IFR conditions.

When I conducted the first Swedish Air Force intercept of an SR-71, the target had completed its north-bound pass of the Soviet coastline, and had turned west, south of the Finnish island of Aland, and was tracking south of a heading that would take it between Gotland and Öland. The datalink from the GCI controller was on, and I lined up for a head-on attack with a target angle of 180°. From my altitude of 8.000m I accelerated to Mach 1.35 then pulled up, very gently, continuing to accelerate to between Mach 1.7 and Mach 2.0, topping out at between 18.500 and 20.000m. All the target data was on my map display, including radar detection of the target at maximum range, which then locked on immediately afterwards. I simulated missile launches – the closing velocity was very high, between Mach 4.5 and 5.0; the SR-71 was flying at Mach 2.98 and 21.500m. I had visual contact. In total I have five hot intercepts against the SR-71 to my credit. All can be described as successful. I was visual three times; on a couple of occasions the SR-71 was conning, which was very useful because you could do a visual check to ensure you ended up in the right spot.

When we began conducting these SR-71 intercepts, the squadron began a special air safety program and we all underwent an intense series of emergency procedure checks in the simulator, because we were flying at the outer edges of the envelope and at higher risk.

On January 1986, while leading a JA-37 three-ship in aircraft tail number “38”, we received target data immediately after take-off from Bravalla. We flew in trail, receiving updated target information over the link from both the GCI controller and the other fighters in the formation. All three of us carried out successful intercepts between 13:14 hours and 13:25 hours, about 50km west of the town of Visby, on the island of Gotland. Major Moller was number two, in tail number “60”, and Captain Ulf Johansson number three in tail number “53”. I remember that the SR-71 was flying at an altitude of 22.000m and a speed of Mach 2.9. Ulf had some difficulties coming back to earth – he actually reached the target’s altitude and passed the SR-71 head-on at the same altitude with some side separation, but suffered a high temperature engine stall! A cartoon drawn by SAS Captain Stefan Lofren to commemorate this event was used as a poster in our briefing room.”

SAAB J-35 Drakken (photo credit unknown)




SAAB JA-37 Viggen (photo credits unknown)





 
Good stuff, though reading between he lines it highlights the reason Blackbird could do its job with such impunity.

All these “successful intercepts” were completely reliant on the predictability of flight patterns. That old adage of never do the same thing twice in combat comes into play had this been for real. All Blackbird planners would have to do is insert a turn point on a known leg or change the time of day for mission by 20-25 minutes and the defenders would be left scrambling (pun intended) to try and adjust.
 
Good stuff, though reading between he lines it highlights the reason Blackbird could do its job with such impunity.

All these “successful intercepts” were completely reliant on the predictability of flight patterns. That old adage of never do the same thing twice in combat comes into play had this been for real. All Blackbird planners would have to do is insert a turn point on a known leg or change the time of day for mission by 20-25 minutes and the defenders would be left scrambling (pun intended) to try and adjust.

That was my thought too. Their success was predicated on the Blackbird's repetition, the same route at the same time every week.

(This is also why Linebacker II was as bloody as it was for the US. In the USAF’s infinite wisdom, they decided that all B52s would take the same route into North Vietnam on the first night. All the NVs had to do was wait for a glimpse of a cell on the radar through the ECM haze, set the correct azimuth, time it correctly and fire unguided.)
 
(This is also why Linebacker II was as bloody as it was for the US. In the USAF’s infinite wisdom, they decided that all B52s would take the same route into North Vietnam on the first night. All the NVs had to do was wait for a glimpse of a cell on the radar through the ECM haze, set the correct azimuth, time it correctly and fire unguided.)

And even before all that, be able to have the luxury of focusing all their air defense radars and systems towards one geographical area, negating the need to even search.
 
Good stuff, though reading between he lines it highlights the reason Blackbird could do its job with such impunity.

All these “successful intercepts” were completely reliant on the predictability of flight patterns. That old adage of never do the same thing twice in combat comes into play had this been for real. All Blackbird planners would have to do is insert a turn point on a known leg or change the time of day for mission by 20-25 minutes and the defenders would be left scrambling (pun intended) to try and adjust.

That was my thought too. Their success was predicated on the Blackbird's repetition, the same route at the same time every week.

(This is also why Linebacker II was as bloody as it was for the US. In the USAF’s infinite wisdom, they decided that all B52s would take the same route into North Vietnam on the first night. All the NVs had to do was wait for a glimpse of a cell on the radar through the ECM haze, set the correct azimuth, time it correctly and fire unguided.)

And we’re still making those kinds of mistakes because it’s the easy way to do things.

Lift assets moving around country like a bus schedule and ground commanders demanding predictability in schedule.


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Meh, this has happened before......
IMG_0413.JPG

The story behind the photo is pretty cool.
 
And we’re still making those kinds of mistakes because it’s the easy way to do things.

Lift assets moving around country like a bus schedule and ground commanders demanding predictability in schedule.


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Good point. One of the many deleterious effects of the now thorough and inextricable commingling of military and industrial.
 
And we’re still making those kinds of mistakes because it’s the easy way to do things.

Lift assets moving around country like a bus schedule and ground commanders demanding predictability in schedule.


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Dude..... preaching to the choir...

That place where we picked up our "regular" guy. What a perfect spot for an ambush. Sitting ducks!
 
And we’re still making those kinds of mistakes because it’s the easy way to do things.

Lift assets moving around country like a bus schedule and ground commanders demanding predictability in schedule.


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Good point. One of the many deleterious effects of the now thorough and inextricable commingling of military and industrial.

Comes down to fiefdoms and human beings being creatures of habit. Leaders are no exception and they fail to see the number of decisions driven off something as arbitrary as “published battle rhythms.”

Undoubtedly this Baltic Express SR-71 routine was designed around some full bird or 1 star somewhere saying something as simple as “I want that imagery on my desk every Tuesday when I arrive.... I need it at 8am so I can brief the 3 Star/boss at the 1300 intel sync.” Then all time tables and execution is molded to meet and keep that standard or god knows there will be hell to pay.


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