For You, Mike — A-10s Saved the Day in Botched Afghanistan Raid

Interesting story. I'm sure someone on HASC will try to make hay out of it.
 
My take-away is that David Axe should stay in his lane rather than making value judgments about which tool is the right one for Close Air Support.

As soon as he rolls in the B-1-vs-A-10 false dilemma, regardless of the story he was telling about one of the many successes he Hog has had over the years, whatever actual argument he may have been making about the continued value of the Hog is lost.
 
My take-away is that David Axe should stay in his lane rather than making value judgments about which tool is the right one for Close Air Support.

As soon as he rolls in the B-1-vs-A-10 false dilemma, regardless of the story he was telling about one of the many successes he Hog has had over the years, whatever actual argument he may have been making about the continued value of the Hog is lost.

Completely agreed. While the A-10 is a fine airframe, each aircraft in the CAS toolbox makes its own contribution to the job. And like the F-4, F-111, and RF-4; the world of CAS won't end when the A-10 is retired. The mission will go on just as it went on with the aforementioned aircraft.
 
My take-away is that David Axe should stay in his lane rather than making value judgments about which tool is the right one for Close Air Support.

As soon as he rolls in the B-1-vs-A-10 false dilemma, regardless of the story he was telling about one of the many successes he Hog has had over the years, whatever actual argument he may have been making about the continued value of the Hog is lost.


Same guy who wrote this:

http://forums.jetcareers.com/threads/marines-pushing-navy-to-retire-c-2-greyhound.183748/
 
My take-away is that David Axe should stay in his lane rather than making value judgments about which tool is the right one for Close Air Support.

As soon as he rolls in the B-1-vs-A-10 false dilemma, regardless of the story he was telling about one of the many successes he Hog has had over the years, whatever actual argument he may have been making about the continued value of the Hog is lost.

This was why I said what I did about HASC. There's going to be Members reading this, and the ones who want to save the A-10 will most assuredly use this as evidence in favor.
 
This entire issue harkens back to something that a former CSAF, Johnny Jumper, foot-stomped endlessly during his tenure a decade ago: effects, not platforms.

His point was that we need to focus on producing the effects needed for "customers" (ergo, whomever the USAF is serving, and whatever end-effect they need) rather than navel-gazing about which particular weapon systems are used to provide the effects. The objective is to have a varied tool-chest (e.g. different weapon types, different delivery systems, different delivery methods) that allows the entire spectrum of kinetic effects that would be realistically needed in a rapid, agile, and efficient manner.

Focusing on a particular weapon system is completely missing the point. Specific systems are chained to the time/technology in which they're built, their cost to operate and maintain, etc., but weapon effects are the same today as they've been since the invention of use of kinetic force to damage or destroy another object or living being.

In terms of effects, this...
9450127.jpg


...is not so different than this...
sg14-11595.jpg


...and not much different than this....
b26_bomb.jpg


...or even this...
incoming_paveway-thumb.jpg


These are all methods over time of providing a kinetic force to damage or destroy an object or kill/injure people. Although the mechanism of delivery differs, the effects only vary in magnitude. The delivery vehicles and methods have certainly changed with technology, but the effects remain the same.

So whenever folks get overly animated about a particular weapon type, or a particular aircraft, or you-name-it, they are really focusing on the wrong things. Yes, certain types of aircraft deliver ordnance more effectively than others, and certain types of ordnance provide certain types of weapons effects better than others -- there's no question about that. Those differences, however, are fleeting; as we've discussed many times here, people proclaimed the end-of-the-world over plenty of other weapon systems being retired that "can't possibly be replaced by" whatever system actually replaced them. Guess what: the military still somehow gets the job done, even with those "irreplaceable" weapons systems long since gone out of service.

When the retirement of a weapon or system leaves a gap in capability, then that is certainly a problem. The one I hear most often is that, with the retirement of the Hog, the capability of the GAU-8 will be lost.

Unfortunately, this represents a massive misunderstanding of weapon effects, EVEN by the Army dudes who often foot-stomp the loudest when protesting the retirement of the Hog. A gun provides an important tool during CAS: low collateral damage effects, or CDE, and low probability of incapacitation, or PI. CDE is the measure of damaging or destroying other things you don't want to destroy that are located close to what you do want to destroy (like a civilian house that's located next to a military barracks, for example). PI is the probability that the effects of the ordnance delivered will harm/incapacitate friendly troops located close to where the bombs hit. Different types of bombs and bullets have quantifiable numbers in terms of CDE and PI, and those numbers are used in helping determine which weapons will be used in which situations. Bombs generally have big CDE and PI distances; bullets tend to have smaller distances.

This means when troops are fighting up-close-and-personal with bad guys, and need to "call in the thunder" from above, based on weapons fielded over the last decade or two, bullets can be used at times when rules of engagement (and other restrictions) won't allow bombs to be used. Given the types of combat over in Afghanistan and Iraq, that has meant that strafing became a often-used tactic in CAS because of the low PI and CDE. There are essentially only three types of guns being used by allied nations over that time; the 20mm (in the Viper, Eagle, etc), the 25mm (in the Harrier), and the 30mm in the A-10. Given the relative sizes of the actual projectiles shot, of course the 30mm is going to provide the most damage of the three, and this is what leads so many ground pounders to love the Hog so much.

What they miss in the process, though, is that there are plenty of other weapons out there that have PI and CDE numbers just as low as the 30mm, and also have similar precision and weapons effects. Unfortunately, the delivery systems for those other weapons -- UAVs, and Pilatuses, and really tiny bombs coming off Raptors and Strike Eagles and soon-to-be Lightnings -- just aren't as sexy and intimidating as the Hog and the gun. It isn't as psychologically satisfying to have that same weapons effect come from a turboprop buzzing around, or a big remote-coltrolled airplane, or a dinky little bomb dropped miles away or up high by a fighter. Again, the weapon effect is the same, and those other weapons and other platforms can be just as effective at delivering them as the "traditional" aircraft used to create those weapon effects. The retirement of the Hog doesn't leave a gap in capability -- it leaves a gap of method of attaining that capability, which is a loss, granted, but one that is easily compensated for. As has been said many times, there is no one aircraft, no one weapon, that is so singularly capable of anything that it is irreplaceable.

So, long story short: every time someone focuses on a particular platform or a particular weapon, they are totally and completely missing the point.
 
I didn't think of this as focusing on the A10 because it's an A10, but because of he characteristics and capabilities. I got pretty excited when the new COIN aircraft was being discussed. As long as it can go low, slow, loiter, maneuver, carry a load, and survive, that role is covered.

Maybe I'm an old fuddy-duddy, but I think the Army is making by mistake retiring the 58's. That mission needs more Mk1 Eyeballs and fewer microprocessors. I guess I'll wait to see when Axe writes about that. :)
 
This entire issue harkens back to something that a former CSAF, Johnny Jumper, foot-stomped endlessly during his tenure a decade ago: effects, not platforms.

So, long story short: every time someone focuses on a particular platform or a particular weapon, they are totally and completely missing the point.

Exactly. Precisely what I was talking about in another thread awhile back about technology in biz land. "Technology" is just a Greek word that means "tool". All too often (typically for social/emotional reasons) we confuse the tool we are using to do the job with the desired outcome of the job itself. Similarly, all too often we conflate and confuse busy-ness with productivity. ... stupid human tricks.
 
Exactly. Precisely what I was talking about in another thread awhile back about technology in biz land. "Technology" is just a Greek word that means "tool". All too often (typically for social/emotional reasons) we confuse the tool we are using to do the job with the desired outcome of the job itself. Similarly, all too often we conflate and confuse busy-ness with productivity. ... stupid human tricks.

That is also how I see CRM being treated in some corners of the civilian flying world: as the end goal in itself, rather than the means to the end (e.g. safe and efficient operation).
 
As has been said many times, there is no one aircraft, no one weapon, that is so singularly capable of anything that it is irreplaceable.

Completely agreed, as well as with the rest of what you wrote.

So, long story short: every time someone focuses on a particular platform or a particular weapon, they are totally and completely missing the point.

Like the majority of the posts on the "Save the A-10" FB page. Lots of fanboi's there, versus the true factual based arguments (of which there are those too).
 
Back
Top