Flight 232 aftermath

A Life Aloft

Well-Known Member
After reading @MikeD 's comments in the Comair thread, I think his knowledge on this subject and information deserves it's own thread and would make for a very interesting discussion/read. I placed it here in the general forum because it is aviation related obviously, and to garner more views/responses.

I found this report on line:

http://www.aviationfirejournal.com/pdf/ConroyPaper.pdf


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Not sure if it was mentioned or not, but there was a movie made about the fire fighters and what they did in training before the incident, and if I remember correctly, assisted that day.
 
This past month was the four year anniversary of the death of a key player in the UA232 crash in 1989 at Sioux City, Iowa. While retired Capts Al Haynes and Denny Fitch speaking on their experiences on UA232 is very interesting and worthwhile, and gets widespread press; hearing some of the other sides of that tragedy is exceptionally interesting too. During firefighter training when I was a young CFR firefighter in the early '90s, I got to hear retired Chief Master Sergeant James Hathaway, who was the fire chief of the (then) 185th Tactical Fighter Wing fire department/crash rescue speak about the CFR response and challenges faced during the crash of 232. CMSgt Hathaway passed away 4 years ago this past December, two days prior to Christmas.

Lots of lessons learned from that accident from that angle. Even from VERY important things such as the specific CFR response itself, as well as completely failed equipment during the firefighting effort, which the 232 accident highlighted. Chief Hathaway and the 185th TFW Fire Dept to this day hold the record for the largest mass-casuality aircraft accident handled by a USAF fire department. Being that the 185th was a fighter unit flying A-7 Corsairs, the ANG (who handled all CFR/ARFF services for the airport) wasn't tailored for large-frame aircraft operations, and hence only had two crash trucks, a water tender, a rescue vehicle, a structural engine, and a small ramp chemical truck. Sioux City was an ARFF Index B airport under 14 CFR 139, for the largest aircraft being a 737-200 that came in a few times a day. DC-10 fields required ARFF Index D, requiring far more water and foam agent capability, more than double an Index B airport required. 232 crashed before follow-on city structure fire vehicles could get to the scene and be fully staged (most of these were waiting off-airport for a potential off-airport crash), but the bulk of the firefighting effort centered on the two primary ARFF vehicles, the water tender, and the ramp dry-chemical vehicle; as the structural engines weren't designed for aircraft firefighting and instead served as ad-hoc water tenders, following the failure of the USAF water tender due to a previously-unknown mechanical deficiency. The situation was so massive, that Chief Hathaway had the base command post send all available ANG personnel....aircraft maintenance, pilots, clerical, cooks, military police, civil engineers, vehicle maintenance, base operations etc.....to the scene to assist. The fire took 2 hours to extinguish.

In Chief Hathaway's speech from over 20 years ago, I still remember him being haunted by some hard decisions that had to be made at the time by him. One in particular had to do with responding to the accident itself, and its one I've always remembered in any leadership role I've ever maintained. As numerous videos have shown, the DC-10 impacted the runway and immediately began to break-up, strewing passengers all over the runway and taxiway (many still strapped to their seats) as the wreckage travelled down the runway and into a cornfield. As this was occurring, the ARFF trucks began moving out down the runway, and a couple stopped to assist people who had been thrown from the wreckage and were on the runway and severely injured. Chief Hathaway had to yell over the radio at his firefighters to NOT stop and assist, they HAVE to get the firefighting vehicles to the main wreckage and begin creating a foam path for pax onboard to either self-extricate the burning wreckage, or allow firefighters to make a rescue entry. They COULD NOT stop and spend time assisting people thrown from the aircraft.....leave that to the ambulances, police cars, maintenance trucks, or other vehicles who were on the way behind. As there were FAR more injured people strewn all over the runway than there were available ambulances, Chief Hathaway described how his ARFF trucks and his chief truck had to steer around and pass up people who were screaming for help, yet wondering why they were being passed by, by the ARFF crews. One of the toughest calls to have to make, as a number of those who had survived and been thrown from the wreckage and were seen right then alive, were later found dead, or died enroute to the hospital. There were just not enough people to help the massive number of casualities in the immediate aftermath. And the ARFF trucks HAVE to get to the main wreckage to begin firefighting operations, that's their job that has to be done as expeditiously as possible.

RIP CMSgt James Hathaway. Your handling of the 232 accident was a precedent-setting event, and even if there were many challenges and some failures during that crash response, your teaching of the lessons learned to many future generations of ARFF firefighters and command officers are lessons that will never be forgotten, and haven't been forgotten by this one.

One of many riveting images of the accident, then-LtCol Dennis Nielsen...an A-7 fighter pilot from the ANG wing....carries 3 yr old Spencer Bailey to a waiting USAF ambulance. Bailey and his brother survived the accident, while their mother was killed. This snapshot, taken among many, became the centerpiece of a memorial in Sioux City dedicated to the accident.

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For those interested....

One failure that occurred that day that had some major ramifications was a failure in one of the firefighting vehicles, the P-18 water tender (pictured below). The P-18 is a 2000 gallon ARFF water tender which is primarily used as a resupply truck for ARFF crash trucks, as well as having a secondary firefighting capability of its own with water only, as the P-18 doesn't possess a foam capability. Water tenders are exceptionally important vehicles for ARFF use since ARFF crash trucks pump at about 500 gpm, and carry anywhere from 1000 gals to 3000 gals of water. The two ARFF trucks of the 185th, a P-4 crash truck and a P-19 crash truck, contained 1500 gals and 1000 gals of water, respectively; so each only had about 2 minutes of fire suppression capability with the water at full discharge rate, and about another 45 seconds each of Halon 1211 (500 lbs) for the P-19 and 45 seconds or so of Purple-K powder dry chemical for the P-4. After that, the ARFF trucks are dependant on the P-18 to resupply them with water so they can get back to work. The other vehicles available to the 185th CFR dept that day were a P-13 ramp chemical truck with 450 lbs of Purple-K powder dry chemical, and 500 lbs of Halon 1211; and a P-10 rescue truck with 25 lbs of Purple-K dry chemical.

5 months prior to the accident of UA232, there had been a failure of one of the P-18 vehicles during a training operation at Tyndall AFB, FL. It was found that the tank-to-pump water line, a soft-hose, had become blocked by a PVC stiffener that had rotated 90 degrees within the line and in-essence, blocked the water line. The Tyndall AFB fire department determined it to be a failure of that particular vehicle, and they instituted a quick fix for it. However, unknown at the time, there was actually a design deficiency with that tank-to-pump hose and the internal stiffener which was of a small diameter than the hose itself. This problem didn't manifest itself when the truck was pumping at lower pressures, but only at its full 500gpm rate, which wasn't often done nor required, in order to not unduly stress the pump on the truck for just training operations.

Following the crash of 232 when the crash trucks arrived on scene, there were severely injured people strewn over the 1/2 mile of wreckage path that there was. The people who were thrown from the wreckage, as I discussed before, as well as many still trapped in the wreckage itself, were primarily in the wing centerbox section aft to the tail. This section of the wreckage was upside down and on fire, yet there were numerous survivors still trapped inside either hanging in their seats, or on what was now the ceiling of the interior of the upside down wreckage. As the P-4 and P-19 moved in, they began a mass-application of AFFF foam on this portion of the wreckage, knocking down the fire with the foam blanket but not fully being able to extinguish it before running out of foam. The P-19 ran out of foam first and began applying Halon, while the P-4 continued its foam attack while a firefighter from that truck deployed a 1-inch handline and began moving in to attack the portions of the deep-seated fuel fire that the trucks couldnt reach, as well as begin getting survivors out of the wreckage of the forward-center wingbox area; with 10-15 pax being rescued. At this time, the P-18 tender was ordered by Chief Hathaway to proceed forward and resupply the P-4 and P-19. The P-18 firefighter pulled in-between the two ARFF trucks and began hooking 2.5 inch supply lines from the tender to each ARFF truck, however when he opened the tank-to-pump valve and throttled-up the pump to the full 500gpm flow rate to transfer water, nothing happened. The PVC stiffener had rotated under the full pressure of the pump and blocked the tank water line, with the firefighters being unable to realize what was wrong. 8 minutes passed as they tried to rectify the problem.......7 minutes went by with no firefighting going on as the P-4 truck ran out of water and dry chemical (the exceptions being the small P-13 ramp chemical truck still firefighting, and the P-10 rescue truck still attempting rescue ops), and the balance of the time was spent unhooking the P-18 tender from the ARFF trucks, backing it out from the scene, and calling City structural fire trucks forward to transfer their water to the ARFF trucks as now ad-hoc water tenders. By this time, the fire that had been knocked down re-intensified as it cooked off the now-unsupported foam blanket and began to burn intensly, propogating rapidly into the fuselage area where the passengers were still trapped, as fuel began to run into the cabin area. It took a further 2 hours to fully extinguish the fires aboard UA232.

Unfortunately, it was found later that 35 people located in the center wingbox area had survived the accident, but died of smoke inhalation and thermal burns, 24 of them not even having any signs of blunt-force injuries of any type. The rest of the injuries being from blunt-force trauma from either the wreckage itself, or being thrown from the wreckage. Had the problem with the P-18 water tender been known, the ARFF trucks could've been resupplied in a timely manner and the foam blanket supported, keeping the fire knocked down and allowing rescue ops to continue. Unfortunately, this problem wasn't widely known, and weekly tests of the trucks were required to only test their ability to pump, not their ability to pump at full rate. The full rate test was done at the factory pre-delivery, but not done in the field in order to not stress or shorten the life of the water pumps on the trucks. Following investigation of the P-18 fire trucks, it was determined that the internal water-pipe stiffener was too short and of a smaller diameter, allowing it to rotate within the hose itself at very high pressures. Of the 210 P-18 fire trucks the USAF owned, 10 were found to already have this deficiency. Subsequently, the trucks were modified with an internal hose stiffener that was longer and of a 4-inch diameter much more closer to the hose size of the tank-to-pump hose, to prevent this anomaly from ever occurring again.

Pics below....top to bottom: Oshkosh P-4 1500 gal ARFF truck, Oshkosh P-19 1000 gal ARFF truck, Landoll P-10 rescue truck, Dodge P-13 ramp chemical truck, Kovach P-18 ARFF water tender

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In Chief Hathaway's speech from over 20 years ago, I still remember him being haunted by some hard decisions that had to be made at the time by him. One in particular had to do with responding to the accident itself, and its one I've always remembered in any leadership role I've ever maintained. As numerous videos have shown, the DC-10 impacted the runway and immediately began to break-up, strewing passengers all over the runway and taxiway (many still strapped to their seats) as the wreckage travelled down the runway and into a cornfield. As this was occurring, the ARFF trucks began racing down the runway, and a couple stopped to assist people who had been thrown from the wreckage and were on the runway and severely injured. Chief Hathaway had to yell over the radio at his men to NOT stop and assist, they HAVE to get the firefighting vehicles to the main wreckage and begin creating a foam path for pax onboard to either self-extricate the burning wreckage, or allow firefighters to make a rescue entry. They COULD NOT stop and spend time assisting people thrown from the aircraft.....leave that to the ambulances, police cars, maintenance trucks, or other vehicles who were on the way behind. As there were FAR more injured people strewn all over the runway than there were available ambulances, Chief Hathaway described how his ARFF trucks and his chief truck had to steer around and pass up people who were screaming for help, yet wondering why they were being passed by, by the ARFF crews. One of the toughest calls to have to make, as a number of those who had survived and been thrown from the wreckage and were seen right then alive, were later found dead. There were just not enough people to help the massive number of casualities in the immediate aftermath. And the ARFF trucks HAVE to get to the main wreckage to begin firefighting operations, that's their job that has to be done as expeditiously as possible.​

Wow...I can hardly even imagine making that call and living with it. Clearly the fire was their top priority at the time, and they had a job to do, but I can only imagine the feeling when they came back and found some of the survivors had died waiting for help.​
 
They applied Halon? Doesn't that suffocate people in a high enough concentration?

I'm sure Mike will give a more complete answer, but Halon comes in several different forms. Halon 104 is incredibly toxic, which is where most of the horror stories come from. It hasn't been used for decades. Halon 1211 isn't nearly as bad but will displace oxygen, as will CO2. It is more effective at stopping a fire.
 
They applied Halon? Doesn't that suffocate people in a high enough concentration?

I'm sure Mike will give a more complete answer, but Halon comes in several different forms. Halon 104 is incredibly toxic, which is where most of the horror stories come from. It hasn't been used for decades. Halon 1211 isn't nearly as bad but will displace oxygen, as will CO2. It is more effective at stopping a fire.

As Nick said, Halon is incredibly effective at fighting fires, due to the O2 displacement. Where the suffocation factor is highest, is in confined spaces. Halon is generally found in computer centers and buildings, as it leaves no residue. Confined areas are where the major health hazard exists. Used in the open, as many flightline fire bottles are Halon, isn't necessarily an issue with the suffocation hazard, but it somewhat less effective as it gets dispersed easily by any winds or such. However against a fuel fire, it is effective.
 
Wow...I can hardly even imagine making that call and living with it. Clearly the fire was their top priority at the time, and they had a job to do, but I can only imagine the feeling when they came back and found some of the survivors had died waiting for help.

Agree. They have to get the trucks to the wreckage and begin rescue operations there for those in extreme danger, versus neglecting them and tending to the persons who are injured, but aren't in danger of burning alive. It's triage at it's worst, but it's necessary. As an Index B airport, the ARFF services were instantly overwhelmed by the large scope of the mass casualty incident; and I agree with you, they played the hand they were dealt, best they could.
 
I would add that unlike CO2, Halon doesn't rely upon displacing oxygen in order to stop the fire. Even at a low concentration, with plenty of oxygen still available, Halon will still stop a fire through a chemical process.
 
The thing that amazes me about UA232, my old boss was onboard and the way he describes it if you were not familiar you would think it was a simple landing gear failure or similar.
 
I worked with a Flight Attendant who lived in Souix City at the time of the crash. She saw the whole thing unfold as a young teen and said it was a harrowing thing to witness. Everyone thought at the time that all will be well when they saw the DC-10 on approach, and when the crash happened, everyone (the news media and the witnessing public) was in shock.
 
On the concept of ARFF capability at specific airports, and in referring to how Sioux City was an Index B airport, that was rapidly overwhelmed by a full DC-10 that crashed there, which would normally be operating out of an Index D airport with twice the vehicles and equipment/gallonage available; it reminded me of something I've seen lately with airports:

When an airport has a certain ARFF Index level that for whatever level can no longer be met, either permanently or (usually) temporarily; a NOTAM is now put out regarding that limitation. Normally, the problem is a large ARFF truck or two being down or out of service, or even more common, the large water tender goes down or out of service. Some airfield examples I've seen come to mind. Keep in mind that military airfields, not being FAA 14 CFR 139 airfields, have no rated ARFF Index, just a military equivilent :

KDMA:

M0517/13 - FIRE FIGHTING AND RESCUE DOWNGRADED TO 5,300 GALLONS. CONTACT
DAVIS MONTHAN AIRFIELD MANAGEMENT AT 520-228-4315 FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION. 09 DEC 16:47 2013 UNTIL 27 FEB 23:59 2014. CREATED: 09 DEC 16:52
2013

KLUF: (can only do firefighting.rescue for Gulfstream jets or smaller)

RSTD: FIRE FIGHTING AND RESCUE LTD TO C-20 OR SMALLER. CTC AFLD MGT FOR VERIFICATION.

KBAB:

M0443/13 - BEALE AFB MAINTAINS A 24/7 AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING (ARFF) VEHICLE SET 1 (NFPA CATEGORY 1-4) FIREFIGHTING CAPABILITY. FIRE FIGHTING AGENT LEVEL IS MAINTAINED AT 2500 GALS.

BEALE AFB PROVIDES:

OPTIMUM LEVEL OF SERVICE FOR USAF ARFF CATEGORY 1 AIRCRAFT (NFPA CATEGORY 1-4): A-10, BQM-34, C-12, C-21, CV-22, C-38, F-15, F-16, F-22, F-117, HH60, T-1, T-37, T-38, T-6, UH-1, UV18, AND U-2.

REDUCED LEVEL OF SERVICE FOR USAF ARFF CATEGORY 2 AIRCRAFT (NFPA CATEGORY 5) SUCH AS THE C-20.

CRITICAL LEVEL OF SERVICE FOR USAF ARFF CATEGORY 3 THRU 5 AIRCRAFT (NFPA CATEGORY 6 THROUGH 9) SUCH AS AC-130, B-1, C-9, C-22, C-32, C-37, C-40, C-130, E-3, E-8, MH53, T-43, VC-137B-1, B-2, B-52, C-17, C-141, E-3A, KC/EC-135, 767, C-727, E-4, VC-25, MD-11, 747, 777, AND KC-10.

LESS THAN CRITICAL LEVEL OF SERVICE FOR USAF CATEGORY 6 AIRCRAFT (NFPA CATEGORY 10) SUCH AS C-5A, AND C-5B. REFER TO AFPAM 32-2004 TABLE 1 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. 19 NOV 01:31 2013 UNTIL 15 JAN 01:31 2014. CREATED: 19 NOV 01:32 2013

KHMN:

M0007/14 - FIRE FIGHTING AND RESCUE: ARFF IS DEGRADED FOR E-4, MD-11, KC-10, 747/777.
ARFF IS CRITICIAL FOR B-2, C-5, AND VC-25.
CONTACT HOLLOMAN FIRE DEPARTMENT AT DSN 572-7228 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. 07 JAN 15:50 2014 UNTIL 19 MAR 23:59 2014. CREATED: 07 JAN 15:52 2014
 
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