Engine ice and Air Algerie Crash

derg

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Sensor icing likely cause of Air Algerie crash
Apr 7, 2015

Alan Dron
  • The icing of engine power management sensors triggered the stall and fatal crash of Air Algerie flight AH5017 in northwest Africa last July 24, according to an investigation.

    French air accident investigation agency BEA and Mali’s Commission d'Enquêtes Accidents et Incidents de l’Aviation Civile issued the update as the investigation proceeded. A final report is due in December.

    Air Algerie Flight AH5017 from Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to Algiers was being operated by a Spanish wet-lease company Swiftair on behalf of the North African flag carrier with a Boeing MD-83.

    It crashed in the Gossi region of northeastern Mali, killing all 110 passengers and six crew. The flight data recorder has yielded usable information, but the cockpit voice recorder is unreadable.
    The aircraft, EC-LTV, took-off at 01:15 local and climbed uneventfully to its cruise attitude of 31,000 ft., with the crew making several heading changes to fly around a storm cell. The autopilot and the autothrottle were engaged.

    The update stated that, about two minutes after leveling off at 31,000 ft., engine pressure ratio, the main parameter for engine power management, “became erroneous on the right-hand engine and, about 55 seconds later, on the left engine.

    “This was likely due to icing of the pressure sensors located on the engine nose cones. If the engine anti-ice protection system is activated, these pressure sensors are heated by hot air.

    “Analysis of the available data indicates that the crew likely did not activate the system during climb and cruise.”

    The false EPR information transmitted to the autothrottle led it to reduce the engines’ thrust and the aircraft slowed. To compensate, the autopilot commanded an increase in pitch attitude to maintain height.

    Speed dropped from 290 knots to 200 knots over a period of around five minutes and the angle of attack increased until the aircraft stalled.

    About 20 seconds after the beginning of stall, the autopilot was disengaged. The aircraft rolled suddenly to the left until it reached a bank angle of 140 degrees, and a nose-down pitch of 80 degrees. The crew did not initiate any stall recovery maneuvers.

    The investigators add that at least two similar events had occurred in the preceding two years—one involving another of Swiftair’s MD-83s—but with no serious consequences.

    This background, the report stated, “should serve as the basis for future publication of corrective measures aimed at assisting crews in identifying and responding to similar situations.”

    Further work is continuing, in particular to analyze the flight parameters to complete the scenario described above; possible crew reactions; and the training and follow-up of Swiftair crew.
 
So synchronous thrust levers that moved back physically as engine power was decreased went undetected for 5 minutes? If it was an A-bus, people would be all over the stationary thrust levers.


I wonder what the fix will be. A heavy emphasis on using engine anti-ice, or the real crux of the matter: airline pilots aren't getting enough high altitude upset recovery training. Partially because sims aren't set up for this, and partially because it isn't required per the FARs for recurrent training.
 
Remember, engine probes measure EPR. Engines are synched by N1 or N2 on the MD-80 series depending on where you have it set.
 
Yet another stall accident where they were unaware they were in a stall and failed before the event to notice the pitch/power that got them into the situation.
 
Sensor icing likely cause of Air Algerie crash
The aircraft, EC-LTV, took-off at 01:15 local and climbed uneventfully to its cruise attitude of 31,000 ft., with the crew making several heading changes to fly around a storm cell. The autopilot and the autothrottle were engaged.

The update stated that, about two minutes after leveling off at 31,000 ft., engine pressure ratio, the main parameter for engine power management, “became erroneous on the right-hand engine and, about 55 seconds later, on the left engine.

“This was likely due to icing of the pressure sensors located on the engine nose cones. If the engine anti-ice protection system is activated, these pressure sensors are heated by hot air.

“Analysis of the available data indicates that the crew likely did not activate the system during climb and cruise.”

The false EPR information transmitted to the autothrottle led it to reduce the engines’ thrust and the aircraft slowed. To compensate, the autopilot commanded an increase in pitch attitude to maintain height.

Speed dropped from 290 knots to 200 knots over a period of around five minutes and the angle of attack increased until the aircraft stalled.

About 20 seconds after the beginning of stall, the autopilot was disengaged. The aircraft rolled suddenly to the left until it reached a bank angle of 140 degrees, and a nose-down pitch of 80 degrees. The crew did not initiate any stall recovery maneuvers.

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This last winter on climbout in the Northeast I got to experience severe icing in the MD80.... With the anti-ice on airspeed decreased 60KIAS in about 20 seconds requiring reconfiguration of the aircraft. Bar none it was the most nervous 5 minutes I've ever had in an airplane. Our EPR indications were all jacked up, the autopilot initiated a descending left turn before being disconnected, and the FMA went blank. Manually flew out of icing conditions, leveled off, and proceeded to listen to the ice break off for the next 20 minutes or so. EPR indications continued to be erroneous for 30 minutes or so following the event. After landing about 3 hours later there was about an 1/8 of an inch of clear ice on the bottom of the wing. Even though the 80 doesn't like climbing with the heat on I tend to leave it on a little longer than required just to be sure.
I realize my experience is quite different than this case but it serves as a good reminder of why we must not allow ourselves to become complacent.
 
This last winter on climbout in the Northeast I got to experience severe icing in the MD80.... With the anti-ice on airspeed decreased 60KIAS in about 20 seconds requiring reconfiguration of the aircraft. Bar none it was the most nervous 5 minutes I've ever had in an airplane. Our EPR indications were all jacked up, the autopilot initiated a descending left turn before being disconnected, and the FMA went blank. Manually flew out of icing conditions, leveled off, and proceeded to listen to the ice break off for the next 20 minutes or so. EPR indications continued to be erroneous for 30 minutes or so following the event. After landing about 3 hours later there was about an 1/8 of an inch of clear ice on the bottom of the wing. Even though the 80 doesn't like climbing with the heat on I tend to leave it on a little longer than required just to be sure.
I realize my experience is quite different than this case but it serves as a good reminder of why we must not allow ourselves to become complacent.
yowzers.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but on the MD the trim wheel doesn't move during auto trim correct?

If it slowed to 200 and used pitch to maintain altitude, one "what the hell is going on" indication would have been the trim wheel annoying the hell out of you.

I know in the 73 if the trim moves more than a few seconds after getting in cruise it gets four eyeballs moving around quick.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but on the MD the trim wheel doesn't move during auto trim correct?

If it slowed to 200 and used pitch to maintain altitude, one "what the hell is going on" indication would have been the trim wheel annoying the hell out of you.

I know in the 73 if the trim moves more than a few seconds after getting in cruise it gets four eyeballs moving around quick.

There isn't a "wheel" in the 80.... Just an indicator and an aural warning that announces "stabilizer motion".... that being said if it really took 5 minutes for the Air Algerie flight to lose airspeed there is a chance the auto trim system wouldn't have triggered the aural warning (thus giving the pilots a heads up that the trim was moving).
Here are the aural warnings...
 
Yet another stall accident where they were unaware they were in a stall and failed before the event to notice the pitch/power that got them into the situation.

Yup. So how do we fix it? Continue with FAR 121 requirements of controlling an aircraft with a failure of the critical engine at takeoff decision speed, continuing the flight, and coming back hand flown single engine ILS ? Or, rewriting FARs to address the pilots and accident chains of this century? (2000 onwards)
 
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