737 goes down off Hawaii

SlumTodd_Millionaire said:
Most who do it never do it again. It’s apparently quite traumatic.
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yeah, it can grind on you. Having to review surviving HUD tapes and recordings from guys that packed it in is never easy, as you don’t just listen/see them once, it’s constant review of the same thing, especially if trying to identify pertinent background sounds or noises, or trying to time when certain actions occurred or didn’t occur.

One accident, I had to be a witness on, having seen it the instant after it occurred out in the middle of nowhere. Midair collision of two A-10s, one coming off target and the other orbiting high over the target. Hog coming off the target in a 30-40 degree climb, hit the orbiting Hog, ripping the entire nose off the orbiting Hog, everything forward of the pilot’s boots. Instrument panel and all. One instant they were there, the next instant the pilot saw the rudder pedals falling forward out the bottom of the floor where the mangled gun barrels were all that was remaining. He bailed out. A-10 that hit him, that pilot also successfully bailed out. Was a relief at first seeing two chutes, but as the second pilot’s parachute deployed at about 11,000 MSL or so, his lower straps had been unhooked, and he fell from the parachute harness at opening shock, freefalling to earth in a seemingly slow-motion, end over end, flailing tumble as I watched one jet make an arc into the ground, and the other enter an upright spin into the ground. Was the squadron safety guy, but not allowed to work it, both being my unit as well as being a witness. Probably can count on 7 hands the guys I knew who ended up as smoking holes. Usually, they just went out and never came back, just as tragic, but easier to process mentally.
 
1.4 Description of Audio Events

The recording began at approximately 2340:02 and the transcript began at
approximately 0039:14. The portion before the transcript began was summarized,
largely containing ambient noise consistent with various preflight activities with little
to no conversation. The first 40 minutes of the transcript cover a protracted discussion
between the flight crew about various topics including company culture, other
company flight crew members, and previous work experience. The departure briefing
was performed starting at 0114:16 and the engines were started at approximately
0120. The flight received a taxi clearance at 0123:08 and began taxiing shortly
thereafter. The engine start and taxi sequences were interspersed with continuations
of the previous extended discussion.
The flight was cleared for takeoff at 0132:20, began the takeoff roll shortly
thereafter with the first officer flying, and became airborne at approximately 0133:37.
Shortly after the positive rate and gear up calls, several unidentified noises were
heard followed by the crew reacting to a loss of engine power in the number 2
engine. The aircraft continued a climb to approximately 2,000 feet and the captain
took control to allow the first officer to run the appropriate checklists. At 0137:40,
after reaching 2,000 feet, the crew attempted to diagnose the issues, and
subsequently identified the number 1 engine as failed. The crew remained in
constant communication with air traffic control during the flight. The decision to turn
back towards the airport was made at 0139:10 as the aircraft continued a gradual
descent towards the water. Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS)
callouts began at 0141:58 and continued intermittently throughout the remainder of
the recording. The captain returned control to the first officer at 0144:51. Sounds
consistent with impact were noted at 0145:17, and the recording ended shortly
thereafter.
As part of the Safety Board’s accident investigation process, the flight crew was
invited to review the CVR transcript and suggest corrections or additions. They
declined the invitation.
 
she's like...I'm not flying anymore.

right...is that because of the...uh winds?

yeah because of them...(@ [company pilot])...and I'm
like @ [company pilot] you are flying you know? and I
told her okay let's do the taxi checklist and she did all
the stuff she didn't do the control check (I do) and I
go what about the control check * she says I'm not
doing it. ***. @ [company pilot].


I think it's like path of least resistance...I think with her
it's easier than saying * you know just kind of let her
go but that emboldens her just to do more and more.


and now they've got a monster—



yep.





and and then she (gets/just)...went on
strike...complete strike...now she's not doing
anything...you know and she stopped the checklist
you know and she goes I'm not flying. and she just
gave up...I was like @ [company pilot] what's wrong
with you you know? this is very very immature you
know this is...it's not right...you know I mean this is a
joke...I...finish (this/the) checklist...no no no...I said
finish the checklist. no? I said finish the god dang
check list...you're going to finish the
checklist...[chuckle]...no kidding...and then it turned
into shouting and yelling you know?






oooohhh man...if you were um...if you were like
standing in the back in the jumpseat with a camera
you'd be laughing man...you know...you'd be
laughing and be yo-your your (purpose/focus) would
be out of focus you know...you'd be cracking up...you
are two little kids in the cockpit...you know...two little
short brats with a fancy toy...she goes nah I'm not
doing it...I'm not flying this flight...I go well you did all
the briefing...you agreed you are going to fly...you are
staying with that agreement...you are...but one time
out of um...Maui...the same thing she's flying she did
all the briefing and everything...and then we got on
the runway...line up...A-T-C gave us the takeoff
clearance...and I go by...the way don't forget it's one
mile before the turn you know...and then she goes
ugh...I'm not flying...***...she goes I'm not
flying...we're cleared for takeoff and I say you have
control meanwhile the airplane's inching forward and
forward...we've been cleared for takeoff...you're not
flying? we're cleared for takeoff. I'm not flying. okay I
got it...and I do it.




yeah...you know and I go...she went on strike on
me...just striked out on me...you know she stopped
flying...you know...*** and took off



and then we're comin' in...and she's comin' in low you
know and I and I go ** low...and again I don't blame
her too much but this is where I don't agree with
her...we're coming in in the morning and the sun was
in our face...you know...so I figured maybe she cannot
see the the PAPI [precision approach path indicator]
here...so she got below the PAPI and I told her you are
low...and she goes I am not low...and I said you are
low I say look at the glideslope (she said) ***
glideslope...*...well I'm not using the glideslope...I'm
using the the PAPI *** then get back on the PAPI you
know?



and then it turned into an argument and I go @
[company pilot] you know just...use the
glideslope...use the glideslope...screw the PAPI...and
she goes I'm not going to use the glideslope if I
wanted to use the glideslope I would have briefed I-
L-S you know...I said god # @ [company pilot] just just
(add) the glideslope. [trails off into laughter] this is the
way we work when I am with her you know you have
to yell at her force her to do things you know...and
then she got on the glideslope and...after we landed
she said I don't like the way you talk to me I said I don't
like the way you do things...you know...and she goes
if I wanted to use the glideslope I would have briefed
the I-L-S...this turned into one hour argument in the
parking lot...you know after we landed...with @
[company pilot]...and I brought this up with @ [DO] I
said look at what this girl is doing you
know...what...and he was like ehhh yeah...the book
the book is not really clear and...I said this is not the
book this is common sense you know...she is being
blinded by the sun...this is what I think...you
know...and she could not stay on the PAPI...I told her
use the glideslope...that is what we do when you
don't see anything.



you know and she's refusing to do that *** the PAPI
*** and she's arguing that she's (right) *** and she's
not going to ***...I go you're driving me crazy...you
know either way *** @ [company pilot] you need to
change your ways.



no and that just enables her to keep pushing and
pushing and pushing and pushing 'cause nobody's
telling her to stop.



exactly that is the thing.



but then this is the result of that now you have a flight
to go...two flights that don't leave because you have
this thing now it's gonna cost...might cost some extra
money...you know...I heard the boss calling @ [chief
pilot] you know and now he's jumping up and down
'cause the flight's going out late and so @ [owner] got
a phone call and that's why they have a meeting with
her so...



no I don't think they're going to be too sympathetic
to....her not wanting to...you know comin' back with
you on * and that's not a good reason




if she says she doesn't want to fly with me that's fine I
understand...uhh...



she got so upset...she goes turn around take
(me/it) back to the ramp I'm not going...I— I don't I say
(@ [company pilot]/like) if you wanna go back to the
ramp...you taxi the airplane...tell A-T-C you're going
back to the ramp.



if you want to...you you take the airplane...you have to
pretty much take the airplane to the (ramp) and turn
it around...and and you tell A-T-C you're going
back...or better yet open the window and jump
out...you know.



@Derg is this the Delta version of a new FO telling the checkairman CA to "eat a bag of d**ks" ;)
 
Skåning said:
Care to share?
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Roger Roger said:
Yeah I must be dumb bc I don’t see it either
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Ya'll not know how to internet? :)



Honestly, I think he hid it because anti-depressants aren't allowed. I say kudos for him to 'fess up. But - as I've said on JC for years - the ENITRE industry needs to wake up and give pilots with depression a path back to the flight deck.














MR. BRAMBLE: Mr. Ryan did you have something you wanted to say before the interview started?

MR. RYAN: I wanted to make a disclosure that I have two prescriptions that I did not
disclose on my application for my medical.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. What are they?

MR. RYAN: One is Wellbutrin.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RYAN: And the other I don’t remember the name, this one’s for high cholesterol.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Do you recall the dose of those meds?

MR. RYAN: I don’t.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And how often do you take them or did you take them?

MR. RYAN: I haven’t.

MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, you’re not currently taking them?

MR. RYAN: No. I do have a prescription but I’m not taking them.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, all right. Were you taking them in the 72 hours preceding the
accident

MR. RYAN: No.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, is there anything else?

MR. RYAN: No.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Thanks for that. All right.

INTERVIEW OF GREGORY RYAN









24OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE - ATTACHMENT 1 - FLIGHT CREW INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND STATEMENT2620Text/Image View
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Ya'll not know how to internet? :)



Honestly, I think he hid it because anti-depressants aren't allowed. I say kudos for him to 'fess up. But - as I've said on JC for years - the ENITRE industry needs to wake up and give pilots with depression a path back to the flight deck.














MR. BRAMBLE: Mr. Ryan did you have something you wanted to say before the interview started?

MR. RYAN: I wanted to make a disclosure that I have two prescriptions that I did not
disclose on my application for my medical.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. What are they?

MR. RYAN: One is Wellbutrin.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RYAN: And the other I don’t remember the name, this one’s for high cholesterol.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Do you recall the dose of those meds?

MR. RYAN: I don’t.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And how often do you take them or did you take them?

MR. RYAN: I haven’t.

MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, you’re not currently taking them?

MR. RYAN: No. I do have a prescription but I’m not taking them.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, all right. Were you taking them in the 72 hours preceding the
accident

MR. RYAN: No.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, is there anything else?

MR. RYAN: No.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Thanks for that. All right.

INTERVIEW OF GREGORY RYAN









24OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE - ATTACHMENT 1 - FLIGHT CREW INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND STATEMENT2620Text/Image View
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Wellbutrin is also commonly used in smoking cessation treatment. The FAA has been permissive when it’s used for this purpose.

Consider this a public service announcement for those that need to address their secretive tobacco addiction.


Pilots who use the medication to help them quit smoking should not fly within several days of the last dose according to Aeromedical Certification Division of the FAA. You may report the physician visit to get the prescription on your next FAA physical examination, as required. Of particular note, some FAA reviewers and Regional Flight Surgeons may not allow use at all. In some cases, a pilot may even be required to be grounded for 30 days or more following cessation of Zyban. Controllers should clear use with the Regional Flight Surgeon before beginning this medication.

Smoking Cessation and Tobacco Abuse - AMAS

Introduction The use of tobacco is centuries old. Tobacco has been a cash crop in America since the colonial days. The nicotine component in tobacco is a very powerful, rapidly addictive compound and is a prime reason for people continuing to smoke despite a sincere desire to quit. It is also...
www.aviationmedicine.com
 
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Cherokee_Cruiser said:
I hear this a lot, that those who volunteer on ALPA and have to hear CVR recordings get shaken enough a lot, sometimes to the point of almost needing therapy.

I dunno. I think I've heard all the ones publicly on youtube. Maybe I'm just that emotionally-void guy, but I haven't been shaken by them. By far, the worst was the Western DC10 into MEX lining up the wrong runway. The CAs screams at that point are primal-animal screams. That was tough to hear, but I feel like I could do this kind of volunteer work for ALPA and not get shaken up by it. Although I may not be if I had personally known the CA involved. Who knows. I can't say since I haven't walked in the investigators shoes. My hats off to these folks who have to pick up the pieces, put it together, so the rest of us can learn lessons so the industry avoids another accident.
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Agreed. That Western into to MEX is the worst one i‘ve heard by far.
 
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