1500 rule in possible jeopardy

Airmanship is a core competency. CRM is a methodology/technique of using that core competency with another person. CRM it is a component of airmanship; they are not analogs of one another. They are not interchangeable. One is a foundation of the house, the other is the interior design of that house.

Judgment cannot be taught in a classroom. Judgment requires experience, e.g. time actually in an aircraft making decisions and seeing the results/impacts of those actions.
 
Airmanship is a core competency. CRM is a methodology/technique of using that core competency with another person. They are not analogs of one another. They are not interchangeable. One is a foundation of the house, the other is the interior design of that house.

Judgment cannot be taught in a classroom. Judgment requires experience, e.g. time actually in an aircraft making decisions and seeing the results/impacts of those actions.

I'd say the foundations of judgement can be taught in a classroom. As you know, it is taught all the time in the military. When you get to see real world examples of other pilots' problems, decision making, and results it can give pilots exposure to a huge variety of decision making opportunities one probably won't ever see themselves in real life. Of course nothing beats actually doing it yourself and personal experience - I definitely see what you're saying - just wanted to add my two cents.
 
I'd say the foundations of judgement can be taught in a classroom. As you know, it is taught all the time in the military.

Teaching the foundations of decisionmaking -- e.g. OODA and the like -- are not the same as "teaching judgment".

In the USAF, the system is set up to initially provide a highly regulated structure student pilots have to fly in during undergraduate training. Students are not afforded the opportunity to make any decisions, as most everything they'll encounter is covered by a rule or a procedure at this basic level of flying. Knowledge of these rules, and how/why they exist, is an initial framework on which judgment is built. Since students are taught in accordance with a very specific and tightly controlled syllabus, they're not generally exposed to situations that require them to use any real judgment.

Second, we expect the instructors to demonstrate judgment with their instruction and in-flight decisionmaking in scenarios where rules and procedure don't apply. The students are intended to observe those decisions made by their instructors and learn from that observation (with the hopes that they'll mimic those decisions when they're put into similar situations while flying solo.

This is used for about the first 200-250 hours of a pilot's training "career", with the expectation that they've built a solid base through that experience.

As they step up to the next levels in the training pipeline, the strict framework is peeled back little by little. This requires student pilots to start applying the judgment they've learned/observed in the training leading up to that point. Those decisions are critiqued/debriefed and, hopefully, lead to the ability to make more good decisions as the procedural framework is reduced on up the ladder.

Bottom line: you can't have a student read a book or listen to a lecture and learn ADM/judgment. You can learn aspects of it, and look at case studies, but until students actually have to apply it, they're not really learning it.

If this were possible, they'd have long since replaced hours in the airplane with hours simply in the classroom, as it is significantly cheaper than burning kerosene.
 
Teaching the foundations of decisionmaking -- e.g. OODA and the like -- are not the same as "teaching judgment".

In the USAF, the system is set up to initially provide a highly regulated structure student pilots have to fly in during undergraduate training. Students are not afforded the opportunity to make any decisions, as most everything they'll encounter is covered by a rule or a procedure at this basic level of flying. Knowledge of these rules, and how/why they exist, is an initial framework on which judgment is built. Since students are taught in accordance with a very specific and tightly controlled syllabus, they're not generally exposed to situations that require them to use any real judgment.

Second, we expect the instructors to demonstrate judgment with their instruction and in-flight decisionmaking in scenarios where rules and procedure don't apply. The students are intended to observe those decisions made by their instructors and learn from that observation (with the hopes that they'll mimic those decisions when they're put into similar situations while flying solo.

This is used for about the first 200-250 hours of a pilot's training "career", with the expectation that they've built a solid base through that experience.

As they step up to the next levels in the training pipeline, the strict framework is peeled back little by little. This requires student pilots to start applying the judgment they've learned/observed in the training leading up to that point. Those decisions are critiqued/debriefed and, hopefully, lead to the ability to make more good decisions as the procedural framework is reduced on up the ladder.

Bottom line: you can't have a student read a book or listen to a lecture and learn ADM/judgment. You can learn aspects of it, and look at case studies, but until students actually have to apply it, they're not really learning it.

If this were possible, they'd have long since replaced hours in the airplane with hours simply in the classroom, as it is significantly cheaper than burning kerosene.

You know I'm not arguing with you or disagreeing with you, right? Was just making the point of the usefullness of the classroom stuff. That's all. Of course you can't teach judgement in its entirety in a classroom. Forget it, actually - I thought I was just BSing with a peer. I didn't expect a lecture about the basic of basics about how military flight training is structured.
 
didn't expect a lecture about the basic of basics about how military flight training is structured.

Oh, I knew that. I just didn't know what your familiarity with the USAF's system was -- hence the description. I certainly don't know much about the Army's system, unfortunately.
 
The funny part, Mark, is that you've proven my point in your first post. Your entire post is one, big example of pilots not wanting to know objective measurement of their piloting skill. You said it yourself, that "measuring one's airmanship is a HORRIFIC practice", and then go on to explain all of the ways that the airlines train and evaluate around it. You state that as if it is undisputed fact, rather than simply your opinion on the matter.

I don't agree that measurement of individual merit is "horrific". I believe quite the opposite, that measurement of individual merit is crucial to knowing one's individual professional deficiencies. Only when you know your personal limits can you personally try to improve on them. One must be individually capable as an airman before they can be an effective member of a team. And yes, training to the point of failure rather than to the point of adequacy is how you find your limits. If you don't set the bar high, you don't know how high you can jump.

I would think that you, of all people, with your history in NCAA sports, would understand that concept. If one member of the team isn't individually competent, the team can make up for that weak point, but it doesn't advance the capability of the team or ensure there is a solid foundation for that team's performance. By the same token, my guess is that your team also did not set an "acceptable" level of performance and then practice weekly only just hard enough to achieve it.

If the airlines don't feel it is necessary to measure individual merit, and rather want to train and evaluate using all of the techniques you mention, I don't have an objection to that, and that's not my point anyway.

Sure, most airline pilots want to be really good at their job -- I completely agree with your statements on that. Pretty much everyone I know in the airline industry is a proud professional. Unfortunately, that is not an analog to wanting to be objectively highly skilled as an aviator. The mistake, in my opinion, is in the belief that that the skills required to succeed in the airlines are the outermost limits of the continuum of airmanship and skill. Ergo, pilots believing that passing training and successfully operating in the 121 environment is some sort of validation of being at the peak level of airmanship. The (false) belief that success in 121 training and operations is the end-all, be-all of aviation capability.

It isn't.

And -- here's the shocker -- neither is my previous career, either. I'm not claiming some kind of skill high ground here. I am, however, saying that there is a much larger world of aviation achievement out there other than 121 airline operations, and the "objective" measure goes out to those levels and beyond.

giphy.gif



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
The actual root issue in those two accidents is flight discipline. The Fairchild crash was mostly a result of an old culture where flight discipline (e.g. knowing the rules and adhering to them) was ignored by a small group of old graybeards, and the showboating was somewhat tolerated by peer squadronmates. If you read Darker Shades Of Blue or Rogue Pilots, there are excellent analyses of the events leading up to that incident and what happened on that particular day. Since we don't have a CVR, we don't know what was happening in terms of crew coordination before the crash.

While I haven't read the book and I am sure some things were tolerated, this commentary does point to a CRM issue...

On 10 March 1994, Holland commanded a single-aircraft training mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to provide an authorized photographer an opportunity to document the aircraft as it dropped training munitions. The minimum aircraft altitude permitted for that area was 500 feet (150 m) AGL. During the mission, Holland's aircraft was filmed crossing one ridgeline about 30 feet (10 m) above the ground. Fearing for their safety, the photography crew ceased filming and took cover as Holland's aircraft again passed low over the ground, this time estimated as clearing the ridgeline by only three feet (1 m). The co-pilot on Holland's aircraft testified that he grabbed the controls to prevent Holland from flying the aircraft into the ridge while the aircraft's other two aircrew members repeatedly screamed at Holland: "Climb! Climb!" Holland responded by laughing and calling one of the crew members "a [ think cat]".[1]

Furthermore it is disingenuous to say that we don't know what was happening in terms of crew coordination...

After that mission, the crew decided that they would never again fly with Holland and reported the incident to the bomb squadron leadership. The squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark McGeehan, reported the incident to Pellerin and recommended that Holland be removed from flying duty. Pellerin consulted with Holland and gave him an oral reprimand and warning not to repeat the behavior, but refused to take him off flying duty. Pellerin also did not document the incident or the reprimand or notify his superiors, who remained unaware of the incident. McGeehan then decided that in order to protect his aircrews, he (McGeehan) would be the co-pilot on any future missions in which Holland was the command pilot. Evidence suggests that after this incident, "considerable animosity" existed between Holland and McGeehan.[12][13]

The Alaska crash is also a flight D issue, but is much more indicative of the "normalization of deviance" than a CRM issue. Only those of us within AF safety channels have heard what was on that CVR, but we do know that the only comment made leading up to the crash was "okay, lookin' good" stated by the observer just before the stall. There was not a CRM breakdown, there was no disagreement about the maneuvers being performed or the parameters being used. The accident investigation revealed that the demo team had been regularly disregarding bank/G limits. Again, not a CRM breakdown, as the crewmembers were all on board with what was taking place leading up to the crash.

Would you agree that there was show boating by Holland, yet he wasn't stopped? Furthermore, did anyone step up and stop the deviance that lead to the crash in Alaska? Why didn't anyone step up? Just because the only thing said was 'lookin good' doesn't mean that others weren't concerned but simply didn't say anything as they didn't have the CRM/TEM tools given to them to properly express what they were concerned about what was going on. You don't need a disagreement to have a CRM breakdown.

Put frankly, as an outsider this points to the fact that the Air Force hasn't had a good track record of learning from the mistakes and CRM breakdowns of their crews.

Even their top brass doesn't know how to deal with it...

In 2005, the USAF Chief of Safety stated he doubted the Air Force flight mishap rate can be significantly reduced because there aren't widespread common problems. "It seems the cause is just human error."- USAF Chief of Safety, 2005 Source: Air Force Times, Oct 17, 2005, "Aircraft mishaps increase in 2005" p. 16

This a completely moronic thing to say and shows at the upper levels, an understanding of CRM/TEM didn't exist at this time.
 
Last edited:
Put frankly, as an outsider this points to the fact that the Air Force hasn't had a good track record of learning from the mistakes and CRM breakdowns of their crews.

Even their top brass doesn't know how to deal with it...

In 2005, the USAF Chief of Safety stated he doubted the Air Force flight mishap rate can be significantly reduced because there aren't widespread common problems. "It seems the cause is just human error."- USAF Chief of Safety, 2005 Source: Air Force Times, Oct 17, 2005, "Aircraft mishaps increase in 2005" p. 16

This a completely moronic thing to say and shows even at the upper levels, an understanding of CRM/TEM doesn't exist.

Put frankly, as an insider countering the point of view of a person that has never participated in a training program which had to weigh necessity of combat tactics and training vs general safety of flight you don't have enough SA to know what to think.

Your statement of "we can always get better" while beating the drum of crew coordination and cockpit management training misses the greater whole of how and why the military has the mishap rate it does. No amount of cockpit management would have stopped the Cobra that went down when it's transmission seized or the Apache that went down at Campbell last year when it's rotor system had a catastrophic mechanical failure. These were simply make your piece with God events particularly when they occur at the edge of the envelope where we typically have them result in class A accidents (loss of life or 2 million in damage). Same as an airplane/helicopter connecting with the ground in the dark. Can it be stopped, sure if we institute hard deck rules preventing crews from training in that mode but that ignores the requirements for crews to train in that mode so that the first time we have them deal with the stress of nap of the earth flight under FLIR/goggles isn't the same day they also need to worry about getting shot at for he first time or putting live ordnance on target.

Same reason we do combined live fire maneuvers. Yes there is absolutely a risk, but it is mitigated through dry rehearsals and sand table walk throughs until the brass as you called them who accept/decline the mission risk after evaluating all facets of the event are comfortable. And then we do it. And sometimes accidents happen. But it is unfortunately far more useful to lose those lives on rare occasion training to keep the knife sharp vs trying to OJT the stuff in combat. Combat is not the day I want to find out my wingman has a hard time flying down on the deck under system and instead goes high enough to get us tracked and shot down.

But you trying to play a "my point of view is superior" by applying a linear metric of accident rate when the military flight training program has entirely different goals from any 121 program is just ignorant.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Last edited:
Soon I will be based somewhere interesting, so I will have to get out more. But that also depends on my schedule since two people in my upgrade class just quit.
 
That's intriguing.
Meh. One just got married and bought a house up here and didn't want to commute, so they went to Empire as a street captain. The other one has been trying to get home to Michigan and finally got a job there. So n it's nothing really shocking.
 
I can't believe I'm getting involved in this discussion, but I find this interesting...
...
I would say the Captain handled this wrong. Again, both crew members and fully trained and qualified to handle the emergency. The Captain taking the controls is nothing but an ego move and screams bad CRM to me. You're a Captain because your seniority number is higher, not because you're the better pilot.
I believe Capt Sully Sullenberger did this exact thing. He was pnf when the emergency happened, and took over flying. Did he do it wrong, in your opinion?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549
 
Back
Top