Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
Oh, I shall!8 hour reduced rest notwithstanding, would you feel more rested after 1 night at home or 1 night in a hotel (assuming equal sleep/wake times and responsibilities on either end)? I know I feel more rested after a night at home. Now I have less or those. But hey, I was gifted 32 hours in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Please, examine my head.

Re: "Our pairings are bad, and I feel bad:" I know. As I understand things, the Shiny Jet side of the company has a lot of the same sort of nonsense going on. I didn't say the transition would be smooth or immediate, but I still believe this is a win.
My job, first and foremost, is safety. This is a tremendous safety win. The Industry(tm) will figure it out. Indeed, the new rules offer some opportunities to be frighteningly efficient as long as your pairing builders can get enough on the ball to make it happen.
The NTSB has repeatedly chided commuter/regional operations about fatigue:
(Acey 2311)[Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc.] scheduled reduced rest periods for about 60 percent of the layovers in its day-to-day operations. The Safety Board believes that this practice is inconsistent with the level of safety intended by the regulations, which is to allow reduced rest periods as a contingency to a schedule disruption, and has the potential of adversely affecting pilot fitness and performance.
(Corporate 5966, emphasis added for emphasis. These guys would have been pumpkins under the new rules.)[F]actors that facilitate the development of fatigue in the accident pilots included the length of their duty day and the type of flying throughout that day (and the previous two days). At the time of the accident, it had been more than 15 hours since the pilots' last significant sleep period, and they had been on duty for 14 1/2 hours. ... Additionally, the pilots' high workload during their long day may have increased their fatigue. The accident occurred during the sixth flight segment of the day while the pilots were performing a nonprecision approach in low ceilings and reduced visibility. The pilot deficiencies observed in this accident could be consistent with fatigue impairment...consistent with the degrading effects of fatigue, the captain made a risky decision to continue the approach based on inadequate visual cues...The Safety Board concludes that, on the basis of the less than optimal overnight rest time available, the early reporting time for duty, the length of the duty day, the number of flight legs, the demanding conditions encountered during the long duty day (and the two previous days) it is likely that fatigue contributed to the pilots' degraded performance and decision-making.
Then there's Colgan 3407, the entirety of the accident report I won't repeat here. And that's just stuff from the low/slow/no-dough side. Fatigue kills and it's been sixty years since the FAA has done anything about it.
This is about safety. I'm on board. Your company will adjust--so will mine. And we'll be awake for all of it.
I agree with @Firebird2XC, in other words:
So if this is tl;dr, read his post.The industry will try to make a crap sandwich out if this even if only to pout on losing the battle.
Things will get better.
